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Taiwanese people are committed to the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. 
Nowadays, according to the rating posted on the Freedom House website, Taiwan is considered 
one of the world’s free countries and is among the best in providing political rights and civil 
liberties.  Knowing this current state, it is hard to believe that the small island was under a period 
of martial law lasting for 38 years in the middle of the twentieth century.   
Tremendous progress and transition in Taiwanese politics and society has happened after 
democratization. One significant change is the progression of the right to freedom of speech. The 
right to free expression in Taiwan is strongly guaranteed now, compared to the active censorship 
of expression under martial law before Taiwan became a democracy. However, any regulation of 
hate speech is still notably missing in Taiwan’s legal system. As a system in an emerging 
democratic country, the current Taiwanese legal system does not have any law specifically for 
hate speech unless the speech relates to an individual victim. Courts at all levels in Taiwan have 
usually given ample protection for people to comment on public affairs or issues, including the 
media commenters using hate speech. However, possible problems with hate speech still exist in 
Taiwan. These forms of speech have become specific issues in Taiwan. However, the current 
system fails to resolve the above problems. 
After democratization, Taiwan underwent a rapid democratic and progressive societal 
change based on importing parts of legal systems from Western democratic countries and 
adapting them to form Taiwan’s own approach. Therefore, considering other countries’ strategies 
is useful in making the constitutional argument to find the appropriate approach in dealing with 
hate speech in Taiwan. Some democratic governments have strict limits or punishments for hate 
speech. Two different political models are usually discussed for hate speech regulations: 
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“militant democracy” and “liberal democracy.”  Most of the European approaches, including 
Germany, are based on the militant democracy theory, while the United States is a liberal 
democracy. The different approaches in Germany and the United States show the diverse 
attitudes countries may hold toward the limitations imposed on hate speech. 
The motivation of this dissertation is to uncover whether hate speech undermines 
democracy under the perspective of comparative constitutional law. This article will compare 
freedom of speech rights in some democratic countries, such as the United States, Germany, 
South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights, and consider the standard set by 
international organizations to understand why they have a diverse approach to regulating or not 
regulating hate speech. This dissertation will also consider how the new approach could resolve 
or alleviate the hate speech problems in Taiwan. I will make a constitutional design argument to 
find the appropriate method to deal with hate speech in Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION 
Taiwanese people are committed to the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. 
This country only underwent the democratization process a little over thirty years ago. There is 
not an exact date at which Taiwan converted to democracy, but a political transition through 
multiple decades. However, the 1986 and 1987 political reform were recognized as the milestone 
of Taiwanese democratization, which included a free press and lifting bans on new political 
parties and street protests in 1986, as well as the end of the martial law period in 1987.2  
The democratization in Taiwan seems to have been successful so far.3 Nowadays, according 
to the rating posted on the Freedom House website,4 Taiwan is considered one of the world’s 
free countries and is among the best in providing political rights and civil liberties.5 Knowing 
this current state, it is hard to believe that the small island was under a period of martial law 
lasting for 38 years in the middle of the twentieth century.6 Tremendous progress and transition 
in Taiwanese politics and society has happened after democratization. One significant change is 
the progression of the right to freedom of speech. The right to free expression in Taiwan is 
strongly guaranteed now, compared to the active censorship of expression under martial law 
before Taiwan became a democracy.7  
 
2 See REUTERS, Timeline: Taiwan's Road to Democracy (Dec. 13, 1:07AM, 2011), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-timeline/timeline-taiwans-road-to-democracy-
idUSTRE7BC0E320111213.  
3 Chris Horton & Austin Ramzy, Asia's Bastion of Free Speech? Move Aside, Hong Kong, It's Taiwan Now, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/asia/china-taiwan-hong-kong-free-
speech.html.  
4 Freedom House is a non-profit non-governmental organization (NGO) to perform research and advocate 
democracy and human rights since 1941. It mainly receives founding from the US government. Freedom House 
provides “Freedom in the World” surveys since 1973. The researching data offers standards to evaluate political 
rights and civil liberties in all countries in the world. See FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/ (last visited 
May 17, 2020).  
5 FREEDOM HOUSE, Taiwan, https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2020 (last visited May 17, 
2020).  
6 THE NEW YORK TIMES, Taiwan Ends 4 Decades of Martial Law (Jul. 15, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-Decades-of-martial-law.html.  
7 FREEDOM HOUSE, Taiwan, supra note 5. 
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However, any regulation of hate speech is still notably missing in Taiwan’s legal system. As 
a system in an emerging democratic country, the current Taiwanese legal system does not have 
any law specifically for hate speech unless the speech relates to an individual victim, in such 
cases it would label as “criminal threatening,”8 “fighting words,”9 and “defamation.”10 Courts at 
all levels in Taiwan have usually given ample protection for people to comment on public affairs 
or issues, including the media commenters using hate speech. However, possible problems with 
hate speech still exist in Taiwan: speech that demonstrates the tension and conflict between 
ethnic groups or national identities, speech that denies or downplays the past human rights 
violation, speech that challenges Taiwanese democracy, promotes dictatorship to threat the “free 
democratic order,”11 or promoting a war, and statements that spread hatred toward LGBTQ 
minorities. These forms of speech have become specific issues in Taiwan. However, the current 
system fails to resolve the above problems. 
After democratization, Taiwan underwent a rapid democratic and progressive societal 
change based on importing parts of legal systems from Western democratic countries and 
adapting them to form Taiwan’s own approach. Therefore, considering other countries’ strategies 
 
8 Article 305 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “A person who threatens to cause injury to the life, body, 
freedom, reputation, or property of another and thereby endangers his safety shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
not more than two years, short-term imprisonment, or a fine of not more than three hundred yuan.” HSING FA 
[Criminal Code] art. 305 (Taiwan). An English version of Criminal Code of the Republic of China (Taiwan) is 
available on Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China (Taiwan), available at 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=C0000001 (last visited May 23, 2020). 
9 Article 309 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “A person who publicly insults another shall be sentenced 
to short-term imprisonment or a fine of not more than three hundred yuan. A person who by violence commits an 
offense specified in the preceding paragraph shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one-year, short-
term imprisonment, or a fine of not more than five hundred yuan.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 309 (Taiwan). 
10 Article 310 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “A person who points out or disseminates a fact which 
will injure the reputation of another for purpose that it be communicated to the pubic commits the offense of slander 
and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year, short-term imprisonment, or a fine of not more 
than five hundred yuan.” However, the article also rules that “A person who can prove the truth of the defamatory 
fact shall not be punished for the offense of defamation unless the fact concerns private life and is of no public 
concern.” To offer a clause to waive the speaker’s criminal liability. HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 310 (Taiwan). 





is useful in making the constitutional argument to find the appropriate approach in dealing with 
hate speech in Taiwan. Some democratic governments have strict limits or punishments for hate 
speech.12 For example, many countries ban racist speech, regardless of those countries being 
common law or civil law systems.13 Two different political models are usually discussed for hate 
speech regulations: “militant democracy” and “liberal democracy.”14 Most of the European 
approaches, including Germany, are based on the militant democracy theory, while the United 
States is a liberal democracy. The different approaches in Germany and the United States show 
the diverse attitudes countries may hold toward the limitations imposed on hate speech. 
Compared to most democratic countries in the world, the United States values freedom of 
speech more strongly, as laid out in the First Amendment of the Constitution. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that limiting hate speech based on race, ethnic, or gender constitutes 
viewpoint discrimination against speakers.15 Thus, hate speech in the United States is allowed. 
“Liberal democracy”16 is the core of the US political theory, which emphasizes the right to 
freedom of speech. The Taiwanese social situation changed after democratization, and 
individualism and freedom of speech are now deeply rooted in the Taiwanese people’s mindsets 
and in Taiwanese society. The decisions from the Taiwanese Constitutional Court have also 
 
12 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 8 (2012). 
13 The purposes include “those designed to safeguard public order,” and “those aimed at protecting human dignity.” 
See Jeannine Bell, Restraining the Heartless: Racist Speech and Minority Rights, 84 IND. L.J. 963, 976 (2009). 
14 See Ruti Teitel, Militating Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 49 (2007). 
15 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
16 Ruti Teitel describes Liberal democracy as follows: “the United States and its constitutional system have offered a 
competing jurisprudential model, namely, a constitutional scheme in which rights are framed and protected in a 
radically individualist fashion. The U.S. Constitution makes no reference to collectivist goals, such as political or 
cultural survival, which are asserted both in the post-war European constitutions, as well as in the European 
Convention rights scheme. Insofar as there is a formulation of the constituent value, one might say that the U.S. 
Constitution is framed in individual rights terms, subject to certain limits related to state police power or compelling 
state interests.” Teitel, Militating Democracy, supra note 14, at 67. 
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shifted the freedom of speech model from the German militant democracy’s17 to the US liberal 
democracy’s;18 hence, the United States is also a good model for Taiwan to consider. 
In contrast, the theory of militant democracy supports different approaches from the United 
States model. The first valuable militant democracy approach for Taiwan may be the German 
hate speech approach. The German system may have one of the strictest restrictions on hate 
speech, which criminalizes hate speech, narrows protections on freedom of speech and punishes 
statements supporting the Nazis and denying the Holocaust.19 Article 1 of the German Basic Law 
states that “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
state authority.”20 Human dignity is at the core of the German Constitution. Section 130 of the 
Federal Criminal Code is significant as a regulation of hate speech, punishing “disturbing the 
public peace, inciting hatred or assaulting the human dignity of others.”21 Also, the statute rules 
that when someone “denies or downplays” the acts committed under the Nazi regime, or 
 
17 Taiwanese Justices held that the “freedom of democratic order” is the boundary of constitutional modification in a 
Taiwanese Justice’s Decision, See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 499 (司法院大法官第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 499] (Mar. 24, 2000) (Taiwan). The finding follows the same concept as the German militant 
democracy system that recognizes a fundamental value in the Constitution and acknowledges the group focus on 
rights. This holding seems to indicate that the Taiwanese Constitution is closer to the German approach. English 
versions of All Judicial Yuan Interpretations are available on Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan), available at https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/en-us/jep03 (last visited May 23, 2020). 
18 However, in Interpretation No. 644, the Taiwanese Justices held that to advocate Communism or the partition of 
the national territory is constitutional, until the speech causes a “clear and present danger.” See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan 
Jieshi No. 644 (司法院大法官第 644 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 644] (Jun. 20, 2008) (Taiwan). 
19 Anna Sauerbrey, How Germany Deals with Neo-Nazis, THE WASHINGTON POST. (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/opinion/germany-neo-nazis-charlottesville.html. 
20 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 1: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art 1 (Ger.) 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ (last visited May 23, 2020). 
21 Germany, Federal Criminal Code, Section 130(1)&(2): “Whosoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public 
peace, incites hatred against a national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origins, against 
segments of the population or individuals because of their belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or 
segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them; Whosoever assaults the human 
dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning an aforementioned group, segments of the population or 
individuals because of their belonging to one of the aforementioned groups or segments of the population, or 
defaming segments of the population. Whoever, in public or in an assembly, approves, denies or minimizes an act 
described in genocide committed under National Socialism, in a manner which is liable to disturb the public peace.” 
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 1&2. Cited from Winfried Brugger, Ban on or Protection of 
Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German and American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 5-6 (2002). 
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“violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist 
rule of arbitrary force,”22 these are all hate speech statements and criminal offenses. The German 
constitution is based around militant democracy. Militant democracy is a significant 
characteristic of German political theory, which holds that individual rights should not destroy 
the free democratic basic order.23 The German approach not only limits hate speech, but also 
recognizes denying historical oppression and challenging the democratic order as hate speech. 
Therefore, the approach is valuable to Taiwan as a model to deal with historical oppression and 
to protect the institution of democracy. 
Another example of militant democracy is the regulation of hate speech in South Africa. 
Article 16 of the South African Constitution rules that its citizens have the right to freedom of 
expression. However, three types of speech are specifically not guaranteed by the constitution, 
including “propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and advocacy of hatred that is 
based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes an incitement to cause harm.”24 
Also, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, so-called the 
Equality Act, is the other relevant speech regulation  on the statutory level. The Equality Act 
prohibits “unfair discrimination, hate speech, and harassment, particularly on the grounds of 
race, gender, and disability.”25 Furthermore, the legislature of South Africa is drafting the 
 
22 Germany, Federal Criminal Code, Section 130(3)&(4): “(3) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, 
denies or downplays an act committed under the rule of National Socialism of the kind indicated in section 6 (1) of 
the Code of International Criminal Law, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be liable to 
imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine. (4) Whosoever publicly or in a meeting disturbs the public peace in 
a manner that violates the dignity of the victims by approving of, glorifying, or justifying National Socialist rule of 
arbitrary force shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.” Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] 
[Criminal Code] § 130, para. 3&4. Cited from id. 
23 Bradley A. Appleman, Hate Speech: A Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the United States and Germany, 
14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 422, 428-429 (1996).  
24 Constitution of South Africa, Section 16(2): “(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to a) propaganda for 
war; (b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or 
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.” S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2), available at 
https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1 (last visited May 23, 2020). 
25 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
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Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill to restrict hate crime and hate 
speech.26 The approach toward hate speech in South Africa may be valuable to Taiwan because 
South Africa is a newly emerging democracy and has a similar history to Taiwan, and the 
countries share the constitutional values of human dignity and militant democracy.  
Furthermore, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that the right to 
dignity and the right to equality should be guaranteed.27 Two international covenants, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), require prohibiting hate 
speech and racism. Although not a member of the United Nations, Taiwan has repeatedly 
attempted to unilaterally ratify two United Nations covenants: the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The Taiwanese Congress has passed acts to implement the two covenants in local 
contexts.28 Therefore, from the perspective of transnational constitutionalism, an international 
organization may offer another perspective from which Taiwan can consider hate speech issues. 
The motivation of this dissertation is to uncover whether hate speech undermines 
democracy under the perspective of comparative constitutional law. This article will compare 
 
2000 [hereinafter Equality Act] Section 2: “The objects of this Act are (c) to provide for measures to facilitate the 
eradication of unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment, particularly on the grounds of race, gender and 
disability.” Equality Act § 2 (S. Afr.), available at https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-004.pdf (last 
visited May 23, 2020). 
26 See the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill (S. Afr.), available at 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/bill/9febb155-8582-4a15-bf12-5961db2828c2.pdf (last 
visited May 23, 2020).  
27 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), Art. 1, available at 
https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited May 23, 2020). 
28 English versions of both Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights & the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are available on Laws & Regulations Database of 
the Republic of China (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=I0020028 
(last visited May 23, 2020). 
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freedom of speech rights in some democratic countries, such as the United States, Germany, 
South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights, and consider the standard set by 
international organizations to understand why they have a diverse approach to regulating or not 
regulating hate speech. This dissertation will also consider how the new approach could resolve 
or alleviate the hate speech problems in Taiwan. I will make a constitutional design argument to 
find the appropriate method to deal with hate speech in Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS HATE SPEECH? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hate speech does not have a single definition.29 The narrowest definition of hate speech is 
speech expressing hatred for a specific group whose members share the same characteristics.30 
However, a variety of approaches to defining hate speech exist in different countries. Similarly, 
there is no consensus among scholars on a single definition of hate speech. However, by 
reviewing different approaches, principles and frameworks of hate speech, a working definition 
can be identified. Also, hate speech can be limited by who is protected and what speech is 
limited. In this chapter, I will try to provide my principles and frameworks of defining hate 
speech. 
II. HATE SPEECH AND GROUP LIBEL 
The following are some of the widely accepted views of hate speech and they are useful to 
know about when drafting and creating hate speech regulations. One approach to frame hate 
speech is to focus on the element of group libel. The function distinguishes hate speech from 
individual defamation. Jeremy Waldron uses group libel to describe hate speech. Waldron 
illustrates section 130 of Germany's Penal Code as an example of a group libel statute,31 which 
punishes defaming a group’s human dignity. In his view, group libel is a legal term to describe 
hate speech regulation. Waldron further explains that hate speech is an opinion from one group 
 
29 Bell, Restraining the Heartless, supra note 13, at 963-964. 
30 Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, General Introduction: Free Speech, Democracy, and the Suppression of Extreme 
Speech Past and Present, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 1, 4 (Hare, Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 
2009). 
31 Jeremy Waldron mention that, “In many countries, a different term or set of terms is used by jurists: “group libel” 
or “group defamation.” Sometimes this is how the legislation describes itself; it is the terminology used, for 
example, in section 130 of Germany's Penal Code, prohibiting “attacks on human dignity by insulting, maliciously 
maligning, or defaming part of the population.” In other countries, “group libel” and “group defamation” are terms 
used in judicial doctrine and among lawyers to describe restrictions of the kind we would call hate speech 




in a community that recognizes members of another group as not worthy of equal citizenship.32 
Also, Alexander Tsesis excludes speech to individuals from his definition of hate speech as 
well.33 In a similar vein, Robert Post recognizes that hate speech undermines a communal norm, 
so-called human dignity. Dignity is not merely subjective but is based on the claims of members 
in a community. Post points out that cultures would establish institutions such as schools and 
laws to offer authoritative interpretations of norms.34 Thus, the hate speech regulation is a kind 
of authoritative interpretation of a norm. The hate speech regulation, under Post’s definition, is 
based on a cultural or group-based communal norm.  
Some countries include group libel in their statutory definition of hate speech. The Criminal 
Code of Canada prohibits speech related to “hatred against any identifiable group;”35 the Danish 
Penal Code restricts any speech in which “a group of people is threatened, derided or degraded;” 
36 and the Federal Criminal Code of Germany rules that hate speech is prohibited against “a 
national, racial, religious group or a group defined by their ethnic origins.”37 The Criminal Code 
of Germany takes special care to call out National Socialism in sections 130(3) and (4).38 The 
clause protects the dignity of the Jewish people. In my view, hate speech targets a group’s human 
 
32 Id.at 1601. 
33 ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, 211 (2002). 
34 Robert C. Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123, 129 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 
2009). 
35 Canada, Criminal Code 1985, Section 319(1): “(1) Everyone who, by communicating statements in any public 
place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is 
guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence 
punishable on summary conviction.” Criminal Code 1985 § 319(1) (Can.). Cited from WALDRON, THE HARM IN 
HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 236 n.8. 
36 Denmark, Penal Code, Article 266(1): “(1)Any person "who, publicly or with the intention of wider 
dissemination, makes a statement or imparts other information by which a group of people are threatened, insulted 
or degraded on account of their race, color, national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual inclination shall be liable to 
a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.” Penal Code ch.27 § 266(1) (Den.). Cited from id. 
37 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 1&2. Cited from Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate 
Speech? supra note 21, at 5-6. 
38 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 3&4. Cited from id. 
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dignity. It is different from individual defamation. However, hate speech might be broader than 
libel. It includes insulting, maliciously maligning, or other negative receptions. 
III. WHO IS PROTECTED? 
1. The term “minority” 
If hate speech is group libel, how do we define the protected group? Scholars have 
sometimes used minorities to identify protected groups. For example, Tsesis, Jeremy Waldron, 
Mari Matsuda, Jeannine Bell, Richard Delgado, and Jean Stefancic have all used minorities to 
describe protected groups in their books or articles.39 The “minority” seems to be an ideal term to 
define potential victims of hate speech.  
Nevertheless, I argue that only taking into account minorities may not be the best way to 
describe this demographic. Minorities could be linked with the minorities in the population. In 
the United States, it would be true that the oppressed groups in history were most typically the 
minorities in the population. The supporters of restrictions on hate speech are usually a distinct 
minority and from oppressed communities, such as people of color or the LGBT community.40 
This oppression could be due to the power structure in US history such that straight, white males 
with economic power hold power over both groups. But South Africa showed a contrary 
example: the white minority governed the black majority in the past and deprived the black 
people of their rights. Another complicating example is the history of hate speech toward 
women. Women are not a minority in the population, but sometimes they are included in the 
classification of hate speech definitions. The Human Rights Watch defines hate speech as “any 
 
39 See TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: 
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 
12; Bell, Restraining the Heartless, supra note 13; RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
AN INTRODUCTION (2017). 
40 MARI MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE, RICHARD DELGADO, & KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2019). 
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form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete 
minorities, and women.”41 Moreover, it is not only the minorities in the population who could be 
weakened and placed under oppression. For example, the state of Mississippi made a law 
designating law enforcement as one of the protected groups in its hate crime act.42 But law 
enforcement is not weak or under oppression.  
So how can we find a better term to define a group for hate speech definitions? John Hart 
Ely’s book Democracy and Distrust might offer an appropriate solution. Ely emphasizes 
discreteness and insularity, which was held by the US Supreme Court in case United States v. 
Carolene Products Co. in 1938,43 as a key point to use when defining a minority.44 A discrete 
and insular group is powerless to defend themselves through the political process.45 In his view, 
although women may not be a minority in the population, they still have been “operating at an 
unfair disadvantage in the political process.”46 The historical oppression of women in the US 
renders them a discrete and insular group. 
2. Historical oppression and hate speech 
In my view, the perspective of historical oppression is a more important factor than the 
picture of a minority in the population. Tsesis argues that a protected group could be defined as 
“members of historically oppressed racial and ethnic groups, the outgroups”47 He uses three 
 
41 Bell, Restraining the Heartless, supra note 13, at 963-964. 
42 Katarina Luketich, Crimes against Law Enforcement Are Hate Crimes in Mississippi, Alabama Considers Harsher 
Penalties, WKRG NEWS 5 (May 10, 2019), https://www.wkrg.com/state-regional/crimes-against-law-enforcement-
are-hate-crimes-in-mississippi-alabama-considers-harsher-penalties/. 
43 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 145 (1938). 
44
 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-170 (1980).  
45 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 145 (1938). 
46 ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 44, at 164-165. 
47 However, he used the term minorities a lot of times in his book as well. He used both terms interchangeably in his 
writing. His theory claims that hate speech results in “institutional inequalities TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, 
supra note 33, at 101-102 (2002). 
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historical oppressions, including the Holocaust, American slavery, and the Indian Removal, to 
prove his hypothesis: hate speech results from systematic persecution in human history. 
Tsesis mentions that German society cleaved to the idea that Jewish people were “vermin, 
unworthy of life and requiring fumigation”48 before the Nazis persecuted them. In America, the 
supporters of slavery believed that black people’s abilities were lesser than whites’, such that 
African Americans should live under white people’s ruling.49 Before the Indian Removal, the 
public opinion in US society was that the Indians were the enemy of God. The disease, which the 
Indians met, was the Puritans’ weapon.50 Accordingly, those destructive messages would cause 
bias toward specific minorities and result in mass persecution.  
Additionally, Tsesis emphasizes a theory: the social psychology of scapegoating. He points 
out: “A racist society may actually promote bigotry in order to unite ingroup members and 
distract them from real political and economic problems by sacrificing a historical scapegoat.”51 
When minorities refuse the majorities’ values and community regulations, the majorities feel 
anger and force the minorities to follow its orders.52 Although some have disagreed with Tsesis’s 
causal theory,53 the link between historical oppression and hate speech cannot be denied. 
 
48 Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech the Regulation of Hate Speech in A Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
497, 505-506 (2009). 
49 Id. at 506. 
50 TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 53. 
51 Id. at 85. 
52 Id. at 105-106. 
53 Nevertheless, Anuj Desai disagreed with Tsesis causal theory. Desai responded to Tsesis’s point of view by using 
a very critical perspective. Desai challenged Tsesis’s hypothesis, hate speech causes persecution, by mentioning that 
the causal relationship between racism and slavery is still an argument in the history profession and that economics 
might be the real cause of slavery, which then triggers racism. It is a “chicken-egg” debate without much-supporting 
evidence. In addition, Desai pointed out that Tsesis’sproposal to ban hate speech is aimed to avoid systeic 
persecution. However, the example of oppression that Tsesis used to support his point, the Holocaust, was not 
persuasive evidence because both Imperial and Weimar Germany had hate speech regulations, and they failed to 
stop the bias and persecution from happening in the following years. Tsesis’sclaim seems to hold that “hate speech 
was a necessary condition for Holocaust” but lacks logical connection. Thus, it was useless to rely on a hate speech 
ban to avoid systemic persecution. Anuj C. Desai, Attacking Brandenburg with History: Does the Long-Term Harm 
of Biased Speech Justify A Criminal Statute Suppressing It? 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 353, 366-370 (2003). 
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Jeremy Waldron argues a similar point about historical association with hate speech 
regulation.54 He argues that no matter how much the European countries and the United States 
developed, their hate speech theories were strongly related to their past acts of oppression, such 
as Nazism, the Holocaust, racism, or segregation.55 Also, Mari Matsuda uses the phrase “a 
historically subjugated group” in her article to discuss the protected group as well. She mentions 
the structural domination between different groups.56 
Jeannine Bell makes a similar argument. She described hate speech in the United States as 
“racist speech, anti-gay and anti-religious speech.”57 She adds that the victims of hate speech are 
mostly those who “lack social power, and are frequently discrete and insular minorities, and have 
been historically discriminated against.”58 Her definition is based on the cases and data research 
in the United States. The protected groups have more particular descriptions, including being the 
minorities in the population, having less social power, and being historically discriminated 
against.  
In sum, for my purposes, hate speech only targets a discrete and insular group, not an 
individual. Additionally, I argue that simply being a minority group is not enough to be defined 
as a protected group for hate speech regulation. I contend that the group that can be defined this 
way has been historically oppressed. Therefore, hate speech regulation should protect a discrete 
and insular group or a group that has been historically oppressed. 
 
54 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1634-1635. 
55 Id. at 1634-1635. 
56 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2361-2362. 




IV. SCOPE OF HATE SPEECH REGULATIONS 
Hate speech targets to a historically oppressed, discrete, or insular group. However, not all 
speech expressing hatred is protected by hate speech regulation. Hate speech regulation has a 
scope. Mari J. Matsuda mentions that the hateful expression could be “violence and genocide; 
racial hate messages, disparagement, and threats; overt disparate treatment; and covert disparate 
treatment and sanitized racist comments.”59 What are the options for limitations on the scope of 
hate speech? Form? Reception? Violence? Possible options are as follows.  
First, hate speech regulation only limits a specific form. If the definition does not limit types, 
the application may be too broad. For example, Tsesis’s definition of hate speech is antisocial 
oratory that persecutes people for “their race, color, religion, ethnic group, or nationality.”60 His 
description is broader than previous ones because it would include any statement relating to “the 
culture of racial and ethnic stratification.”61 Tsesis does not clearly distinguish hate speech from 
the following three terms: “hate propaganda,” “destructive messages,” and “biased speech.” No 
intention of hatred is required in his definition.62  
Anuj C. Desai critiques Tsesis’sdefinition as too vague to separate speech “uttered as an 
expression of opinion on a neutral scientific, academic, or religious subject, intended to incite 
persecution, or intended to promote destructive behavior.”63 Desai says: “After all, if Chaucer, 
Shakespeare, and Dickens constitute proscribable ‘hate speech,’ Tsesis’s argument amounts to 
the creation of a substantial police state, excising large chunks of our cultural heritage, not to 
mention popular culture. Modern day book burnings would be trivial in comparison.”64 I agree 
 
59 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2332.  
60 Desai, Attacking Brandenburg with History, supra note 53, at 358-361. 
61 Id. at 358-361. 
62 Id. at 358-361. 




that the forms of hate speech could be narrowed to avoid punishing the expression of opinions on 
a neutral scientific, academic, or religious subject. Also, Matsuda recognizes that some symbols, 
like the Swastika, could themselves show hatred toward oppressed groups, so the symbols are 
also used as hate speech.65 
Secondly, I would like to emphasize reception. In Robert Post’s argument, the types of 
expression used are the other important part of defining hate speech. Thus, the current hate 
speech regulations usually include additional elements beyond the expression of dislike or 
abhorrence. The attached conditions are the manner of speech or the likelihood of causing 
contingent harm, like violence or discrimination. Lawmakers could narrow the reception of 
expression. A hate speech regulation does not just punish content but also the reception of the 
involved speech, such as when it “insults, offends, or degrades.”66  
Some examples coming from different countries support my point: the Public Order Act of 
the United Kingdom prohibits “threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior;” 67 the 
Danish Penal Code restricts speech in which “a group of people is threatened, derided or 
degraded.” 68The Human Rights Act of New Zealand restricts any speech that is “threatening, 
abusive, or insulting… words.”69 The Federal Criminal Code of Germany rules that hate speech 
 
65 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2365-2366. 
66 Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 126-127. 
67 United Kingdom, Public Order Act 1986, Section 18(1): “Use of words or behavior or display of written material. 
(1)A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior, or displays any written material which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if (a)he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b)having 
regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.” Public Order Act, 1986, ch.64, S 18(1) 
(UK). Cited from WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 237 n.12. 
68 Penal Code ch.27 § 266(1) (Den.). Cited from WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 236 n.9. 
69 New Zealand, Human Rights Act 1993, Section 61(1): “It shall be unlawful for any person (a) to publish or 
distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or television 
or other electronic communication words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or (b) to use in any public 
place as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981, or within the hearing of persons in any such 
public place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have access, words which are threatening, abusive, 
or insulting; or (c) to use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting if the person using the 
words knew or ought to have known that the words were reasonably likely to be published in a newspaper, 
magazine, or periodical or broadcast by means of radio or television, being matter or words likely to excite hostility 
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involves “assaulting human dignity of others by insulting [or] maliciously maligning.”70 The idea 
that laws should include reception is an international consensus. 
Moreover, some scholars argue that incitement to violence should be included in the 
definition of hate speech. Tsesis states that violent hate speech is anti-democratic and excludes 
the weak minority from the democratic discussion.71 I recognize that the incitement of violence 
should be considered a kind of hate speech.72 An excellent example of regulating incitement is 
South Africa. In South Africa, Section 16(1) of the Constitution of South Africa defines the 
freedom of speech right.73 The unprotected speech is directly addressed in Section 16(2) as the 
exception clause to Section 16(1), including “propaganda for war, incitement of imminent 
violence; or advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that 
constitutes incitement to cause harm.”74 Besides, Section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the Equality Act) limits any speech that is 
“hurtful, [is] harmful or to incite harm, or promote or propagate hatred.”75 Regarding incitement 
as an element of hate speech would greatly limit the scope of hate speech regulation. 
 
against or bring into contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to New Zealand on the ground of the 
color, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons.” Human Rights Act 1993 § 61(1) (N.Z.). Cited 
from WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 236 n.11. 
70 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 1&2. Cited from Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate 
Speech? supra note 21, at 5-6 (2002). 
71 TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 178-179.  
72 However, the provocation of violence is only a kind of hate speech, and not all hate speech aims to trigger 
violence immediately. Some hate speech only incites hatred or discrimination. Michel Rosenfeld, Conference: Hate 
Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1528-1529 (2003). 
73 The Constitution of South Africa, Section 16(1): “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which 
includes—(a) freedom of the press and other media;(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c) 
freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.” S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 
16(1). 
74 S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 16(2). 
75 Equality Act, Section 10: “(1) Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or 
communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to (a)be hurtful; (b) be harmful or to incite harm; (c)promote or propagate 
hatred. (2) Without prejudice to any remedies of a civil nature under this Act, the court may, in accordance with 
section 21 (2) (n) and where appropriate, refer any case dealing with the publication, advocacy, propagation or 
communication of hate speech as contemplated in subsection (1), to the Director of Public Prosecutions having 
jurisdiction for the institution of criminal proceedings in terms of the common law or relevant legislation.” Equality 
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However, the scopes of expression should not be designed too narrowly. The reason is that 
the type of hateful expression could be very different. Michel Rosenfeld distinguishes the 
difference between “hate speech in the form and hate speech in substance.”76 Hate speech in 
form is pure sanction or suppression, such as racist insults. The other is indirect information or 
communication. Holocaust denials are a kind of hate speech in form.77 He states that the hate 
speech of today is different from what happened in Nazi Germany. Also, current hate speech 
producers may use more indirect ways to present their racist messages rather than broadcasting 
direct insults; for instance, they may cite scientific debate or invoke certain statistics to support 
their racist claims. For instance, they may say “proportionately blacks commit more crimes than 
whites.”78 Consequently, some hateful communications and misleading research might be 
considered hate speech. 
In sum, the options for limitations on the scope of hate speech should include a specific form, 
like a reception, such as that it insults, offends, or degrades. Inciting violence is a type of hateful 
expression as well. An indirect way to express hatred should also be considered hate speech. 
V. A VARIETY OF CHARACTERISTICS OF HATE SPEECH 
If hate speech is speech expressing hatred for a specific group whose members share the 
same characteristics, what are those characteristics? Legal regulations from different countries 
offer the first track to understanding the characteristics of hate speech regulations.79 For 
example, the Public Order Act of the United Kingdom prohibits “racial hatred;”80 the Danish 
Penal Code rules against speech that degrades anyone “because of their race, color of skin, 
 
Act § 10 (S. Afr.). 
76 Rosenfeld, Conference: Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence, supra note 72, at 1527-1528. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1525-1526. 
79 Cited from Waldron, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 8 (2012). 
80 Public Order Act, 1986, ch.64, S 18(1) (U.K.). Cited from id. at 237 n.12 (2014). 
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national or ethnic background;”81 the Human Rights Act of New Zealand prohibits speech that 
targets a group “on the ground of the color, race, or ethnic or national origins;”82 and the Federal 
Criminal Code of Germany rules that hate speech targets “a national, racial, religious group or a 
group defined by their ethnic origins.” 83  
On the international organization level, international conventions offer other sources to 
understand the universal definition of hate speech. The following are some examples. Article 20 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that hate speech is 
“propaganda for war, advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred;”84 Article 13, section 5 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights says: “Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of 
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or any other 
similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, 
color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law;”85 
and Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
mentions that it “… shall declare an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based 
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence 
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another color or ethnic origin, 
and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities.” 86 The above international 
conventions focus on avoiding propaganda for war and protecting race, color, national origin, 
racial background or religious affiliation. 
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82 Human Rights Act 1993 § 61(1) (N.Z.). Cited from id at n.11. 
83 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 1&2. Cited from Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate 
Speech? ? supra note 21, at 5-6. 
84 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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Also, private companies sometimes have their own rules for regulating hate speech. For 
instance, Facebook’s regulation mentions “an attack, such as a degrading generalization or slur 
targeting a ‘protected category’ of people, including one based on sex, race, ethnicity, religious 
affiliation, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and severe disability or disease.”87 
Although there are differences between the definitions of hate speech in the above examples, 
those regulations have protected groups that could be identified by specific characteristics. The 
particular groups are usually based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, nationality, and severe 
disability or illness, but is not limited to these examples. Females, under specific cultural 
contexts or societal backgrounds, belong to the group as well.  
VI. HATE SPEECH AND OFFENCE  
Besides, Jeremy Waldron recognizes that hateful expression is not aimed at an individual’s or 
a group’s feeling or reputation, but at the basics of the social standing of a community whose 
members are connected by specific characteristics. Thus, in his view, hate speech regulation is a 
protection for individuals not from the offense or a painful feeling, but from an assault on the 
dignity and social cohesion of their communities.88 That is why Waldron kept emphasizing the 
status and reputation of a community rather than an individual’s or a group’s feelings. His 
argument is also based on protected groups with specific characteristics. But his view differs a 
great deal from the perspective of victims’ experience. 
Waldron’s argument is also significant to me. His point of view correctly makes a distinction 
between the objective social standing of a community and subjective offense. For instance, in his 
book, critiquing the idea of Islam is not the same as abusing Muslims. Comments about 
 
87 Audrey Carlsen & Fahima Haque, What Does Facebook Consider Hate Speech? Take Our Quiz, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/13/technology/facebook-hate-speech-
quiz.html. 
88 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1609-1613. 
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Muslims’ beliefs might cause Muslims to feel bad. However, only assaulting their objective 
social position constitutes hate speech.89 For me, this example may more clearly explain the idea: 
a statement supporting human rights for Hong Kong might cause some Chinese people to feel 
unhappy, but the support is not prosecutorial, hateful, or degrading to the social cohesion of their 
communities.90 The speech is not a hateful expression at all. Hence, hate speech regulation 
should only focus on protecting the basics of a community’s social standing, not people’s 
feelings. 
VII. HOW TO DEFINE HATE SPEECH 
The definition used in my argument most closely aligns with Matsuda’s. Matsuda’s 
definition was a narrow view due to the compromise with the First Amendment. It was “The 
message is of racial inferiority; the message is directed against a historically oppressed group, 
and the message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.”91 She argues that the first element is 
the identifier pointing to the targeted group as inferior; the second factor connects the racism to 
power and subordination, to constitute “a historical vertical relationship,”92 and the third 
emphasizes the harmful form. The definition focuses on structural subordination in history. The 
power structures in history are the main reason to constitute the protected groups in different 
countries. Hate speech should be limited to speech that is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. 
I will exclude her first factor because her article focuses on racism, but historically oppressed 
encompasses more than race. I strongly agree with the idea of using a discrete and insular group 
or requiring the group to have been historically oppressed. These may include race, ethnicity, 
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 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 105-143. 
90 Lauren Frias, Activists supporting the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong filled the stands at a Brooklyn Nets 
game, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2019, 1:53 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/activists-supporting-hong-
kong-protests-filled-stands-at-nba-game-2019-10.  
91 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2357. 
92 Id. at 2358. 
21 
 
religion, gender, nationality, and severe disability or illness, but such a definition is not limited to 
these examples.  
Moreover, the speech should be prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading. The factor is enough to 
distinguish hate speech and expression, which is only an opinion on a neutral scientific, 
academic, or religious subject. Nevertheless, the element does not exclude any hateful 
communication or misleading research based on the evidence proving the bad intention in 
individual cases. 
Hate speech has been defined in a variety of ways by different scholars and governing 
bodies. But in the subsequent argument, I will rely on the following definition. First, hate speech 
targets specific protected groups with specific characteristics. I argue that this must be a discrete 
and insular group, or the group has been historically oppressed. This could be an exact term that 
lawmakers use to present the structural subordination in history in different countries. The time 
and the relationship between the groups involved could determine whether the expression 
constitutes hate speech. Also, the expression could be diverse but must be persecutorial, hateful, 
and degrading to the protected groups. These safeguards would help protect the expression of 
dissenting opinions. However, the definition should not exclude hateful communication or 
misleading research because those types of statements are still persecutorial, hateful, and 
degrading. Finally, the speech should harm the objective social standing of a community, not 
only stand as a subjective offense. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Hate speech does not have a single definition. A variety of approaches can be applied to 
different perspectives. After considering the above definitions, I conclude that my definition 
should be:  
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Hate speech targets a discrete and insular group, or the group has been historically 
oppressed. The speech could be diverse but must be persecutorial, hateful, and degrading 
to the protected groups, including hateful communication, misleading research, or any 
other forms of expression that are persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. The speech 






CHAPTER THREE: APPROACHES TO HATE SPEECH REGULATION 
IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While Chapter Two provided a basic framework for defining hate speech, the next chapter 
will introduce three countries’ approaches and one international standard on hate speech for 
comparison purposes in this chapter. As discussed in Chapter Two, the nature of the historical 
oppressions people in different countries have faced profoundly relates to the approaches toward 
hate speech each country has taken. Taiwan can look to different models. This chapter will first 
introduce the model in the United States, which emphasizes freedom of speech as the most 
important right. The second section will cover the German approach, which strongly protects 
human dignity in its legal system. The third section is the South African approach. As an 
example of the third wave of democracy, South Africa also emphasizes human dignity and 
balances dignity and freedom of speech. Finally, I will analyze the approach taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights from the perspective of transnational constitutionalism to 
provide a general rule on international law standards. 
II. APPROACH OF THE UNITED STATES 
1. Overview 
The approach toward hate speech in the United States reflects the uniqueness of its history 
and culture. The United States protects freedom of speech for its several significant functions, 
including individual self-fulfillment, attainment of truth, participation in decision-making and 
balance between stability and change.93 The reason that the US emphasizes the freedom of 
speech is because of the Red Scare in the 1910s and the McCarthy era that stretched from the 
 
93 Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 NO. 5 YALE L. J., 877, 878-886 (1963). 
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1940s to the 1950s. Freedom of speech was under deep oppression during the above periods. 
Therefore, the US has not followed European experiences and applied strong limitations to hate 
speech.94 The country has not developed a ban on hate speech, and, on the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has legally protected hate speech. In the following section, I will discuss more formative 
examples of oppression in the United States. 
Racism is one of the most significant issues in the United States’ history, and white 
supremacy has substantially dominated its legal system. The history of racism in the country can 
be seen through various examples, such as slavery, segregation, and the genocide of indigenous 
peoples.95 Other oppressed groups, such as women and the LGBTQ community, have also 
suffered discrimination and persecution throughout the United States’ history.  
Racism can be traced back to the colonial history of the United States. The Atlantic slave 
trade enslaved the African people from the 15th century on,96 and the transportation of slaves 
between Africa and North America caused an enormous number of deaths.97 After the American 
Civil War, Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution abolished 
slavery.98 However, the Southern states still enacted the Black Codes, which imposed unfair 
treatment of African Americans. These codes limited the blacks’ ability to own property, to find 
employment, to make testimony, and to marry white people, and those restrictions constituted the 
extension of slavery.99 Instead, the rules allowed for these states to enact laws that would further 
 
94 Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 
42-43 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
95 TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 1-7. 
96  Id. at 28. 
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98 Section 1, Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
99 Andrew Costly, Southern Black Codes, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, https://www.crf-usa.org/brown-v-
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restrict African Americans’ rights by using the gray zones of the Amendment, such as 
grandfather clauses, poll taxes, or literacy tests. After the Reconstruction era, the Deep South still 
had many unequal laws toward African American people. For example, the Jim Crow laws 
enforced racial segregation in the Southern states.100 
In addition to racism, the oppression based on gender is another dark side in American 
history. Some states could limit women’s suffrage.101 Both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth 
Amendments only guaranteed the rights of male citizens to vote. This voting discrimination 
lasted until 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment guaranteed women’s suffrage. Nevertheless, 
black women could not vote until later.102 Women are still oppressed in the United States 
nowadays, for instance, “high-profile allegations of sexual assault and increasing restrictions on 
women’s access to abortion” still remain.103 
Another vector of discrimination in the United States is how LGBTQ groups are 
discriminated against. On June 28, 1969, the police raided the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich 
Village, New York City, to oppress the LGBTQ community.104 In early US history, 
homosexuality was illegal, and it was even punished under sodomy laws until 2003. The 
Supreme Court of the United States holds that to outlaw homosexual activities is 
unconstitutional.105 Bans against gay marriage were held unconstitutional in 2015, but there are 
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still state laws that allow companies to fire LGBT individuals because of their sexuality, showing 
that there is still a level of oppression and discrimination against this minority group.106 
The United States is a significant model of protecting freedom of speech. However, as 
described above, the oppression of minorities has been rampant in the United States’ history. 
Moreover, this persecution has taken place in a country ostensibly known for its liberty. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has played a significant role in shaping the regulation of hate 
speech in the country. The following section will introduce the decisions around hate speech 
handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
2. Hate Speech Jurisprudence in the United States 
The US Supreme Court’s judgments have guaranteed ample protections for the freedom of 
speech. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. proposed that the best way to seek the truth was to 
submit a statement to allow competition in the marketplace of ideas107 by not limiting speech at 
all. From the traditional view of the First Amendment, even the most unpopular speech is 
allowed expression. However, the Supreme Court creates some categories of unprotected speech, 
such as obscenity, child pornography, fighting words, and false statements of fact with actual 
malice. For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, fighting words were limited because they 
had “no essential part of any exposition of ideas and were of such slight social value, and the 
Court held that the social interest in order and morality is more important than any benefit 
derived from them.”108 As a result, speech that includes fighting words has less protection in the 
First Amendment.109 
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In 1952, in the case Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, the Supreme Court allowed 
the states to limit hate speech regarding group libel.110 In this case, the white group leader 
directly linked the “Negro with the aggressions, rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana.”111 
Group libel seems to have restrictions in the US legal system. However, the Court held its 
approach to individual libel in New York Times v. Sullivan, and the libel is protected under the 
First Amendment.112 The case for protecting individual libel also affects group libel issues even 
though the Beauharnais case was not overturned. In the case, National Socialist Party of America 
v. Village of Skokie, the National Socialist Party of America paraded with Nazi costumes and 
intentionally passed by the Jewish community in Skokie, Illinois, where many members of the 
community were survivors of the Holocaust. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
protected the demonstration.113 That means the National Socialist Party of America’s speech 
toward the Jewish community was protected, even though the expression may count as libel to 
survivors of the Holocaust. The holding makes clear that the group libel should be protected by 
the First Amendment as well.  
Until the 1990s, in the case R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the US Supreme Court held that a 
content-based restriction is not allowed even for racial hate speech. In R.A.V., the petitioner and 
several other teenagers were accused of cross burning on a black family’s lawn.114 The Court 
recognized that states could not limit speech based on “hostility, or favoritism, toward a non-
proscribable message they contain.”115 The Court insisted that selectively restricting speech due 
to its content cannot be supported, even by avoiding group hatred. The content-based 
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discrimination could only be limited under two conditions as “secondary effects, and when the 
basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech 
at issue is prescriptible.”116 Therefore, the state statute restricted speech about specific topics as 
viewpoint discrimination over protection against hate speech. The R.A.V. case showed that 
freedom of expression holds the superior position by making it difficult for states to regulate hate 
speech. 
Along with hate speech, a similar concept is hate crime. Hate speech is allowed in the 
United States. The country, however, punishes hate crimes. According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), a hate crime is “a criminal offense committed against a person or property 
which is motivated by the offender’s bias against a race, religion ethnic/national origin, sexual 
orientation, or disability.”117 In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Court broadened the restriction of hate 
crimes but maintained the freedom of speech protection established in the R.A.V. case. The 
holding distinguished between hate speech and hate crimes. They held that the enhancing a 
defendant’s sentence due to their intent or motive is different from limiting hate speech. As such, 
the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Unlike hate speech, hate crimes focus on action 
rather than speech itself. The Court stated that hate crime was different from the result in R.A.V. 
v. St. Paul because it focused on “conduct unprotected by the First Amendment”118 rather than 
speech. The Wisconsin v. Mitchell case separated hateful action from hate speech and allowed 
for the punishment of offensive action. Nevertheless, the case maintained the restricted legal 
structure of the R.A.V. case.119 
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The cross burnings, like the one from R.A.V., still continue. In Virginia v. Black, three 
defendants were accused of cross burning on a black family’s property.120 The US Supreme 
Court had a different opinion but did not overrule the R.A.V. case. In Virginia, the holding only 
limited the form of speech rising to the fear of bodily harm, not hate speech. First, the Court held 
that a cross burning in the United States is strongly connected with the history of the Ku Klux 
Klan and imposes a reign of terror, which depicts “whipping, threatening, and murdering 
blacks.”121 Therefore, burning a cross is a symbol of hate in US history and represents true 
threats to a specific racial group. The Supreme Court held that banning true threats is allowed 
under the First Amendment. The state could therefore punish people for burning crosses intended 
to create fear among victims. However, the Supreme Court held that the government could not 
limit speech until those forms of intimidation rise to the fear of bodily harm. The court held that 
the Virginia statute, which ruled that "Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence 
of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons,"122 is unconstitutional because it created 
prima facie evidence to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant and violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.123 Justice Thomas delivered a dissenting opinion in Virginia. He agreed 
with the majority that banning cross burning was necessary. However, he stated that cross 
burning was not an issue of freedom of expression, but a true threat. He argued that, in US 
culture, cross burning always means “lawlessness and raises the grounded fear of physical 
violence” in its victims.124 Virginia did not overrule the holdings suggested by the R.A.V. case, 
but instead opened other paths for the state to regulate true threats, which constitute specific 
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categories of unprotected speech. However, the US Supreme Court has yet to balance the dispute 
between the harm of hate speech and the guarantee of the First Amendment, since it still has not 
overruled the R.A.V. case. 
The R.A.V. case establishes the basic rules of freedom of speech theory, which allows hate 
speech. Also, Wisconsin v. Mitchell limits hate crime. The principle in the United States was, 
“Sticks and stones can break my bones, but words can never hurt me.”125 The US Supreme 
Court has designed an essential structure for hate speech regulation since hate speech was 
allowed in the R.A.V. case. Even though hate speech might be harmful, the Court deems that it 
could not regulate it without prohibiting all negative speech. Moreover, in Virginia, the holding 
only limits true threats that rise to the fear of bodily harm, not hate speech. 
3. Current Hate Speech Issues in the US 
A.  Statistics, Data about Hate Speech 
Hate speech is legal in the United States. The hate groups are therefore free to spread hate 
speech. Many communities in the United States have long-standing animosity toward each other 
from community history, and this manifests in hate speech between the groups. For example, the 
cross burning and the hangman’s noose are symbols of racism that reflect the horrific acts of 
lynching in American history, in which the victims were mostly African Americans. The 
hangman’s noose has become an offensive symbol of threatening black people in the United 
States because the country has a history of lynching African American men.126 In 2007, more 
than 80 cases of hangman’s noose displays were used to threaten black people in the United 
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States.127 On August 11th, 2017, in Charlottesville, Virginia, white supremacists and Nazis 
clashed with counter-protesters. Their slogans were anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic and 
communicated their hatred for these minority groups. They claimed that the First Amendment 
guaranteed their right to hate speech.128 
In addition, in 2018, the FBI recorded over 7,000 hate crimes, and anti-Semitic hate crimes 
and hate speech were at near-historic levels. An estimated 70% of US adults claim that hate 
speech and hate crimes are increasing and are targeting all minorities.129 The research also shows 
that the American people believe the following reasons are behind this increase: first, the 
encouragement or inspiration from politicians; second, the significant influence of social media 
and the Internet; and third, the fact that US society has become sharply polarized.130 
Racism has affected the political climate in the United States,131 and hate speech against 
immigrants has become a serious problem. Reportedly, the anti-immigrant movement has 
dramatically increased in the past ten years. Some hate speech even stems from high-level 
government outlets. For example, US President Trump has stated that immigrants and refugees 
were “an invasion and they carve you up with a knife” to incite hatred toward immigrants.132 
Nowadays, hate groups use the Internet to send hateful messages. Research at the Simon 
Wiesenthal Center found that an estimated 50 hate groups had accessed their website in 1995, 
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and Klan Watch claimed that there were more than 400 hate groups and more than 800 hate 
websites in the United States in 1997. Because of its widespread use, the Internet has become the 
main path through which to spread hatred in the United States.133 Based on the online hate 
speech issue in the US, Tsesis argues that the rules implemented in the private sector and the 
social media filters are not enough to avoid hatred from spreading and hurting the victims. He 
therefore advocates for the government to ban hate speech online.134 
Moreover, the hostility toward people with different sexual orientations is a problem as 
well. Anti-LGBTQ groups in the United States claim that they defend family values and 
disseminate hate speech or hateful communication. For instance, a right-wing website distributed 
the statement that “gay people are sexual bums who suffer from a preoccupation with sex and 
seek excessive distraction through sex, drugs and other risk-taking behaviors.”135  
Different minor groups in the United States that have been historically oppressed continue 
to experience hate speech. The approach of the United States, which only punishes hate crime, 
but allows hate speech, does not really fix or alleviate the hate speech problem.  
B. Current Hate Speech Restrictions and Limitations 
Generally, hate speech is protected in the United States. However, courts have offered 
protection by distinguishing some actions from speech, such as hate crime and true threats. 
Based on the decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, the US legal system is 
dominated by the R.A.V. structure, which did not outlaw hate speech. The Wisconsin v. Mitchell 
case further separated speech and actions. The US lower courts follow this approach in making 
their judgments. For example, in the case United States v. Stewart, the defendants were members 
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of the Ku Klux Klan and performed a cross burning in a black family’s yard, which caused 
mental injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the R.A.V. 
case and the Wisconsin case to distinguish speech and action, and then it affirmed the 
defendants’ conviction due to their unprotected conduct.136 In the case in re M.S., the defendant 
used both hate speech and violence to attack LGBT victims. The Supreme Court of California 
judged the same outcome as the Eleventh Circuit did. It affirmed the hate crime conviction for 
the defendant due to the defendant’s harmful actions.137 After the case Virginia v. Black in 2003, 
the lower court further used the Virginia case to outlaw true threats. In the case of United States 
v. White, the defendant was the commander of the American National Socialist Workers' Party, 
and he sent e-mails to threaten victims based on those victims’ race. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment to hold the defendant’s 
speech as constituting an actual threat.138 In sum, judicial system in the United States followed 
the rules of both the R.A.V. case and Wisconsin case, which punishes hate crime, but allows hate 
speech. Also, if the form of speech rises to the fear of bodily harm, it would become a true threat, 
and then it would be limited by the rules of the Virginia case. 
Some schools in the United States ban campus hate speech with speech codes, but they 
sometimes face a challenge from students or other individuals. For instance, in the 1995 Corry v. 
Stanford University case, the Court’s decision favored the plaintiffs, who claimed that the school 
code limitation on hate speech violated their First Amendment rights.139 Also, private companies 
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sometimes have their own rules for regulating hate speech. For instance, social media has some 
regulations to limit hate speech in the country.140  
The current system in the United States does not prohibit hate speech. However, hate crimes 
are not allowed in the US legal system. The hate crime regulations have been instituted at both 
the federal and state level. Forty-six states in the United States, plus Washington D.C., have laws 
to limit hate crimes.141 According to research from the Department of Justice, hate crimes in the 
United States are mostly related to racism and xenophobia, but hate crimes related to sexual 
orientation, gender identity, and anti-Semitism are also prevalent.142 Although the United States 
has hate crime laws, hate crimes in the United States still run rampant. 
4. Conclusion 
Allowing hate speech in the United States is based on freedom of speech reigning supreme. 
However, hate speech is still a problem in the United States. The hate speech that exists in the 
United States is addressed toward a variety of traits and identities, such as race, color, religion, 
ethnic group, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and severe disability or disease. 
For example, the Ku Klux Klan, white supremacists, and neo-Nazis still use hate speech to 
spread racism and xenophobia.143 In sum, the hate speech approach in the United States has not 
worked very efficiently. The judicial system in United States has tried to rely on regulating hate 
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crimes to avoid people spreading racism and xenophobia, but that has failed. The minorities 
continue to be oppressed and hate speech and hate crimes are not well controlled.  
III. GERMANY’S APPROACH 
1. Overview 
After World War II, Germany developed its legal system to remedy the failure generated by 
the Weimar Constitution and the rise of Nazism. Germany prioritizes human dignity, leading to 
more restrictions on hate speech. German Basic Law is designed as a human dignity-based legal 
system with the jurisprudence of a militant democracy. 
The Nazis believed that the Jewish people were inherently evil and therefore needed to be 
extinguished from German society.144 The idea of anti-Semitism arose in Germany in the Middle 
Ages, and the theory developed that Jews were the enemies of Jesus Christ.145 The persecution of 
the Jewish people thus became a religious obligation.146 When the Nazis came into power in 
1933, they promoted collectivism and used the “people’s community” to distinguish the 
Volksgenossen (National Comrades) and the Gemeinschaftsfremde (Community Aliens).147 In 
doing so, they claimed they would save the valued group and eliminate the non-valued one. Anti-
Semitism, nationalism, and pseudoscience initially triggered the Holocaust.148 The Holocaust is 
the most severe oppression in German history. Nazi Germany perpetrated genocide on six 
million Jewish people and other non-Jewish victims, including the Polish people, the Romani 
people, the African people, political dissentients, religious dissentients, and gay people. The total 
victims numbered close to 11 million people.149  
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An unfathomable onslaught against and abuse of human dignity characterized the Holocaust. 
The victims suffered torture, degradation, discrimination, and cruel punishment because they 
were seen as objects, not equal human beings. For example, the Nazis forced the Jews to endure 
hard labor and then worked them to death.150 Nazi physicians subjected the prisoners in the 
concentration camps to human experimentation in which the victims underwent medical 
torture.151 Such were the unfathomable violations against human dignity.  
Germany has had hate speech regulations throughout its history. The German Empire, the 
government prior to 1918, had hate speech regulations. For example, the Criminal Code of The 
German Empire, Section 221, punished speech inciting group hatred as breach of the peace and 
public order.152 The act also applied in the Weimar Republic, the government that existed in 
Germany between 1918 and 1933. Article 109 of the Weimar Constitution ruled “all Germans 
are equal before the law, and Article 128 prohibits any discrimination to its citizens.”153 Under 
the Weimar Republic’s government, many members of the Nazi party were found guilty of 
defamation against Jewish people. However, the defamation regulation was still an individual-
based crime, not applying to general group libel. Section 130 of the Criminal Code prohibited 
“inciting different classes of the people to acts of violence against each other,”154 and Section 
166 of the Penal Code punished people for offensive expressions against others’ religions.155 
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Gesetz zum Schutze der Republik (the Act for the Protection of the Republic) in June 1922 
enhanced the sentence to outlaw the Nazi leaders. Nevertheless, the punishment, which was 
mainly a fine, rarely a prison sentence, was too light to alleviate the racial hatred.156 Therefore, 
the hate speech laws in the Weimar Republic failed to prevent the Nazis from taking charge. 
2. German Hate Speech Jurisprudence 
The German experience contradicts the view of the “clear and immediately dangerous” 
standard. The values of Nazism developed over hundreds of years, from hate speech to the 
persecution system,157 and manifested during the Holocaust. This unparalleled historical 
oppression triggered the legal jurisprudence of human dignity that emerged after the Second 
World War in Germany.  
From November 1945 to October 1946, the trials held in Nuremberg indicted and tried the 
Nazi leaders for war crimes. The Allies of World War II believed that Germany should take 
responsibility for the war. In September 1948, a Parliamentary Council was founded in Bonn to 
develop a temporary constitution for West Germany. The Council comprised 70 representatives 
from the western states in Germany. They were called state parliaments but were not elected by 
citizens. The group contained scholars, government officers, and politicians under the Weimar 
Republic, and most of them had suffered under the Nazis’ rule. In May 1949, the Council 
enacted the Constitution called the Basic Law, rather than the Constitution, because it was a 
temporary clause for the transitional period before the two Germanys were unified.158 
The founding fathers of the Basic Law considered the lessons of history and aimed to modify 
the mistakes made in the Weimar Republic. They followed the jurisprudence of militant 
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democracy, which was proposed by the German scholar Karl Loewenstein in 1930. The theory 
argues that democracy is fragile, and that extremism would invade a liberal democratic regime 
by using its democratic system to go against democracy itself. For instance, Hitler used 
democratic processes to destroy the Weimar Republic. When democratic governments are 
threatened by anti-democratic groups, their response is to limit some conduct to avoid 
extremism. However, such restrictions may be called into question under their legal systems.159 
The militant democracy argued that individuals could not use their freedom to abuse the free 
democratic basic order, and a party that proposed otherwise was deemed anti-constitutional and 
subject to banning by the constitutional court.160 Hate speech regulation is therefore 
constitutional, as a tool of militant democracy, to avoid the potential harm induced by hate 
speech. 
The Federal Constitutional Court applied and interpreted the German Basic Law to 
constitute a theory of fundamental rights in German jurisprudence.161 All rights are not equal in 
the German Constitution.162 Article 1 of the German Basic Law states that “human dignity shall 
be inviolable,”163 which means that human dignity is at the core of the German Constitution. 
Human dignity is an absolute right in Germany, one that cannot be restricted and compromised 
by any other rights.164 Human dignity is the essential constitutional value order of the Basic Law, 
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which has become the formative principle for the definition and explanation of all other 
constitutional rights.165 That is to say, all fundamental rights are recognized as “specific 
manifestations of the human dignity principle.”166 In addition, the culture in Germany holds that 
personal honor is superior to freedom of speech.167 
Article 5 of the Basic Law of Germany undergirds the freedom of speech right in the 
German Constitution.168 The German Constitution did not put freedom of speech in the most 
significant position, but rather, human dignity. The Constitution therefore emphasizes human 
dignity over liberty.169 The German Court does not set free speech rights as superior to the other 
constitutional rights and interests. Article 1 is superior to the right indicated by Article 5, so the 
limitation on freedom of speech is predictable in its constitutional structure, and thus freedom of 
expression is not a superior right.170 The free speech claims under Article 5 do measure up 
equally with the human dignity claims premised on Article 1.171 Hence, the purpose of the Basic 
Law seems to be to balance human dignity and freedom of speech and to protect the institution 
of democracy.172 For example, the Federal Constitutional Court has held that the ban on denying 
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the Holocaust is constitutional. The limitation on speech denying the Holocaust is to protect the 
victims’ human dignity and also to prevent the speech from inciting hatred toward Jews and the 
speech promoting National Socialism, which is harmful to the institution of democracy.173 The 
German Constitutional Court has held some cases relating to the conflict between human dignity 
and freedom of speech as follows: First, the Mephisto case: Klaus Mann was the writer of the 
novel Mephisto. The story centered on a fictional actor working with the Nazi regime and 
critiqued his loss of humane values. The character was based on a real actor, Gustaf Gründgens. 
After Gründgens’ death, his adopted son sued Mann for an injunction to stop him from 
publishing the novel. The Court held that Gründgens’ human dignity should be protected and 
that the book could not be published.174 Secondly, the Princess Soraya case offers an example: a 
media company, Die Welt, published a fictional interview with Princess Soraya, who was the ex-
wife of the King of Iran. Soraya sued Die Welt. The Court rejected the newspaper’s freedom of 
speech claim by protecting Soraya’s human dignity.175 Thirdly, the Strauss case: The magazine 
Konkret portrayed a politician, Franz Josef Strauss, as a pig having sex with another pig. 
Although the freedom of speech right protects satire and parody, the Court held the magazine 
guilty of defamation to protect Strauss’s human dignity.176 
One the contrary, in the United States, the holding of the case New York Times v. Sullivan 
chose to protect First Amendment rather than public figures’ dignity, unless the speakers have 
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actual malice in mind when they make false defamatory statements. The case also held that the 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, although sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials should be allowed.177 If the above 
cases had happened in the United States, Princess Soraya may have needed to provide evidence 
to show the speaker had actual malice, and the comments to Gründgens and Strauss would be 
considered fair comments, although the comments were considered unpleasantly sharp. 
The German constitutional commitment includes “militant democracy.”178 Militant 
democracy is a significant characteristic of German jurisprudence and is ruled by Article 18179 
and Article 21180 of the Basic Law. The German approach to hate speech is based on militant 
democracy, which holds that individual rights should not destroy the free democratic basic 
order.181 Modern democracy should protect both the constitution and human rights. Hence, a 
compromise between a state and its citizens potentially constitutes a restriction on human rights. 
In other words, human rights should not become the tools with which to destroy democracy.182 
From the perspective of militant democracy, the constitutional court is the guardian of 
democracy and the constitution. In the German system, constitutional activism is characteristic of 
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the constitutional court,183 and the court could rule for the dissolution of parties184 that promote 
or advocate against the institution of democracy.185 Hate speech regulation is therefore 
constitutional, as a tool of militant democracy, to avoid the potential harm induced by hate 
speech. The purpose of the Basic Law’s framers was to prevent a dictatorship, such as Hitler’s 
under the Nazis, from arising again. The German legal system is “the most speech-restrictive 
democracy in the Western world.”186 It restricts hate speech because of its potential damage. 
Thus, German legal theory applies a “biased risk allocation philosophy” to restrict hate speech 
and prevent injury because of it.187 
Based on militant democracy, the German Constitution established an “objective ordering 
of values” for the Federal Constitutional Court to declare and enforce those values.188 German 
Constitutional Jurisprudence holds that a constitutional right could be limited by realizing public 
interest or protecting another constitutional right.189 Compared to the jurisprudence of the United 
States, the German Constitutional Court rejects the state action requirement. It can therefore 
intervene in the rights conflict between private sectors. A famous case was the Lüth decision in 
1958. Erich Lüth, a German writer and film director, advocated a boycott against the movie 
Immortal Beloved. Veit Harlan directed the film, and he was a famous anti-Semitic activist in the 
Nazi era. Harlan sued Lüth in a civil law injunction against Lüth’s boycott. In turn, Lüth claimed 
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his freedom of speech rights against Harlan. The Court held that the German Basic Law is not a 
value-neutrality system, but rather, it defends the objective ordering of values. The Court 
intervened in the civil case and balanced Lüth’s freedom of speech right with Harlan’s economic 
interest. Ultimately, the Court denied the injunction to the boycott.190 In this case, the Court 
balanced these two parties’ constitutional rights by using an objective ordering of values.191 
3. Legal Regulation and Courts’ Decisions 
A. Criminal Law 
Hate speech is a crime in Germany and can be prosecuted by the statutes. The German 
approach regulates both “bias-motivated” crimes (Voruteilsdelikte) and “symbolic” crimes 
(Botschaftsverbrechen).192 The “bias-motivated” crimes are enforced by Section 46(2) of the 
Federal Criminal Code,193 and they relate to racist, xenophobic, and other inhumane or 
contemptuous motives.194 If the crime targets “the political attitude, nationality, ethnicity, race, 
color, religion, worldview, origin, sexual orientation, disability, external appearance or social 
status,” it constitutes a “politically motivated crime.”195 
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The bias-motivated crimes are similar to hate crimes in the United States. The “symbolic 
crimes,” on the contrary, are aimed at their speech content. Section 86 of the Federal Criminal 
Code prohibits disseminating propaganda material of unconstitutional organizations,196 and 
Section 86a limits using the symbols of unconstitutional organizations.197 Section 126 of the 
Federal Criminal Code limits the breaching of the public peace by threatening to commit 
offenses,198 which includes genocide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime. 
Sections 130(1) and (2) of the Federal Criminal Code are significant as regulations against 
hate speech.199 Sections (3) and (4) make National Socialism an illegal act of inciting hatred and 
disturbing the public peace,200 which pertains to the Holocaust-denying crime. The German 
Constitutional Court distinguishes the Holocaust-denying as two forms. The first one is “simple 
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denying,” which includes a “blanket denial of the fact that genocide took place,” or “the denial of 
one or more so-called essential characteristics of the Holocaust.” For example: “the Holocaust 
never happened,” or “the number of Jews killed is inflated.”201 In contrast, “qualified denying” is 
the simple form accompanied by “additional normative conclusions” or “calls to action.”202 An 
example is, “something should be done about the use of extortion as a political tool against 
Germany by Jews spreading lies.” The intention is not required, and the crime is an “abstract 
endangerment offense,” which means that clear and present danger is not necessary.203 
In the following case, the constitutional court upheld “pursuing the truth, rather than the 
harm.”204 The incident happened in 1994, when the revisionism scholar David Irving was invited 
by the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), an extreme right-wing party, to give a 
speech about Holocaust denial in München. The speech was banned by the city government, 
based on Section 130. The court recognized that fact is different from opinion because the latter 
cannot be testified to and proved. Also, the court stated that the untrue statement is unprotected 
speech and pointed out that protecting truths and facts could “end at the point where they cease 
to contribute anything to the formation of public opinion that is presupposed in constitutional 
law.”205 Hence, the Holocaust denial law is constitutional, and the speech should not be 
allowed.206 
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The court, however, restricts the interpretation of Section 130 in specific circumstances to 
add more space for freedom of speech. In 2011, an ultranationalism supporter was accused of 
violating section 130 by criticizing a documentary on the Holocaust, in which he stated there 
were “no gas chambers” and “no fair judgment to Nazi Germany after World War II.”207 The 
court held that “only the manner of communication already tangibly gives rise to overstepping 
the line to violating legal interests and crosses the threshold to an imminent violation of legal 
interests.”208 That is to say, the court claimed that the term “dissemination” in Section 130 only 
applies to “a group of individuals whose size becomes uncontrollable.”209 Therefore, the way the 
disinformation is distributed, and the size of the audience, are vital factors to consider.  
Nevertheless, the Court changed the holding in 2017. An article that stated that “since 1944 
not a single Jew was deported to Auschwitz” was charged under Section 130.210 The court held 
that “the specific meaning of the statement in question has been accurately established,” and 
therefore, it was necessary to rule it as unprotected speech.211 The question of “why other 
possible interpretations were disregarded”212 is an important element for consideration in the 
conviction. In other words, if research concludes that no Jew was deported to Auschwitz since 
1944 and challenges Holocaust history, it should prove that the research has already considered 
all the possible alternatives.  
Section 185 of the Federal Criminal Code in Germany regulates the limitation of insults.213 
The crime of insulting, however, may constitute hate speech because it applies not only to 
 
part of the group, against him.” KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY, supra note 165, at 251-252. 
207 1 BvR 461/08 (Nov. 9, 2011). Cited from ARTICLE 19, Germany, supra note 192, at 26. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 1 BvR 1384/16 (Mar. 28, 2017). Cited from id. at 24-26. 
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213 It states: “Insult will be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year or by a fine.” Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] 
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individuals but also to the group as a group-libel crime.214 For instance, in the Hedler Case of 
1952, the court held that using “traitors to the nation” to target a specific group is a group-libel 
crime under section 185.215 The hate speech stated, “a Jew is like a louse, crawling into fur and 
remaining there” and thus, it constituted a group-libel crime.216 
The court also tried to define what a group is under the term group libel. In the Tucholsky 
case, a pacifist bumper sticker stated that “soldiers are murderers.” The constitutional court held 
that the statement was a critique, not an insult or a group-libel crime.217 However, if the soldiers 
were specifically concretized as a German or a person with another nationality, the holding may 
be different. For instance, the group-libel crime would apply if the statement referred to “all our 
soldiers.”218 The court balanced the soldiers’ human dignity and the civilians’ freedom of 
speech.219 
In sum, hate speech is a crime in Germany. Sections 86, 126, 130 and 185 of the Federal 
Criminal Code in Germany have strong limitations to regulate hateful expression. The German 
Federal court has also provided its interpretation to the above statutes to balance freedom of 
speech and human dignity. 
B. Administrative Law and Civil Law 
Some regulations in administrative law may rule on the hate speech issue as follows: the 
Public Meetings Law does not allow assemblies to promote political parties aimed at abolishing 
the free and democratic order as a tool of militant democracy. However, the constitutional 
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214 93 BVerfGE 266, 300 ff. (1995). Cited from ARTICLE 19, Germany, supra note 192, at 28-29. 
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court’s holdings can veto the restrictions of the law. The court held that the lawsuits to dissolve 
the unconstitutional parties are still based on whether the party caused the actual danger to the 
democratic system and involved substantial political action to this end, as, for example, in the 
dissolution of the Neo-Nazi Party in 1952 and the dissolution of the German Communist Party in 
1956.220 In the 2017 case of the dissolved NPD, nevertheless, the court held that the NPD was 
constitutional, even though the party’s stated intention was to abolish the basic order of free 
democracy. Although the court recognized that the party’s political proposal might hurt human 
dignity and violate the principle of democracy, it points out that “there is a lack of specific and 
weighty indications suggesting that this endeavor will be successful.”221 The Law on 
Associations has the same function as the Public Meetings Law, as, for instance, in relation to 
the Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth).222 The holding balances the freedom of speech right and the 
system of militant democracy. 
The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) was passed in 2017. The purpose of the Act is to 
restrict hate speech, fake news, and propaganda on the Internet.223 Section 1(3) of the NetzDG 
lists “unlawful content” that corresponds to the hate speech regulation in the criminal code.224 
 
220 RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 178 (2008). 
221 FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT), No prohibition of the National Democratic 
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last amended by Article 1 of the Act of 10 March 2017 (BGBl). I p. 419). Cited from: ARTICLE 19, Germany, supra 
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The Act also gives the social networks an obligation to “report,225 remove, or block the unlawful 
content.”226 Moreover, the Youth Protection Act prohibits the speech or material from causing a 
negative influence on youth, including anything that is “immoral, brutal, glorif[ies] war, or 
incite[s] others to violent acts, crimes, or hatred.”227 
The German Civil Code also provides compensation to victims for the damages caused by 
the crimes of hate speech. The tort to harm personality rights can be used for claim recovery, 
including money and restored reputation. The 2006 General Act on Equal Treatment (AGG) 
limits the discrimination based on “race or ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation.”228 The 2002 Act on Equal Opportunities of Disabled People also protects 
people with disabilities from hate speech.229 
 
225 NetzDG, § 2(1): “(1) Providers of social networks which receive more than 100 complaints per calendar year 
about unlawful content shall be obliged to produce half-yearly German-language reports on the handling of 
complaints about unlawful content on their platforms, covering the points enumerated in subsection (2), and shall be 
obliged to publish these reports in the Federal Gazette and on their own website no later than one month after the 
half-year concerned has ended. The reports published on their own website shall be easily recognisable, directly 
accessible and permanently available.” 
226 NetzDG, § 3(2): “The procedure shall ensure that the provider of the social network: 1.takes immediate note of 
the complaint and checks whether the content reported in the complaint is unlawful and subject to removal or 
whether access to the content must be blocked; 2.removes or blocks access to content that is manifestly unlawful 
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competent law enforcement authority on a longer period for deleting or blocking any manifestly unlawful content; 
3.removes or blocks access to all unlawful content immediately, this generally being within 7 days of receiving the 
complaint; the 7-day time limit may be exceeded if a) the Decision regarding the unlawfulness of the content is 
dependent on the falsity of a factual allegation or is clearly dependent on other factual circumstances; in such cases, 
the social network can give the user an opportunity to respond to the complaint before the Decision is rendered; b) 
the social network refers the Decision regarding unlawfulness to a recognised self-regulation institution pursuant to 
subsections (6) to (8) within 7 days of receiving the complaint and agrees to accept the Decision of that institution; 
3.In the case of removal, retains the content as evidence and stores it for this purpose within the scope of Directives 
2000/31/EC and 2010/13/EU for a period of ten weeks; 4.immediately notifies the person submitting the complaint 
and the user about any Decision, while also providing them with reasons for its Decision.” 
227 Protection of Young Persons Act (Jugendschutzgesetz), adopted 23 Jul. 2002 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2730), 
last amended by Article 11 of the Law of 10 March 2017 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 420), available at 
https://dejure.org/gesetze/JuSchG. Cited from ARTICLE 19, Germany, supra note 192, at 34. 
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In sum, both administrative law and civil law in Germany have regulations to limit hate 
speech. Those statutes show how the German government balances freedom of speech and 
human dignity.  
4. Current Hate Speech Issues in Germany 
There are hate speech problems in German society even today. Offensive speech has 
increased, possibly directed toward immigrants and refugees. This is, in turn, possibly due to 
more than 60% of the applications submitted refugees and asylum seekers in the EU having been 
made in Germany. As a result, tensions have increased between the German people and the new 
immigrants, and this phenomenon has caused the German people to turn against the refugees and 
asylum seekers. Right-wing parties in Germany, such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD), 
have largely been responsible for the online hate speech toward immigrants and have used the 
hatred to increase their public support and political strength.230 In 2019, the AfD had great 
success in a regional election in the Free State of Thuringia.231 
Moreover, anti-Semitic speech still exists in Germany, as the right-wing party has raised not 
just anti-immigrant sentiment but also anti-Semitism. This anti-Semitic speech includes 
Holocaust denials. For example, one of the AfD leaders, Alexander Gauland, mentioned the 
Holocaust as a “speck of bird poo in over 1,000 years of successful German history,” and another 
member, Bjoern Hoecke, said, “the Holocaust memorial in Berlin is a monument of shame.”232 
Moreover, the other right-wing party, the National Democratic Party of Germany, keeps 
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proposing to challenge the “free democratic order” and spread offensive speech in relation to this 
principle.233 
Moreover, NetzDG’s work also shows that hate speech on the internet is a severe problem in 
Germany. In real practice, NetzDG’s influence existed before it was formally applied. It led to 
251 suspensions and 11 removals on Twitter from April to May 2017. In 2018, a case showed 
that Twitter removed a politician’s speech on behalf of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a 
right-wing political party, but also eliminated the statement to critique the removal.234  
5. Conclusion 
Compared to the US approach to hate speech, the German approach is very different. The 
German system is a model of human dignity-based jurisprudence. Karl Loewenstein framed the 
German approach as a classic case of militant democracy.235 The German approach includes the 
strictest restrictions on hate speech in the world. Laws have been enacted and regulations are in 
place to punish statements supporting the Nazis and denying the Holocaust. The principles of 
human dignity and militant democracy are the central characteristics of German jurisprudence. 
The German approach not only limits hate speech but also recognizes the denial of historical 
oppression and challenges to the democratic order as hate speech.  
IV. SOUTH AFRICA’S APPROACH 
1. Overview 
The Constitution of South Africa rules that hate speech is not protected. The Equality Act is 
the other relevant speech regulation at the law level. Furthermore, South Africa is drafting the 
 
233 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, No prohibition of the National Democratic Party of Germany as there are no 
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Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill to restrict hate crimes and hate 
speech. As in Germany, the approach toward hate speech in South Africa has human dignity and 
militant democracy at the core of its constitution.  
“Apartheid”236 was the segregation system in South Africa from the 1940s to the 1990s. The 
National Party in South Africa proposed apartheid after World War II, and it became a formal 
rule and practice in 1948. The National Party distinguished four primary racial groups: white, 
black, Indian, and “colored,”237 and forced them to live in specific places.238 The white people 
were the only citizens eligible to be political candidates at that time.239 A “Bantustan” was a 
significant approach of apartheid. The Bantustan was a territory set aside as a black state or 
homeland in order to implement racial segregation.240 Another problem that combined with the 
black homeland policy was “forced removal,” a system based on the Group Areas Act in 1950.241  
 
236 Under the apartheid system, “Grand Apartheid” means separating different races in diverse living areas. The 
Population Registration Act of 1950 specified the formal classification of races through the Identification Card for 
citizens of South Africa. The Group Areas Act of 1950 forced people to live in a specific area based on their race. In 
contrast, “Petty Apartheid” separated the different public facilities based on race. The Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act of 1953 also separated the public facilities for different races. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE 
SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981). 
237 “Colored” was a specific term in Population Registration Act, 1950. It means “mixed race,” including “Khoisan, 
Bantu, Afrikaner, Whites, Austronesian, East Asian or South Asian.” See Deborah Posel, What’s in a name? Racial 
categorizations under apartheid and their afterlife, NO. 47, TRANSFORMATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 50 (2001). 
238 Richard Dowden, Apartheid: Made in Britain: Richard Dowden Explains How Churchill, THE INDEPENDENT. 
INDEPENDENT DIGITAL NEWS AND MEDIA (Oct. 22, 2011), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/apartheid-made-in-
britain-richard-dowden-explains-how-churchill-rhodes-and-smuts-caused-black-south-1370856.html. 
239 In 1956, the South African Parliament passed the Separate Representation of Voters Act, which separated voters 
into white voters and non-white voters. The coloreds were allowed to vote four representatives to the parliament 
until a 1969 law abolished those seats. IAN LOVELAND, BY DUE PROCESS OF LAW: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE IN SOUTH AFRICA 360-375 (1999). 
240 The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 provided the legal basis to create the government structure of segregation in 
South Africa. The Promotion of Black Self-Government Act of 1959 forced the black people to stay in their 
homeland with self-government and banned white representatives in the black people’s government. Finally, the 
Black Homeland Constitution Act of 1971 proposed that the black states were substantially independent, so that the 
“white minority” could always be a political majority in South Africa by excluding the black groups in their 
homelands. Martin Abel, Long-Run Effects of Forced Resettlement: Evidence from Apartheid South Africa, 79, no. 4 
THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 915, 920 (2019). 
241 From the 1960s to the 1980s, the government of South Africa forced citizens to resettle to a new living area, 
depending on their race. The government used police violence to counter the resistance of the South African people. 
Id. at 920-922 (2019).  
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Throughout South African history, hate speech regulations were used to oppress the black 
groups and prevent them from spreading speech against “apartheid” or other unfair treatments. 
For instance, the Native Administration Act of 1927 outlawed these groups from uttering “any 
word or engaging in any other act or thing whatever with the intent to promote any feeling of 
hostility between natives and Europeans.” In actual practice, the Act punished the black people 
for using offensive speech toward white people. The punishment included fines, imprisonment 
and forcible removal. The Publications Act of 1974 restricted “a publication of anything that 
could incite racial hostility or could amount to an expression of ridicule or contempt for a section 
of the population.” However, the Act was usually used to outlaw the anti-racial discrimination 
point of view.242 The Internal Security Act of 1982 further prohibited people from critiquing 
racial policies.243 After democratization, however, the legal system created human dignity rights 
and militant democracy to correct the previous wrongdoing. 
2. Constitution of South Africa and its Jurisprudence 
The Constitution of South Africa is created to correct the wrongful discrimination based on 
race and the apartheid system of the past. Its jurisprudence places an emphasis on the guarantee 
 
242 Gilbert J. Marcus, Racial Hostility: The South African Experience, IN ARTICLE 19: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE 
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of human rights,244 equality,245 and dignity.246 However, freedom of speech247 is not the superior 
right in the Constitution. Some unprotected speech is directly written into Article 16(2) as an 
exception clause, which rules that the freedom of speech does not extend to (a) propaganda for 
war, (b) incitement of imminent violence, or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, 
ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”248 Ryan F. Haigh 
argued that “incitement to cause harm” in Article 16(2)(c) is an additional requirement for hate 
speech directed toward race, ethnicity, gender, or religion.249 
Human dignity is a prominent right in the South African Constitution, as it is in the German 
system. However, compared to German Constitutional jurisprudence, human dignity in South 
Africa is a “relative right.” It is not an “eternal right as well,” and also “not the only supreme 
value.” The Constitutional Court of South Africa recognizes that human dignity is limitable 
when it is proportional.250 It also could be amended.251 The importance of human dignity, 
 
244 Constitution of South Africa, Section 7: “(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It 
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
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248 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2). 
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equality, and freedom are at the same level.252 Hence, the jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitution is “a web of mutually supporting rights to promote human dignity and social 
transformation.”253 The principle of human dignity, however, guides the equality jurisprudence 
of the constitutional court and has become an essential right in South Africa.254 In the case 
Khumalo v. Holomisa, which was a defamation case related to a public figure,255 Justice Kate 
O’Regan mentioned that the balance between human dignity and freedom of speech is necessary. 
The freedom of speech right is significant and fundamental to democracy, but it should be 
construed along with the values of human dignity and equality.256 Therefore, hate speech issues 
in South Africa, as a balance between freedom of speech and human dignity, prefer neither the 
freedom of speech nor human dignity.   
One example is the case Islamic Unity Convention v. Independent Broadcasting Authority. 
The constitutional court held that prohibiting hate speech is acceptable. The case involved an 
employee in the Islamic Unity Convention who claimed that “Israel was illegitimate,” there was 
“no gas chamber in World War II,” and there were “only one million Jewish victims because of 
the Holocaust.” The Authority sued the Convention for violating the regulations regarding 
broadcasting.257 Justice Langa stated that “the most speech restriction should be not allowed, and 
offensive speech should be tolerated. However, the hate speech undermines human dignity, 
 
252 However, The Human Dignity Clause in German Basic Law is superior than other constitutional values. Id. 252-
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enhances discrimination and the unequal situation to divide the society.”258 The prohibition is 
constitutional for the following reasons. First, to limit hate speech does not mean all racial 
offenses are illegal. Second, only offensive speech with “real harms” would be banned by the 
hate speech regulation.259 The holding balanced the rights’ conflict then found the middle ground 
between freedom of speech and human dignity. 
3. Statutory Interpretations of Hate Speech Regulations 
A. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the 
Equality Act) is the primary regulation that deals with hate speech issues in South Africa. The 
Equality Act designs some agencies and special courts for its issues. The South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHCR) is the institution that handles hate speech claims. If SAHCR 
recognized that further court action was necessary, the complaint might move to the Equality 
Courts, which are based on the Equality Act and were established in 2003.260 The judgement of 
the Equality Court could be appealed to The High Courts of South Africa. The High Courts may 
deal with hate speech issues under the specific requirements met.261 
Article 10 of the Act limits speech that is “hurtful,” intended to “be harmful or to incite 
harm,” or “to promote or propagate hatred.”262 The Equality Act, however, applies more 
 
258 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others (CCT36/01) [2002] ZACC 3; 2002 
(4) SA 294; 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (Apr. 11, 2002). available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/3.html. 
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FXI.ORG.ZA. “HANDBOOKS” 20 (Jun. 25, 2013), https://www.fxi.org.za/docs-
resources/Hate_Speech_and_Freedom_of_Expression_in_SA.pdf.  
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discrimination which does not fall within one of the prescribed grounds, such an order must be confirmed by the 
High Court having jurisdiction prior to such order being of force and effect. 3. In addition, an appeal to the High 
Court lies from Decisions made by Magistrate’s Court Equality Courts.” Id. at 21. 
262 Equality Act § 10 (S. Afr.). 
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extensively than the ruling of the Constitution of South Africa, and includes “sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, conscience, belief, culture, 
language, birth, and any other similar discrimination.”263 Compared to Article 16(2) of the 
Constitution, “the incitement to cause harm” is not necessary for Article 10 of the Equality Act. 
The Article possibly overrides the protection of the Constitution. Also, the terms “hurtful” and 
“harmful” are too vague. Hence, the Act might punish people on the basis of jokes and 
sarcasm.264 Critics find the act to be too expansive.  
B. The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill 
The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill is a specific law aimed 
at reducing hate speech and hate crimes.265 The National Assembly of South Africa proposed the 
bill in 2016, and it is sitting before the legislative assembly to date.266 The law is based on 
section 7, section 8,267 section 9, section 10, and section 16 of the Constitution of South Africa, 
plus the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and 
it is directed against offensive speech and crime based on “any race or group of persons of 
another color or ethnic origin.”268 The definition of hate speech is in Article 4 of the bill and 
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267 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10. 
268 Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, Preamble: “Since the Constitution of the 
58 
 
rules that the offensive expression must be harmful, incite harm, and promote and propagate 
hatred, based on the following categories: “age, albinism, birth, color, culture, disability, ethnic 
or social origin, gender or gender identity, HIV status, language, nationality, migrant or refugee 
status, race, religion, sex, which includes intersex, or sexual orientation.”269 The bill also creates 
the exception of hate speech as follows: “bona fide artistic creativity, performance or other form 
of expression,” “academic or scientific inquiry,” “fair and accurate reporting or commentary in 
the public interest,” or “the bona fide interpretation and proselytizing or espousing of any 
religious tenet, belief, teaching, doctrine or writings.”270 
Some critics of the bill point out that the hate speech definition in the bill may cause a 
chilling effect on freedom of speech rights. For example, saying “white people are privileged or 
stole land,” or “men are trash” might constitute hate speech based on this bill.271 Hence, the bill 
has remained under debate in Congress for many years. 
 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, commits the Republic of South Africa and its people to establish a society that is 
based on democratic values of social justice, human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism… and since the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, to which the Republic is a signatory, requires States Parties to Declare, among others, an 
offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial 
discrimination, as well as acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin.” 
269 Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, Section 4(1): “(1) (a) Any person who 
intentionally publishes, propagates or advocates anything or communicates to one or more persons in a manner that 
could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to—(i) be harmful or to incite harm; or (ii) promote 
or propagate hatred, based on one or more of the following grounds: (aa) age; (bb) albinism; (cc) birth; (dd) color; 
(ee) culture; (ff) disability; (gg) ethnic or social origin; (hh) gender or gender identity; (ii) HIV status; (jj) language; 
(kk) nationality, migrant or refugee status; (ll) race; (mm) religion; (nn) sex, which includes intersex; or (oo) sexual 
orientation, is guilty of an offence of hate speech.” 
270 Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, Section 4(2): “(2) The provisions of subsection 
(1) do not apply in respect of anything done as contemplated in subsection (1) if it is done in good faith in the course 
of engagement in—(a) any bona fide artistic creativity, performance or other form of expression, to the extent that 
such creativity, performance or expression does not advocate hatred that constitutes incitement to cause harm, based 
on one or more of the grounds referred to in subsection (1)(a); (b) any academic or scientific inquiry; (c) fair and 
accurate reporting or commentary in the public interest or in the publication of any information, commentary, 
advertisement or notice, in accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
or (d) the bona fide interpretation and proselytising or espousing of any religious tenet, belief, teaching, doctrine or 
writings, to the extent that such interpretation and proselytisation does not advocate hatred that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm, based on one or more of the grounds referred to in subsection (1)(a).” 
271 Krista Mahr, A South African law would make hate speech punishable by jail time, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 28, 
2019). https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-south-africa-hate-speech-20190328-story.html.  
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4. Current Hate Speech Issues in South Africa 
A. Current Issues 
There have been some hate speech issues in South Africa recently, which show that racial 
hate speech still exists in the country. For example, a white Afrikaner nationalist group displayed 
“the apartheid-era flag,” which was the old national flag of South Africa and was replaced by the 
current flag in 1994. In 2019, the South African Equality Court held that the flag constituted hate 
speech toward black people, based on the Equality Law.272 The Asian people in South Africa 
have also claimed that they are under attack by hate speech.273 Moreover, anti-immigrant hate 
crimes have become a severe problem in South Africa, and research has shown that anti-
immigrant sentiments might rise even further in the coming years.274 Further, offensive speech 
aimed at homosexuality is another problem. For instance, a pastor, Oscar Bougardt, stated that 
“we need ISIS to come to countries that are homosexual friendly. ISIS, please come rid South 
Africa of the homosexual curse.” The Equality Court denied his defense of freedom of religion 
and held that he violated the Equality Act.275   
 
272 REUTERS, South African Court Rules Display of Apartheid Flag Constitutes hate speech (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-politics-flag/south-african-court-rules-display-of-apartheid-flag-
constitutes-hate-speech-idUSKCN1VB1AF. Also, 61. NBC UNIVERSAL NEWS GROUP, South Africa Court: 
Using Apartheid-Era Flag Is Hate Speech, Should Be Punished (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/south-africa-court-using-apartheid-era-flag-hate-speech-should-n1045086.  
273 SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Silent No Longer, South Africa's Chinese Fight Back against Hate Speech (Apr. 
13, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/3006018/dagger-our-backs-racism-no-longer-just-black-
and-white-south. 
274 Steven Gordon, What Research Reveals about Drivers of Anti-Immigrant Hate Crime in South Africa, THE 
CONVERSATION (Sept. 8, 2019), http://theconversation.com/what-research-reveals-about-drivers-of-anti-immigrant-
hate-crime-in-south-africa-123097. 
275 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, South African Court Delivers Blow to Religious Defense of Hate Speech, 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/south-african-court-delivers-blow-religious-defense-hate-speech (last visited Sept. 15, 
2019). Also, Ohene Yaw Ampofo-Anti, Court Rules That Religion Cannot Be Used as a Defence for Anti-Gay Hate 




B. Courts’ Decisions 
In the case Afri-Forum and Another v. Julius Sello Malema, the defendant was accused of 
singing the song “Dubula ibhunu, Dubula amabhunu baya raypha” to his son, which caused such 
offense to a Boer farmer that he shot them, saying they were rapists. The Equality Court of South 
Africa recognized the speech as hate speech under the Equality Act. However, the Court held 
that while the issues touch “majoritarian or minoritarian positions,” the test to consider in 
determining whether an action constitutes hate speech or crime “must always be whether the 
measure under scrutiny promotes or retards the achievement of human dignity, equality, and 
freedom.” 276 In this case, the Court examined whether the actual audience was substantially 
impacted in determining whether the song was harmful. 
The Equality Court further explained the standard in the case Human Rights Commission of 
South Africa v. SABC, in which a Zulu song offended the Indian immigrants by accusing them 
of being the reason for the Zulu people’s poverty. The Court held that the “incitement to cause 
harm” was the element to consider in whether this act constituted hate speech.277 In the case 
Ramesh Dharamshee Jethalal v. Mbongeni Ngema and Universal Music, in which the song 
“Amandiya” caused offense to the Indians,278 the Equality Court once again stated that section 
 
276 Global Freedom of Expression, Afri-Forum v. Malema, 
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/afri-forum-v-malema/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
277 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INSTITUTE, HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 
260, at 23. 
278 The lyrics of the song was “Oh men! Oh, virulent men! We need a courageous man to delegate to the Indians. For 
this matter is complicated and now needs to be reported to men. Indians don’t want to change, even Mandela has 
failed to convince them, it was better with whites we knew then it was a racial conflict . . . Indians are not interested 
to cast their vote but when do so they vote for whites . . . Being turned into clowns by Indians, Zulus do not have 
money and are squatting in shacks as chattels of Indians . . . I have never seen Dlamini relocating to India Yet here 
is Gurmede in Durban being homeless. We struggle so much here in Durban, as we, have been dispossessed by 
Indians who in turn are suppressing our people.” Cited from KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS, 
supra note 254, at 209. 
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16(2) of the Constitution required satisfying both the “advocacy of hatred based on race” and the 
“incitement to cause harm” conditions. Then, the clause could be applied.279 
In the case South African Human Rights Commission v. Jon Dubula Qwelane, the Equality 
Court’s decision favored the South African Human Rights Commission. The issue was raised 
because of Jonathan Dubula Qwelane’s article, which mentioned “call me names, but GAY is not 
okay,” which was recognized as an offense to the LGBTQ community. The Court agreed with 
the Commission’s claim that speech is harmful when it is intended to “incite harm or propagate 
hate against a particular group.”280 
Regarding religious hatred, the High Court of South Africa prohibited the publishing of 
Danish cartoons that stated “the Prophet Muhammad wears a bomb-shaped turban with a lit 
fuse.” The Court recognized that first, the cartoon constituted religious hate speech, and second, 
the clear and present danger standard was met in this situation.281 
5. Conclusion 
South Africa has designed its approach to hate speech based on the country’s history of 
oppression. However, neither the Equality Act nor the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes 
and Hate Speech Bill are too strict to balance human dignity and freedom of speech. In fact, they 
make the freedom of speech right very limited. As a newly emerging democracy, South Africa 
might have fixed some problems with its approach, but it has created others.  
 
279 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INSTITUTE, HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 
260, at 23-24. 
280 SAHRC, SAHRC Welcomes Judgment in Qwelane Matter – SAHRC: "Freedom of Expression Should Not Be 
Used as a Veil for Hate Speech," https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/808-sahrc-welcomes-
judgment-in-qwelane-matter-sahrc-freedom-of-expression-should-not-be-used-as-a-veil-for-hate-speech (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2019). 
281 KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS, supra note 254, at 203-205. 
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V. APPROACH OF EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
1. Overview 
The hate speech regulation in international law could be ruled on the basis of different 
treaties.282 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an international court founded by 
the European Convention on Human Rights.283 Forty-seven states have signed and joined the 
Convention as members. The treaty has a binding effect on its all members.284 The ECtHR 
accepts both Inter-State applications285 and Individual applications.286 The approach toward hate 
speech regulation in the European Court of Human Rights provides an essential legal basis for 
the members of the Convention as well as a legal standard to follow. 
The approach toward hate speech espoused by the European Convention on Human Rights is 
mainly designed under two articles: Article 10 rules on the freedom of expression right, and its 
limitation is defined in Section 2 of the Article.287 Article 17 outlines the prohibition of the abuse 
 
282 For examples, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) governs the 
freedom of speech right and its limitation. Article 20 is the hate speech regulation. See International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. & International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 20, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.; Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) limits hate speech as well. International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 19; Another similar rule is Section 5, Article 
13, of the American Convention on Human Rights, which also regulates hate speech. American Convention on 
Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art 13. sec. 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 128. 
283 Article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “To ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a 
European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as "the Court". It shall function on a permanent basis.” 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR] art 19. 
284 Article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the 
Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only 
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” ECHR art 41. 
285 Article 33 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court 
any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the protocols thereto by another High Contracting 
Party.” ECHR art 33. 
286 Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “The Court may receive applications from any person, 
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties 
undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.” ECHR art 34. 
287 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10: “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.  This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
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of rights.288 Section 2, Article 10, constitutes the limitation of freedom of speech and defines that 
it must be balanced under three elements: legal basis, causation, and the doctrine of 
proportionality. In contrast, Article 17 is the exclusive clause and directly denies the guarantee of 
freedom of speech289 in cases where the violation severely contradicts the fundamental values of 
the Convention.290 To review the decisions from the European Court of Human Rights, I will 
define different categories in the following sections. 
2. Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of 
Human Rights’ Decisions 
A. The Existence of Clearly Established Historical Events: The Discussion around Applying 
Article 17 Is Unnecessary. 
Article 17 is an exclusive clause and applying it directly denies that constituents are 
guaranteed freedom of speech. The Holocaust Denying and Revisionism would directly apply to 
Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights to deny the freedom of speech 
protection. In the case of Garaudy v. France, the applicant published the book The Founding 
Myths of Modern Israel, which denied the Holocaust. The Court held that the Holocaust is one 
example of “the existence of clearly established historical events.” Thus, to deny the Holocaust is 
 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. (2)The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for  the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.” ECHR art 10. 
288 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 17: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying 
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any 
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
Convention.” ECHR art 17. 
289 Fort Fu-Te Liao, What is Hate Speech? Shall and How to Regulate? Analysis of Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights, vol. 45, no. 4 EURAMERICA 464-467 (2015). 
290 European Court of Human Rights claims: “There is no doubt that any remark directed against the Convention’s 
underlying values would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17” See EUROPEAN COURT OF 




to deny crimes against humanity with the aim of rehabilitating the National Socialist regime. The 
Court used Article 17 to reject the defendant’s application.291 
In the case M’Bala M’Bala v. France, the applicant awarded “the prize for infrequent ability 
and insolence” to Robert Faurisson, a scholar of revisionism who denied the Holocaust.292 The 
Court applied Article 17 to hold that the application was inadmissible.293 Therefore, while 
meeting “the existence of clearly established historical events,” the Court engaged in no further 
discussion about Article 17 and immediately rejected the claim of freedom of speech. 
B. Applying Article 17 after the Discussion around It 
In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights rejects anti-Semitic speech, which does not 
touch on Holocaust denial, to constitute “the existence of clearly established historical events.” 
In the case Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, the applicant was a Russian who edited a newspaper written 
to advocate the exclusion of Jewish people. The Court held that his speech was a violation 
against the values of tolerance, social peace, and non-discrimination, and it applied Article 17 to 
deny his application.294 The difference between Holocaust denying and other anti-Semitic speech 
is that when constituting “the existence of clearly established historical events,” the discussion 
around applying Article 17 is unnecessary, in the other words, Article 17 directly applies.295 
Cases challenging democratic order also apply Article 17. In the case of the German 
Communist Party (GCP) v. the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957, the European Court of 
 
291 Garaudy v. France (Dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX. Cited from id. 
292 Robert Faurisson was punished by French government in 1991. The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC) held that his speech constituted hate speech and was punishable in 1993. See case of Faurisson v. France, 
Communication No. 550/1993 (Nov. 8, 1986). Cited from Friedrich Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech? 
Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 373 (1998). 
293 M’Bala M’Bala v. France (Dec.), no. 25239/13, ECHR 2015. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, supra note 290, at 3. 
294 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (Dec.), no. 35222/04, 20 February 2007. The same holding, see W.P. and Others v. Poland 
(Dec.), no. 42264/98, ECHR 2004-VII. Cited from id. at 2. 
295 Liao, What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at 470-476. 
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Human Rights rejected the freedom of speech claim from the GCP and applied Article 17 to 
declare its inadmissibility. The Court stated that to challenge the democratic order contradicted 
the values of the Convention.296 However, in the 2005 case, Partidul Comunistilor and 
Ungureanu v. Romania, the Court ruled to allow the funding of the Communist Party. The 
difference between the two holdings was whether the party promoted itself using violence.297 
About the issues of racial hatred and ethnic conflicts, in the case Glimmerveen and 
Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, the applicant spread leaflets with the statement “White Dutch 
people” and “the others out of Netherland.” His account mainly targeted Surinamers, most of 
whom were Dutch citizens.298 The European Court of Human Rights applied Article 17 to ban 
the speech due to it directly violating the values of the Convention.299 
About the issue of religious hatred, in the case Norwood v. the United Kingdom, the 
applicant showed a picture with a statement, “Islam out of Britain. Protect British People.” The 
UK government convicted him. The European Court of Human Rights held the application 
inadmissible by Article 17 of the Convention. The Court pointed out that the speech went against 
the values of tolerance, social peace, and non-discrimination.300 
 
296 German Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, no. 250/57, Commission Decision of 20 July 1957. Cited from 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, supra note 290, at 4-5. 
297 Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, no. 46626/99, ECHR 2005-I. Cited from Liao, 
What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at 481-482. 
298 Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech? supra note 292, at 373-374. 
299 Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, nos. 8348/78 et 8406/78, Commission Decision of 11 October 
1979, DR 18. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, 
supra note 290, at 3. 
300 Norwood v. the United Kingdom (Dec.), no. 23131/03, ECHR 2004-XI. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, id. at 4. 
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3. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of 
Human Rights’ Decisions 
A. Apply Article 10 but not Violate it 
Section 1 of Article 10 protects freedom of speech, and Section 2 of Article 10 balances the 
freedom of speech with other rights and interests. Therefore, applying Article 10 but not 
violating it means denying the guarantee of freedom of speech. For example, in the case Balsyté- 
Lideikiené v. Lithuania, which addresses racial hatred and ethnic conflicts, the applicant 
published a calendar with an opinion that the territories of Poland, Belarus, and Russia all 
belonged to Lithuania. Lithuania convicted her. The European Court of Human Rights held that 
there was no violation of Article 10 because the speech proposed “aggressive nationalism and 
ethnocentrism” and incited hatred to people in the above countries.301  
In the case Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), which addresses national identity, the applicant published 
two letters that firmly blamed the Turkish government for oppressing the independence of the 
Kurdish people. He was convicted due to incitement of hatred. The European Court of Human 
Rights recognized that the applicant promoted using violence and seeking revenge. Turkey was 
declared that it did not violate Article 10.302 
Moreover, in the case Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, which addressed LGBTQ rights, the 
applicant circulated homophobic leaflets in a high school to incite hatred toward homosexuals. 
The leaflets claimed, “Homosexuality is a deviant sexual proclivity, a morally destructive effect 
on the substance of society, and it was responsible for the development of HIV and AIDS.” 303 
The European Court of Human Rights held that the statement made “serious and prejudicial 
 
301 Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania, no. 72596/01, 4 November 2008. Cited from id. at 9. 
302 Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999-IV. Cited from id. at 5. 
303 Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, no. 1813/07, 9 February 2012. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, supra note 290, at 6-7. 
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allegations.”304 Although the hateful actions had not been triggered, the Court agreed with the 
Swedish government to punish the applicant. 
B. Apply Article 10 and Violate it 
Applying Article 10 and violating it means the Court prefers to guarantee freedom of speech. 
If some historical oppressions of Nazism or Fascism are not related to Holocaust Denying and 
Revisionism, the “the existence of clearly established historical events” will not apply. In the 
case Lehideux and Isorni v. France, the applicants published their article in a newspaper to 
support Marshal Pétain and tried to clear his name regarding his cooperation with the Nazis. The 
Court, however, refused to use “the existence of clearly established historical events” to apply 
Article 17. The holding pointed out that the speech in the article did not deny the Holocaust. 
Moreover, the historical event occurred more than 40 years ago and was debatable. Speakers’ 
freedom of speech should be protected; consequently, the Court only recognized the punishment 
of the applicants’ speech violating Article 10.305 
Article 10 applies to cases of historical oppression against non-Jewish people. In the case 
Perínçek v. Switzerland, the applicant was a Turkish politician. He mentioned that the Ottoman 
Empire did not perpetrate genocide on the Armenians in 1915, based on a racist and nationalistic 
perspective. The Swiss government punished him. However, the European Court of Human 
Rights rejected Switzerland’s decision and held the violation of Article 10 because the 
applicant’s statement  was only a different viewpoint from the public opinion.306 Also, in the 
case Fáber v. Hungary, the applicant brought the striped Á rpád flag, which was linked with the 
 
304 However, whether “serious and prejudicial allegations” constitutes hate speech? It is still unclear. See Liao, 
What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at 504-506.  
305 Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII. Cited from id. 
at 7-8. 
306 Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, ECHR 2015. Cited from id. at 11. 
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totalitarian regime in Hungary, and displayed the flag in a parade aimed against racism and 
hatred. The Hungarian government punished him for hate speech. Nevertheless, the European 
Court of Human Rights disagreed with the decision and held that the violation of Article 10 
because the applicant used no violence and proposed no threat.307  
About racial hatred and ethnic conflicts, comparing to the case Balsyté- Lideikiené v. 
Lithuania, in the case Jersild v. Denmark, the applicant was a journalist and made a documentary 
to interview the racially based group, “Greenjackets.” In the film, Greenjackets made unfriendly 
statements against immigrants and other races, including comparing Turks and other foreigners 
with rats and advocating the expulsion and extermination of those groups.308 Denmark’s 
government convicted the journalist. However, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
the purpose of the film was not racism, but rather to introduce social issue from the perspective 
of racists. Hence, the Court held the violation of Article 10.309 
In the case Gündüz v. Turkey, which relates to religious hatred, the applicant was a member 
of an Islamic sect. He made a comment promoting Sharia law rather than secular and democratic 
principles, and the Turkish government convicted him. The European Court of Human Rights 
supported the applicant’s freedom of speech claim and held the violation of Article 10. The 
reason was that the speech did not incite violence and intolerance.310   
Comparing the case Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) with the case Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 
regarding national identity, a spokesman of a Basque separatist parliamentary group stated “the 
supreme head of the Spanish armed forces, in other words, the person in command of the 
torturers…defends torture and imposes his monarchic regime on our people through torture and 
 
307 Fáber v. Hungary, no. 40721/08, 24 July 2012. Cited from id. at 8-9. 
308 Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298. Cited from id. at 9-10. 
309 Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298. Cited from id.  
310 Gündüz v. Turkey, no. 35071/97, ECHR 2003-XI. Cited from id. at 6. 
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violence.” He was subsequently convicted of insulting the King. The Court held that violation of 
Article 10 occurred on the Spanish government. The holding pointed out that the applicant’s 
speech might be unfriendly, but no incitement of violence was included in the statement.311 
4. Conclusion 
The European Court of Human Rights offers broad categories of hate speech cases. It has 
collected hate speech incidents from different European countries and developed unification 
rules and basic standards for hate speech regulation. This could further the discussion of hate 
speech regulation by not only limiting it to a single country but approaching it from an 
international perspective. It supports the view that although hate speech involves differences in 
detail, it is a global problem for all human beings. The European view also reflects that the hate 
speech approach in the United States might be one example of American exceptionalism. The 
supporters of hate speech regulation tend to recognize the European countries’ success and 
advocate changing the current situation of hate speech in the United States.312   
VI. CONCLUSION: WHY THE ABOVE APPROACHES ARE USEFUL TO TAIWAN 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the nature of the historical oppressions of people in different 
countries profoundly relates to the approaches toward hate speech each country has taken. The 
United States, for example, is infamous for some extreme hate speech stances. As a traditional 
liberal democracy, the United States is very different than most other democratic countries, but it 
has many similarities with Taiwan in freedom of speech rights. Frederick Schauer argues that the 
First Amendment is a typical example of American exceptionalism.313 For Taiwan, considering 
the US approach to hate speech could be very useful. First, freedom of speech is a supreme right 
 
311 Otegi Mondragon v Spain, App No 2034/07 (ECtHR, 15 Mar. 2011). Cited from id. at 12-13. 
312 Krotoszynski, A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment, supra note 162, at 1551. 
313 See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 94, at 57-89. 
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in US jurisprudence, and the Taiwanese political culture also emphasizes freedom of speech. In 
addition, most Taiwanese freedom of speech doctrines were built on the US freedom of speech 
theories. In comparing the Taiwanese political system with the German and South African 
systems, the Taiwanese system is closer to the US presidential system. However, the drawback 
of majority rule is that it may cause a negative outcome for minority groups. Besides, it is 
apparent that the American culture has a strong influence over the Taiwanese culture. 
Compared to the US approach to hate speech, the German approach is very different. 
Contrary to the supremacy of freedom of speech in the US, the German system is a model of 
human dignity-based jurisprudence. Karl Loewenstein framed the German approach as a classic 
case of militant democracy.314 In this sense, the German system can provide Taiwan with some 
reference value, as, first, the Taiwanese constitution also has the militant democracy 
jurisprudence. Second, the principle of human dignity in Germany is prioritized more strongly 
than the freedom of speech principle, and the Taiwanese Judicial Review has incorporated 
human dignity as a constitutional value as well. Third, the previous dictatorship and authoritarian 
rule by the Nazi Party and Socialist Unity Party of Germany were similar to the period of martial 
law in Taiwan. Fourth, the Holocaust history in Germany is comparable to the February 28 
incident in Taiwan. This similarity could be helpful in examining whether the Holocaust-denying 
clause applies to Taiwan. Fifth, the speech promoting the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in 
East Germany has been recognized as hate speech by the laws in West Germany because it 
threatened the free democratic order in West Germany. Nowadays, in a similar way, speech 
promoting the Chinese Communist Party may also be a threat to freedom and democratic rule in 
Taiwan. 
 
314 See Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, supra note 235, at 417, and Loewenstein, 
Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II, supra note 235, at 638. 
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Like the German system, South Africa also built its human dignity-based jurisprudence after 
the third wave of democracy, and South Africa is a militant democracy system. As an emerging 
democracy, Taiwan could benefit by understanding the South African situation in the following 
ways. First, in South Africa historically, the white minority ruled the black majority, similar to 
the ethnic conflicts in Taiwanese history. Also, the legislatures of South Africa have passed 
many Acts promoting racial, ethnic, and gender equality, some of which are highly controversial. 
The comments and critiques related to these Acts could offer Taiwan valuable guidance in 
reconsidering its Ethnic Equality Act. Finally, promoting war is also considered hate speech in 
South Africa, and this could provide an example to Taiwan for dealing with this kind of 
expression. 
The different countries’ approaches to hate speech vary greatly due to their histories and 
cultures. However, what is the possibility that they might influence each other? In this respect, 
international law could provide a resource for developing an approach to hate speech regulation 
from the perspective of transnational constitutionalism. Transnational constitutionalism, also 
called world constitutionalism, is a phenomenon arising from both the internationalization of 
constitutional law and the constitutionalization of international law.315 The internationalization of 
constitutional law reflects the development of treaty-like constitutions in different countries, such 
as the incorporation of international human rights treaties into domestic constitutions.316 The hate 
speech regulations under international law and international courts have been developed as a 
specific approach to countering hate speech as well. The development of international laws 
around hate speech may offer useful materials for further analysis.  
 
315 See, Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 771 (1997). 
316 See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Internationalization of Constitutional Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1166 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
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After introducing the above approaches, I will further discuss those approaches’ underlying 
debates, from strong freedom of speech to strong human dignity and militant democracy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON 
HATE SPEECH?  
I. INTRODUCTION 
At present, this historical debate about the levels of limitation in hate speech is occurring in 
the United States. The current hate speech approach in the US is to keep freedom of speech 
supreme, due to which only the hate crime is punished, but hate speech is allowed. Some 
influential scholars in the United States have provided very significant theories to support 
freedom of speech supremacy to justify the United States’ methods. Also, I will introduce the 
counterarguments from the scholarship. 
In addition, different democratic countries have various theories of limitations on what 
constitutes hate speech. What are the reasons to restrict hate speech in other democratic 
countries? There are two leading theories that are the basis of hate speech restrictions in different 
democratic regimes. The first is human dignity. The second is militant democracy. The right to 
dignity constitutes a significant foundation for hate speech regulation. The balance between 
freedom of expression and human dignity presents a distinction of jurisprudence for some 
European countries, such as Germany, that emphasize dignity rights over freedom of speech. 
However, human dignity is less strongly emphasized in the United States compared to other 
countries.  
Secondly, from individualism to collectivism, the European countries have a specific theory 
that has allowed them to limit hate speech: militant democracy, which was created by Karl 
Loewenstein in 1937. Militant democracy means that democracy should protect itself by limiting 
some individual rights. Militant democracy creates a duty for the constitution to protect the 
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institution of democracy—the free and democratic order—and freedom of speech should not 
violate it. The theory makes hate speech further relate to preserving the institution of democracy. 
Indeed, the United States seems to be an exception to the hate speech strategies across the 
world. The United States has an incredibly distinct approach to freedom of speech based on its 
First Amendment jurisprudence. Why is the approach to hate speech in the United States 
different from the methods in other democratic countries? Frederick Schauer uses American 
exceptionalism to explain the difference between the United States’ approach to freedom of 
speech and other regimes’.317 The approach of balancing human dignity and freedom of speech is 
also a part of methodological exceptionalism within American exceptionalism. I will analyze the 
American exceptionalism theory below. The theory is useful in designing hate speech regulation 
in Taiwan. 
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR STRONG PROTECTION TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
1. Overview 
Some influential scholars in the United States have provided very significant theories to 
support the freedom of speech approach taken in the United States that limits bans on hate 
speech. Ronald Dworkin claims that the United States allows hate speech because allowing 
freedom of speech provides the United States with democratic legitimacy. Secondly, C. Edwin 
Baker argues that the American First Amendment theory is built on guaranteeing its citizens’ 
autonomy. Thirdly, Robert Post claims that hate speech should not be banned in the United 
States to protect the integrity of public discourse. This scholarship proposes that enforcing fewer 
limitations on hate speech ensures the values of the United States.  
 
317 See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 94, at 57-89. 
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2. Ronald Dworkin’s Argument of Democratic Legitimacy 
Scholar Ronald Dworkin acknowledges that hate speech might cause harmful consequences, 
but he still proposes that we should tolerate it. His main argument is based on democratic 
legitimacy.318 
Dworkin agrees that some speech, such as pornographic images or racist speech, could not 
offer any value or contribution to the marketplace of ideas, but those expressions are the basis of 
the democratic legitimacy of a country’s policymaking. Dworkin insists that “each citizen has 
not just a vote, but a voice and that is necessary for ‘a fair democracy.’”319 He also emphasizes 
that free expression is the only way to justify the majority decision.320 In his theory, the right to 
free expression is just like the right to vote, as these are essential functions needed to maintain a 
working democracy. Freedom of speech justifies the government’s actions and provides 
democratic legitimacy. Dworkin argues that the government should not use coercive powers to 
impose a decision on dissenting individuals unless each individual was treated as a free and 
equal member of the community.321  
Dworkin points out that freedom of speech is the most significant method of protecting a 
dissenting opinion, no matter how terrible the ideas are. He said a government could use 
antidiscrimination laws to avoid racism or discrimination toward women and LGBT persons, but 
to intervene further “upstream” by forbidding any unfairness or unequitable expression should 
not be allowed. He warns: “If we intervene too soon in the process through which collective 
opinion is formed, we spoil the only democratic justification we have for insisting that everyone 
 
318 Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY v, vi-vii (Hare, Ivan Hare & James 
Weinstein eds., 2009). 





obey these laws, even those who hate and resent them.”322 Therefore, in his theory, freedom of 
expression is a necessary condition for a state to achieve democratic legitimacy.  
3. C. Edwin Baker’s Argument of Autonomy 
Paralleling Dworkin’s point of view, C. Edwin Baker also supports freedom of speech 
supremacy. His main argument in favor of freedom of speech is the value of autonomy.323 He 
stated that a state’s legitimacy depends on respecting its civilians’ equality and autonomy. 
People’s autonomy is based on their free expression to show their values, no matter how terrible, 
disrespectful, or harmful those values present themselves from the content of their speech. 
People only experience their dignity in the legal system, when it guarantees their equality and 
autonomy. Baker insists that a country could not request that its civilians obey legal regulations 
unless the legal system was built on people’s autonomy, meaning, unless those people have a 
chance to make choices. That is so-called formal autonomy.324 
Furthermore, Baker talks about people’s substantive autonomy. For him, substantive 
autonomy means “a person’s actual capacity and opportunities to lead the best, most meaningful, 
self-directed life possible.”325 To enhance some individuals’ substantive autonomy, nevertheless, 
might oppress others. To respect everyone’s expression is a significant part of substantive 
autonomy. For example, hate speech speakers perform their autonomy while showing their 
unpopular opinions, although, in certain situations, their autonomy might offend others. Baker 
 
322 Id. at viii. 
323 About relationship between democracy legitimacy and autonomy, Baker said “Democratic legitimacy, I believe, 
and certainly the civil libertarian commitment, requires that, in advancing people’s substantive autonomy as well as 
in advancing substantive egalitarian aims and other proper policy goals, the legal order neither have the purpose to 
nor use general means that disrespect people’s formal autonomy (or their formal equality).” see C. Edwin Baker, 
Autonomy and Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 139, 143 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 
2009). 
324 Id. at 142. 
325 Id. at 143. 
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argues that in this situation, a government should avoid having a preference for the collective 
self-definitional or majoritarian values.326 
Baker also worries that hate speech regulation might force hate speech underground. Thus, 
different opinions will not have the chance to understand their enemy and to have an appropriate 
opportunity to respond to it.327 Also, Baker mentions that the hate speech ban would cause 
people to retreat into more extreme anger and stronger beliefs. They might foment more hatred 
and choose to use violence or illegal approaches. Limiting hate speech could reduce a 
democracy’s ability to deal with internal conflicts and to use political resolution, and the society 
might fall into a violent struggle.328 The hate speech ban might advance the point of racism for 
racists if they are deprived of the ability to express their hate speech. The hate speech ban might 
become proof of the racist viewpoint.329  
Besides, Baker also illustrates his concern that the government might abuse its power by 
applying its hate speech ban. In some countries, such as Ethiopia, the hate speech regulation is 
usually aimed at extreme dissidents who are under substantial historical oppression. Also, the 
hate speech ban might enhance subordinate, weak groups.330 
Moreover, Baker said that banning hate speech will weaken the challenging response to 
extreme views such as racism. If nobody argues against a wrongful viewpoint, a truce could not 
be achieved. People will lose the ability to provide evidence for harmful statements if the 
 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 152. 
328 Id. at 152-153. 
329 Baker claimed: “a political program of enacting and enforcing hate speech prohibitions runs the danger of 
diverting political energy from arguably more meaningful political responses to the underlying causes of racism. 
Often the purveyors of racism have themselves experienced forms of social or material discrimination (or 
deprivation)—and sometimes they even list their depressed material condition as evidence justifying their racist 
views. Changing these material conditions is crucial. Though full consideration of the causes of racism is far beyond 
the scope of this talk (and my understanding), social and material conditions, including those that generate feelings 
of economic and social marginalization, are likely contexts in which racial resentment flourishes.” Id.  
330 Id. at 154. 
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government outlaws those addresses. By way of illustration, if the US defeated communism by 
disallowing speech to support it, people in the US might miss the chance to make a 
counterargument against communism.331 To address racist speech, people should listen to it and 
have a critical response against it.332 
Furthermore, Baker challenges the view that prohibiting hate speech could stop systematic 
persecution. He doubts that any claim of causation between hate speech and the abuse could be 
efficiently proven. In contrast, he recognizes that the limitation of hate speech might be 
counterproductive and result in adverse outcomes. A hate speech ban would oppress those 
speakers and might trigger more hatred and extreme politics. Hence, officially restricting evil 
would cause an evil consequence.333 He insists: “To allow people the option to express their 
dreadful views is less dangerous than to attempt to outlaw this expression.”334  
Finally, Baker concludes with the reasons that the hate speech ban might cause a poor 
outcome, which are:335 First. allowing and then combating hate speech is the best choice to 
understand hateful thought. Secondly, limiting hate speech reduces the ability to socially respond 
to it. Thirdly, banning hate speech might encourage more violence. Fourthly, not restricting hate 
speech could enhance the possibility of resolving a conflict through politics rather than violence. 
 
331 For Hate speech debate, speech supporting Communism may be not a parallel example. But for Baker, the two 
kinds of speech are both extreme speeches. Baker claims “Nevertheless, Douglas illustrates the logic of a view that 
favouring free speech provides a central aspect of the best response to a major evil to which objectionable speech is 
said to contribute. Crucially, nothing in Douglas’s argument for allowing the expression of evil views counsels 
neutrality toward or even social toleration of those objectionable revolutionary views. The same lack of social 
toleration even more obviously applies to the expression of racial hatred. Nothing about legally allowing the 
speech—either in the Dennis case or in the hate speech context—suggests that the views expressed do not present a 
serious threat to the existence of an acceptable world. Rather, the pragmatic claim is that to allow people the option 
to express their dreadful views is less dangerous than to attempt to outlaw this expression.”  Id. at 146-147. 
332 Id. at 150-151. 
333 Id. at 148-149. 
334 Therefore, he disagrees Tsesis’spoint of view in hate speech issue. Id. at 150. 
335 Id. at 155. 
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Fifthly, governments might abuse their power by limiting speech. Therefore, in his theory, 
freedom of expression is a necessary condition of people’s autonomy. 
4. Robert Post’s Argument on Protecting the Public Discourse 
Beyond Dworkin’s and Baker’s arguments, Robert Post provides another perspective on 
supporting freedom of speech supremacy. Post emphasizes protecting the public discourse such 
that a state should allow hate speech. In his argument, the First Amendment is a shield for 
processing democracy by defending essential communication, the so-called “public 
discourse.”336 
Post recognizes that continuing public debate is a practice of self-determination that 
constitutes a collective will. The process is democracy. Without this structure, the majority 
decision will lose its foundation on self-determination and become a majority that rules 
minorities through heteronomous submission. Under this theory, the function of public discourse 
is to coordinate everyone’s will. Accordingly, public discourse becomes respect between each 
free and equal person. Thus, public discourse is “a communicative medium through which the 
democratic ‘self’ is itself constituted.”337 
Post’s theory, in addition to self-determination, proposed another concept: a community.338 A 
community works based on civility rules that protect its members’ personal integrity and ensure 
the community’s identity. Post’s civility rules connect with human dignity.339 He argues in 
 
336 Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 278 (1991). 
337 Id. at 284-285. 
338 In his definition, a community is a social formation that inculcates norms into the very identities of its members. 
Id. at 286. Also, he said: “What goes to make up the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are 
common to the group. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the 
institutions of that community into his own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his 
personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the 
attitude of the members of the community. Such, in a certain sense, is the structure of a man’s personality.” See Post, 
Hate speech, supra note 34, at 128. 
339 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 336, at 286. 
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dignity based on the communal norms between the members of a community. Dignity rights are 
not subjective but are objective norms founded on members’ claims.340 
Post emphasizes the tension between a community and democracy: “Democracy seeks to 
open the space of public discourse for collective self-constitution; community seeks to bound 
that space through the enforcement of civility rules.” 341 The public discourse aims to achieve 
reconciliation through public reason, but a community’s civility rules will outlaw some speech as 
both irrational and coercive. Post defines the situation as “a paradox of public discourse: the first 
amendment, in the name of democracy, suspends legal enforcement of the very civility rules that 
make rational deliberation possible.” 342  
Robert Post instead argues that the public discourse should protect all forms of 
communication, as public discourse might lose its function by excluding any conversation.343 
Post responds to the argument of limiting hate speech in the interest of preventing individuals’ 
harm. He mentions that punishing hate speech would confuse the distinction between individual 
and collective identity. The damage to an individual in hate speech simultaneously hurts the 
community identity. Therefore, the government should choose to execute the rules from the 
communities to avoid harmful results, but it should not use legal mechanisms to perform specific 
civility rules. He said individual injury is “an unavoidable cost of the political constitution of 
community identity.”344 The antiracist movement, however, is precisely raised by self-
determination. Hence, if the purpose is to make the public discourse self-guided, using speech 
rejecting hatred and discrimination is a more appropriate method than using legal regulations.345 
 
340 Post, Hate speech, supra note 34, at 129. 
341 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 336, at 286. 
342 Id. at 286-288. 
343 Id. at 294-300. 
344 Id. at 301. 
345 Id. at 300-302. 
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Post further replies to the argument about rejecting the marketplace of ideas, which stated 
that irrational and hateful expressions would exclude minorities’ opinions. Once again, Post 
emphasizes the importance of the public discourse. He still prefers protecting freedom of speech 
because limiting hate speech undermines the principle of autonomy and protecting irrational 
speech would not automatically deny the possibility for rational discussion.346 
Moreover, Post recognizes that people would always communicate with one another by 
considering those people’s understanding of social context. Hence, the public discourse, under 
his perspective, could not be responsible for minorities’ silence. Rather, the reason for 
minorities’ silence was a consequence of racism and social structure, not freedom of speech.347 
Finally, Post discusses the theory of symbolic cultural oppression. He rejects limiting some 
people’s autonomy in a speech to protect others’ autonomy. He claimed that to restrict the public 
discourse is one of many strategies to result cultural oppression. He also proposes that the other 
way to achieve this goal was through “anti-discrimination laws, affirmative action programs, 
redistribution of economic resources, and restraints on racist forms of nonpublic speech.”348 
To fix the paradox of public discourse, Post insists the government should guarantee the 
idea of content neutrality. He elaborates by stating that democracy is a structure of 
communication and prohibiting hate speech would have a negative influence on the value of self-
determination, which requires the public discourse to be open to everyone. Hate speech 
regulation violates the value of self-rule and the function of the First Amendment.349 Therefore, 
the hate speech law might exclude people from the political procedure and keep them from 
 
346 Id. at 302-304. 
347 Id. at 306-311. 
348 Id. at 312-318. 
349 Id. at 290-292. 
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challenging certain norms of civility.350 Therefore, in Robert Post’s theory, freedom of 
expression is a necessary condition to fix the paradox of public discourse. 
5. Conclusion 
In my view, Dworkin’s and Baker’s arguments are both correct: democratic legitimacy and 
people’s autonomy constitute the difference between a democratic country and an authoritarian 
regime.351 More speech regulation means that the government has less democratic legitimacy and 
the people have less autonomy. In addition, Post’s theory concerning public discourse is a 
procedure of democracy to achieve democratic legitimacy and people’s autonomy. Therefore, 
public discourse should be open to all members of society, who are thereby able to engage in 
self-rule and provide legitimacy to their government.  
An authoritarian regime may have a hate speech law on the basis that some speech hurts 
oppressed groups in the country. However, if a state does not have democratic legitimacy and its 
people have no autonomy to design its politics, the hate speech law is simply a way of enabling 
the government to abuse its power and to deprive people of their autonomy.352 Thus, debating 
hate speech law means nothing to an authoritarian government since, without the guarantee of 
freedom of speech, the government does not have democratic legitimacy, and the people do not 
have autonomy. Hence, if there are no strong reasons to limit hate speech, a democratic country 
 
350 However, Steven J. Heyman responded to Post’s theory by mentioning that hate speech refuses to recognize other 
members in society, and the public discourse only works without this rejection. Heyman disagreed that hate speech 
regulations would be “imposing the norms of community on democratic deliberation,” but rather, “the duty to 
respect others can be understood as an integral feature of public discourse itself.” To recognize one another is 
characteristic of a community. Without its essence, the community would not exist. Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech, 
Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123, 173 (Ivan Hare & James 
Weinstein eds., 2009). 
351 Dworkin, Foreword, supra note 318, at v; Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 139. 
352 For example, Singapore outlaws hate speech to oppress political dissent. See Linda Lakhdhir, Kill the Chicken to 
Scare the Monkeys: Suppression of Free Expression and Assembly in Singapore, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 26, 
2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/12/kill-chicken-scare-monkeys/suppression-free-expression-and-
assembly-singapore; NBC Universal News Group, Teen Blogger Amos Yee, Who Criticized Singapore Government, 




should allow them. The Taiwanese political system is open and free rather than closed and 
autocratic. Democratic legitimacy, people’s autonomy, and open public discourse are significant 
in Taiwan. They are the most useful for creating a new model of hate speech for Taiwan. 
Another disadvantage of limiting hate speech is the overlapping and confusing line between 
hate speech and dissent. Nevertheless, if there is no rule for separating the two concepts, 
oppression may rise from having banned some speech. Robert Post recognizes that it is 
challenging to distinguish hate speech and dissenting opinions. He thinks disagreement could not 
justify regulating hate speech and punishing different points of view.353 With the same point of 
view, Edwin Baker worries that hate speech regulation might be misused to describe pure 
disagreement as hate speech as well.354 That is, hate speech regulation may be used to oppress 
the extreme members of the oppressed groups, who use extreme speech to express their 
disagreement.355 
I agree with Baker’s concern. Should hate speech be defined relatively by the relationship 
between the speaker and object? As the above discussion explains, hate speech targets a discrete 
and insular minority, or the group has been historically oppressed. However, if there is a case: 
Group A, which is a majority group, oppresses Group B, a minority group; Group B oppresses 
Group C (more minor than B), is there any difference between Group A and Group C while each 
of them is applying the same hate expression to B? For example, does a situation involving 
Palestinians using anti-Semitic speech to protest the oppression from Israel still count as hate 
speech? Furthermore, the hate speech regulations in South African history were the other 
 
353 Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 126-127. 
354 Baker said: “that labor agitators ferment class hatred and, potentially, class violence; lesbians ferment hatred of 
and violence against men; black nationalists make racist attacks on whites; Algerians insult the French.” Baker, 




instance to prove my point. The regulations were used to oppress the black groups and prevent 
them from having any dissent against “apartheid” or other unfair treatments. 
Another example is  the question surrounding whether using the term “the Wuhan virus” or 
“Chinese virus” is discrimination.356 Some comments have said that the term constitutes hate 
speech aimed at the Chinese American community or other Asian communities.357 In contrast, 
some people have used this term to hold Beijing accountable for the Coronavirus outbreak in 
2020.358 The term in the United States may be hate speech while the white majority uses it 
attaching Chinese Americans. However, the term from the other perspective may also be a way 
for people to protest the Chinese Communist Party in covering up the information and the other 
faults in the global pandemic of COVID-19.359 
Matsuda recognizes that historical oppression is a factor in making a distinction between 
dissent and hate speech. Dissenting opinion criticizes the powerful institutions or government. 
But hate speech targets weak communities. Therefore, she focused on “the historical contexts of 
subordination.”360 For example, she compared racial hate speech with Marxist speech. She 
recognizes that Marxist speech is only an “unpopular political expression,” but racism is wrong 
by virtue of the history of slavery, the Holocaust, and apartheid.361 Also, Matsuda recognizes 
 
356 Josh Rogin, Don’t blame ‘China’ for the coronavirus — blame the Chinese Communist Party, WASHINGTON POST 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/dont-blame-china-for-the-coronavirus--
blame-the-chinese-communist-party/2020/03/19/343153ac-6a12-11ea-abef-
020f086a3fab_story.html?fbclid=IwAR27JjvffjtiPQB6LmKyMHlIa_pdnMmeIL8iML_q2Oc-qd6DYWox-EOynHk. 
357 Vazquez, Marietta, Calling COVID-19 the ‘Wuhan Virus’ or ‘China Virus’ Is Inaccurate and Xenophobic, YALE 
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (Mar. 12, 2020). https://medicine.yale.edu/news-article/23074/. The same point of view, the 
editorial board, Call It 'Coronavirus, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/opinion/china-coronavirus-racism.html.  
358 Ho-fung Hung, Holding Beijing Accountable For The Coronavirus Is Not Racist, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RISK, 
VOL. 8, NO. 3 (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.jpolrisk.com/holding-beijing-accountable-for-the-coronavirus-is-not-
racist/.  
359 Paul D Miller, Yes, Blame China for the Virus, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 25, 2020). 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/25/blame-china-and-xi-jinping-for-coronavirus-pandemic/.  
360 MATSUDA, LAWRENCE, DELGADO, AND CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND supra note 40, at 9-10. 
361 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2358-2360. 
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offensive speech between two subordinated groups as hate speech based on specific historical 
factors.362 For example, this encompasses offensive speech between Jews and African 
Americans. Matsuda agreed that anti-Semitic literature that defames the victims of the Holocaust 
is hate speech.363 However, a statement promoting Zionism could be recognized as either a 
“reaction to historical persecution” or “white dominance over brown and black,” based on the 
specific condition. The victim privilege will be denied if the Zionist speech promotes white 
supremacy.364  
Yet, could the “historically oppressed groups” change to the point that they do not need 
protection someday in the future? Matsuda also agreed that time might change the historical 
oppression. She said, “Should history change course, placing former victim groups in a dominant 
or equalized position, the newly equalized group will lose the special protection suggested here 
for an expression of nationalist anger.”365 However, although sometimes the group’s status may 
improve, the subordination and harm may continue to exist. For instance, the Jewish people or 
Asian-Americans may change their economic situation now while anti-Semitism and race 
discrimination against Asians persists.366 
In sum, we should be careful with hate speech and dissent because they are sometimes 
overlapping and confusing terms. The same term may sometimes be used for different purposes 
and targets. To ban the word would deprive speakers’ rights to go against persecution or 
injustice. Therefore, without considering the historical contexts of subordination, the hate speech 
regulation might cause new oppression. 
 
362 Id. at 2364. 
363 Id. at 2366. 
364 Id. at 2364. 
365 Id. at 2361-2362.  
366 Id. at 2363. 
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III. THE ARGUMENT FOR STRONG LIMITATION OF HATE SPEECH 
1. Overview 
In contrast to the argument of supporting freedom of speech supremacy, the 
counterarguments are also notable. Scholars of Critical Race Theory (CRT) argue that American 
society is still rife with racism and white supremacy. They challenge the theories of neutrality 
and color blindness and, thus, recognize that hate speech is part of the oppression of minorities in 
the US. Their point could apply to any country with racist viewpoints. Further, Jeremy Waldron 
points out that hate speech undermines democracy. He uses the idea of assurance to support his 
thoughts on limiting hate speech. In contrast to the preceding section that suggests that limiting 
hate speech impedes democracy, these scholars argue that not limiting hate speech is worse for 
democracy. 
2. Introduction of Critical Race Theory (CRT) 
What is Critical Race Theory (CRT)? CRT scholars367 emphasize that American society is 
still full of racism and that they would like to fix it. Racism is a common phenomenon in 
American society and CRT focuses on how traditional values became tools of racial 
subordination, rather than maintaining the current situation.368 CRT’s purpose is to end 
oppression.369 CRT challenge the legal system’s traditional views, such as “equality theory, legal 
reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law.”370 CRT 
rejects the theories of neutrality and color blindness.371 Its proponents contend that the legal 
 
367 CRT scholars include but are not limited to Derrick Bell, Alan Freeman, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Angela Harris, 
Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Richard Delgado. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra 
note 39, at 5-6. 
368
 MATSUDA, LAWRENCE III, DELGADO & CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 40, at 6-7. 
369 Therefore, CRT scholars aim at the legal system’s background and ideology rather than at specific statutes. 
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992). 
370
 DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 3. 
371 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 53-69 (1991). 
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system’s neutrality may repress minority groups.372 The majority would lack the motivation to 
end racism because they benefit from it.373 Racial oppression is only one type—gender, class, 
and sexual orientation are also included.374  
In the legal field of freedom of speech, CRT challenges the traditional view of racial hate 
speech and protect the rights of minority groups. I will introduce some of the CRT scholars’ 
opinions in the following sections. 
3. Mari Matsuda’s Critical Race Theory 
Matsuda rejects protecting racial hate speech because of wrongful acts against minorities in 
history. Slavery, the Holocaust, and apartheid are all morally wrong. This is a general rule and a 
sign of progressive human beings. Therefore, no justification could excuse hate speech.375  
Matsuda proposes that hate speech should be disallowed as an exception to the First 
Amendment. She mentions that the current legal scholars recognized hate speech as protected 
speech, which they did not for other offensive statements. The double standard of white 
dominance is a part of interest convergence theory. Although they knew certain rights should 
balance with freedom of speech in creating some unprotected speech, they refused to ban hate 
speech and ignored the minority’s suffering.376  
 
372 In addition, CRT scholars believe that “racism has contributed to all contemporary manifestations of group 
advantage and disadvantage along racial lines.” CRT insists on including the real experience of minorities’ lives to 
have “critical reflection on the lived experience of racism.” CRT is cross-disciplinary, involving liberalism, law and 
society, feminism, Marxism, poststructuralism, critical legal theory, pragmatism, and nationalism. CRT’s final goal 
is to end “all forms of oppression.” MATSUDA, LAWRENCE III, DELGADO & CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND, supra 
note 40, at 6-7. 
373 CRT scholars also recognize two characteristics of racism. The first is ordinariness. Racism is difficult to fix 
because it might be equal on the surface, and only obvious discrimination could be solved. The second characteristic 
is “interest convergence.” DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 7. 
374
 DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 51-52. The intersecting recognition forms of 
subordination are useful in fixing these kinds of oppression. MATSUDA, LAWRENCE, DELGADO & CRENSHAW, 
WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 40, at 6-7. 
375 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2359. 
376 Id. at 2375. 
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Matsuda claims that hate speech undermines the values of freedom and equality. She states 
that freedom of speech supremacy constitutes an unfair treatment of minorities and burdens the 
cost of speech promoting.377 The distribution violates equal protection under the 14th 
Amendment and undermines the duty to fix this historical mistake.378 
Matsuda further points out that banning hate speech should be recognized as a “state action.” 
She says that if a racist group promoting violence, persecution, and hatred was allowed and had 
protection from a government power, the meaning would be that the state supports racism, for 
example, in the case of the National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie.379Without 
this state’s support, hate groups would become weak. A lack of hate speech regulation showing 
that the government does not ensure minorities’ safety might cause secondary harm to the 
victims. Therefore, in this situation, the government should recognize hate speech as a state 
action and allow victims to claim a remedy.380 
In conclusion, Masuda advances her efforts to resolve the hate speech issue. She suggests 
using criminal liability rather than civil liabilities to prosecute hate speech messages. She states 
that if “a narrow, explicitly defined class of racist hate speech” was submitted as a crime, it 
would prevent “the most serious harm.” She narrows the regulation and the prerequisites for 
 
377 Matsuda said: “In making typical legal concessions to the first amendment, we burden a range of victims. In the 
case of flag-burning, we force patriots, veterans, and flag-lovers of all races to tolerate flag desecration as part of the 
price of freedom. In contrast, when victims of racist speech are left to assuage their own wounds, we burden a 
limited class: the traditional victims of discrimination. This class already experiences diminished access to private 
remedies such as effective counterspeech, and this diminished access is exacerbated by hate messages. Debasing 
speech discredits targets, further reducing their ability to have their speech taken seriously. 274 The application of 
absolutist free speech principles to hate speech, then, is a choice to burden one group with a disproportionate share 
of the costs of speech promotion.” Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2376. 
378 Id. 
379 In the case National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, the National Socialist Party of America 
paraded with Nazi costumes and intentionally passed by the Jewish community in Skokie, Illinois. The Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the demonstration. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of 
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977). 
380 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2379-2380. 
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prosecution as follows: “[t]he message is of racial inferiority; the message is directed against a 
historically oppressed group; the message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.”381 
4. Richard Delgado’s Critical Race Theory 
Distinct from Matsuda’s criminal law approach, Richard Delgado proposes his approach by 
applying torts law. Richard Delgado is another CRT advocate. He points out that liberal, moral, 
and legal rights could be on opposite sides of their original functions. He recognizes that when 
rights contradict the interests of the powerful, minorities always face repression.382 
Delgado says that hate speech causes feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred in 
the victims. Although some oppressed groups have high social or economic conditions, the 
psychological harm cannot usually be fixed.383 This leads to psychological harm, negative 
influence and physiological effects. Oppressed groups are more likely to experience 
hypertension, hypertensive disease, and stroke.384 The worst effect of racial hate speech and 
discrimination is a negative influence on parenting practices toward children. According to 
Delgado, this situation perpetuates a tradition of failure.385 
In addition, Delgado points out that hate speech violates the constitutional value of equal 
protection. He suggests that hate speech represses other people’s opinions, so victims do not 
participate in the government’s decision-making processes.386 Hate speech causes “badges and 
 
381 Id. at 2357. 
382 Delgado’s examples are “hate speech, which targets mainly minorities, gays, lesbians, and other outsiders, is 
almost always tolerated, while speech that offends the interests of empowered groups finds a ready exception in 
First Amendment law. Think, for example, of speech that insults a judge or other authority figure, that defames a 
wealthy and well-regarded person, that disseminates a government secret, or Deceptively advertises products, thus 
creating a large class of middle-income consumers.” DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 
39, at 23-24. 
383 Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136-138 (1982). 
384 Id. at 139. 
385 Id. at 138-139. 
386 Id. at 178. 
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incidents of slavery,” and political power to belong only to some people. Racism goes against the 
idea that “all men are created equal.” 387 Delgado also critiques the marketplace of ideas as a 
reason to protect hate speech. He said victims usually lack enough ability to go against the harm 
from hate speech. More speech is useless because minorities would be afraid of further 
offense.388  
Delgado’s approach limits hate speech by utilizing civil liability. He proposes constituting 
civil liabilities caused by racial hate speech, such as some causes of action to assault and battery, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of constitutional and statutory 
provisions.389 However, he also notes that the difficulties of using civil liability to limit racial 
hate speech are measuring damages, apportioning damages, and avoiding fraudulent claims.390 I 
may choose to use the civil liability approach rather than the criminal one. If criminal liability is 
used to regulate hate speech, it risks encouraging the governmental abuse of power. The method 
will be more suitable for Taiwanese society, which has had historical oppression against freedom 
of speech in the Martial Law period. 
5. Charles R. Lawrence’s Critical Race Theory 
Like Delgado, Charles R. Lawrence also emphasizes the power structure of white 
supremacy and the mental harm of hate speech. Lawrence suggests that “white privilege and 
white supremacy” are the foundation of “the power structures” of society.391 He claims 
individual racial discriminations as a whole totality, the institutionalization of the ideas of white 
 
387 Delgado said: “Racism and racial stigmatization harm not only the victim and the perpetrator of individual racist 
acts but also society as a whole. Racism is a breach of the ideal of egalitarianism, that “all men are created equal” 
and each person is an equal moral agent, an ideal that is a cornerstone of the American moral and legal system.” Id. 
at 140-141. 
388 Id. at 146-147. 
389 Id. at 150-165. 
390 Id. at 165-172.  




supremacy. He contends that some racist acts were recognized as neutrality because the status 
quo keeps maintaining racism.392 
Lawrence proposes banning hate speech. Like Matsuda, Lawrence critiques the state action 
doctrine. He argues that the court system should consider intervening in the constitutional issues 
between private individuals.393 He said that hate speech is harmful because it might affect silent 
minorities who would keep silent or run away due to the threat. He contradicts freedom of 
speech supremacy and posits that the First Amendment only causes domination rather than being 
a vehicle of liberation. He advocates against underestimating the harm of hate speech and 
listening to the victims of hateful expression.394 
Instead, Lawrence emphasizes psychic injury as well. He stated that the victims of hate 
speech usually suffer everything from “rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, to nightmares, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, and suicide.” 395 Moreover, Lawrence discusses the 
marketplace of ideas. He claims the hate speech would reduce the total amount of expression in 
the marketplace of ideas because the minority would not speak when met with hate speech.396 
CRT provides a methodology to challenge the traditional view of the First Amendment 
theory, as well as a positive perspective on understanding the harm of hate speech and finding a 
way to restrict it. 
 
392 Id. at 443. 
393 Id. at 446-447. 
394 Id. at 458-459. 
395 Id. at 462. 
396 Id. at 472-473. 
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6. Jeremy Waldron’s Argument of Assurance 
Jeremy Waldron proposes banning hate speech because hate speech undermines the dignity 
of vulnerable minorities and denies their equal positions; therefore, it is harmful. A state ban on 
hate speech is an assurance to protect vulnerable minorities’ dignity.397  
For Waldron, hate speech regulation is a concept of group libel, which does not relate to an 
individual’s reputation. In contrast, it is an understanding of a group’s social position. For him, 
human dignity is defined as: “dignity, in the sense of these persons' basic social standing, of the 
basis of their recognition as social equals, and of their status as bearers of human rights and 
constitutional entitlements.”398 
Thus, Waldron keeps insisting that protecting dignity is not the same as safeguarding from 
the pure offense. He recognizes that the hate speech issue is about individuals’ and groups’ social 
positions rather than their feelings.399 For example, hate speech regulation should avoid the 
defamation of Christian communities’ social standing but not prohibit critiquing their religious 
figures and tenets, such as any pope, saint, or doctrine.400 He emphasizes that: “they are 
organized to protect the dignity and reputation of the persons themselves, not to impose an aura 
of untouchability around their convictions.” 401  
Therefore, Waldron rejects an individual’s subjective aspects of feelings, such as hurt, shock, 
and anger, as the harm in hate speech. In contrast, he recognizes that these feelings would 
“naturally accompany an assault on dignity.” 402 Waldron cites Stephen Darwall’s theory. He 
separated “appraisal respect,” which states that “one’s estimation of people varies by their 
 
397 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 1-6. 
398 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1610. 
399 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 105-143. 
400 Id. at 123. 
401 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1613. 
402 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 106-107. 
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merits, their virtues and vices, their crimes, their views, and so on” and “recognition respect,” 
which is “fundamental to the dignity of persons and invariant in the face of differential merit, 
even commanding how people are to be treated when they are guilty of terrible crimes.”403  
Consequently, in his view, hate speech regulation is a protection for individuals not from the 
offense or a painful feeling, but from an assault on the dignity and social cohesion of their 
communities.404 Waldron proposes that hate speech regulation is aimed to protect groups’ 
objective social positions,405 an essential difference between CRT scholars and Waldron’s 
theory. His view differs a great deal from the perspective of victims’ experience. For instance, in 
his book, critiquing the idea of Islam is not the same as abusing Muslims. Comments about 
Muslims’ beliefs might cause Muslims to feel bad. However, only assaulting their objective 
social position constitutes hate speech.406 The speech is not a hateful expression at all. Hence, 
hate speech regulation should only focus on protecting the basics of a community’s social 
standing, not people’s feelings. 
Waldron analyzes the relationship between a well-ordered society and hate speech.407 The 
purpose of a state was to ensure that every member of the community could enjoy equal 
treatment. Based on Rawls, Waldron introduces his theory of hate speech regulation: assurance. 
He further elaborates on the idea, stating that a member of a well-ordered society could 
reasonably expect not to be discriminated against, humiliated, or terrorized. Thus, society 
 
403 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at, 1628-1629. 
404 Id. at 1609-1613. 
405 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 105-111. 
406
 I used an example to explain the idea in Chapter Two: statement supporting Human rights for Hong Kong might 
cause some Chinese people to feel unhappy, but the support is not prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading the social 
cohesion of their communities. See Chapter Two, section VI. Hate Speech and Offence. Id. at 105-143. 
407 Waldron cited John Rawls’ political philosophy, which stated that a well-ordered society is one in which 
“everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice.” WALDRON, THE 
HARM IN HATE SPEECH supra note 12, at 69. Also, Rawls believed a well-ordered society cannot exist with racial or 
religious hatred. Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1621. 
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members feel safe and are willing to face social interactions.408 Hate speech, however, 
undermines this public good. It destroys assurance and rejects vulnerable minorities’ equal 
position as members of the society. The government banning hate speech would prohibit these 
destructive actions.409 
Further, Waldron responds to the theory of freedom of speech supremacy. He critiques 
Dworkin’s opinion of hate speech, which was a democratic legitimacy argument. Waldron 
claims that democratic legitimacy is just the support from the public, not a normative property.410 
But how should the destruction of democratic legitimacy be defined? Waldron lists several 
hypotheses: first, hate speech might violate the legitimacy of some downstream laws and not 
others.411 The second possibility is that the law’s legitimacy is about a matter of degrees. Hate 
speech reduces the legitimacy of downstream laws but does not destroy them.412 
Waldron emphasizes that if democratic legitimacy is not “an all-or-nothing matter,”413 a hate 
speech regulation is aimed to protect vulnerable minorities’ basic social standing or so-called 
elementary dignity. It will not seriously damage democratic legitimacy.414 Thus, Dworkin’s 
argument is unconvincing. 
 
408 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1627. 
409 Id. 1626-1630 (2009). 
410 A normative property is either “the existence of a political obligation to obey the laws” or “the appropriateness of 
using force to uphold them.” Id. at 1642. 
411 Waldron’s example was that perhaps it undermines the legitimacy of laws forbidding discrimination but not the 
legitimacy of laws forbidding violence. He said: “In Britain, there are laws forbidding the expression of racial 
hatred. There are also laws forbidding racial discrimination, not to mention laws forbidding racial and ethnic 
violence and intimidation, and laws against criminal damage protecting mosques and synagogues from desecration; 
these are the downstream laws, the laws whose legitimacy Dworkin believes is hostage to the enforcement of hate 
speech regulation. Should we really believe that in Britain citizens have no obligation to obey these downstream 
laws? Should we really believe that the enforcement of these downstream laws is morally wrong and that the use of 
force to uphold them is just like any other illegitimate use of force? A landlord discriminates against English 
families of South Asian descent in a way that is prohibited by the Race Relations Act. Do we really want to say that 
he has no obligation to obey the antidiscrimination law and that no action should be taken against him, at least so 
long as the statute book also contains provisions banning him from publishing virulent anti-Pakistani views?”  See 
id. at 1643. 
412 Id. at 1644. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. at 1646. 
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Waldron also responds to Edwin Baker’s theory of autonomy. Baker insists that freedom of 
speech is a way to show people’s value, so hate speech is an expression of a speaker’s value, no 
matter how bad it is. However, Waldron notes that the harm and damage in hate speech would 
not disappear. Hate speech still undermines the public good and the state’s assurance. Baker’s 
attitude toward this self-discourse constitutes the destruction of the state’s assurance to 
vulnerable minorities. As a result, Baker’s claim that “to allow the dreadful expression is less 
dangerous than to outlaw it” is considered wrong.415 
Last but not least, Waldron contradicts Robert Post’s public discourse argument. Waldron 
recognizes that hate speech regulation would not exclude people from the political process or 
avoid challenging certain norms of civility. He mentioned that to challenge a hate speech 
regulation without using hate speech is possible. Although the norms of civility might be the 
target of a democratic challenge, they might still work until they are overturned. That is, if the 
challenge’s only problem is the expression’s mode and manner, using norms of civility will 
regulate a debate on these norms. On the contrary, norms of civility are significant for assuring 
vulnerable minorities.416 
7. Hate Speech and Assurance 
With regard to the issue of hate speech, my idea falls closest to Jeremy Waldron’s assurance 
theory: The reason that a state regulates hate speech is to provide an assurance to its civilians and 
to ensure the equal position of oppressed groups.417 Under the assurance, vulnerable minorities 
would not be excluded from public discussion. 
 
415 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 144-172. 
416
 Id. at 197-201. 
417 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1626-1630. 
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Dworkin’s and Baker’s arguments are both correct: freedom of speech is important to 
democratic legitimacy and people’s autonomy in democratic nations. However, as Waldron 
argues, democratic legitimacy is not “an all-or-nothing matter.”418 European countries do not 
allow hate speech, but most of them are still democracies. They would not lose any democratic 
legitimacy purely because of a hate speech law. Moreover, European people have autonomy, 
even though they may not be able to express and spread hatred due to the restrictions on hate 
speech. Thus, Dworkin’s and Baker’s views cannot explain how European countries still work as 
functioning democracies while having hate speech laws. 
However, if the issue of democratic legitimacy is a matter of degree, not all-or-nothing, is 
there a line dividing legitimate and illegitimate regimes? Presumably, if it is a matter of degree, 
there are degrees of democratic legitimacy between democracy and non-democracy. Post argues 
that the term “democratic deficits” is intended precisely for this situation: European countries 
prefer to tolerate some “democratic deficits” to reduce violations of the norms of civility, which 
relates to human dignity.419 By contrast, people in the United States insist that the norms of 
civility should not intervene in the marketplace of ideas in order to undermine individuals’ 
autonomy. Hence, freedom of speech is superior to the value of human dignity in the United 
States. 
There is a tension between individual autonomy and collective human dignity. Hate speech is 
aimed at protecting dignity at the expense of freedom of speech, at surrendering democratic 
legitimacy to defend human dignity. A state deploying hate speech laws would thus carry a 
greater democratic deficit. 
 
418 Id. at 1644 (2009). 
419 Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 137. 
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Too large a democratic deficit could turn a democratic country into an authoritarian one. If a 
state has too many limitations on speech, it may finally lose its freedom due to the reduction in 
democratic legitimacy and the people’s autonomy. In sum, a country can restrict hate speech but 
the limitations on hate speech should be only enough to provide assurances to oppressed groups. 
8. Giving up the Content Neutrality in Freedom of Speech Theory 
Since hate speech regulation should provide “enough assurance” to oppressed groups, the 
corresponding approach cannot not treat all contexts of speech as equal. Additionally, all groups’ 
autonomy in a state should not be treated as equivalent. Freedom of speech protection should 
reject content neutrality. American First Amendment jurisprudence insists that a government 
should not support any value or ideology. In the case R.A.V. vs. Saint Paul, Justice Scalia denies 
hate speech regulation because of the “content neutrality” of all speech regulation.420 
Some support theories are based on the above argument. For example, Baker says that 
limiting hate speech could reduce the ability of a democracy to deal with internal conflicts and 
use political resolution.421 In his view, political resolution should be open to a complete range of 
opinions. I do not agree with this. In reality, allowing hate speech sometimes makes a situation 
worse. Critical Race Theory (CRT) highlights this: hate speech can lead to the silencing of 
vulnerable groups because they do not want to participate in communication at all.422 
Baker also argues that banning hate speech could lead to more violence, with the hatred 
being driven underground.423 I argue, however, that hate speech causes more destruction. Some 
 
420 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
421 Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 155. 
422 Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 391, at 472-473. 
423 Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 152-153. 
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hate speech not only spreads hatred but also directly incites violence, and because of the fear of 
violence, minorities sometimes choose to remain silent.424 
Indeed, content neutrality should only apply where everyone is genuinely equal. If a legal 
system or social structure is not equal for every member, content neutrality will cause an unequal 
outcome. For example, in a white supremacist society, where a government maintains content 
neutrality in freedom of speech, it is strengthening and extending an unfair situation. Interest 
convergence makes things worse. The more powerful and influential groups will not be likely to 
defend the vulnerable because they can enjoy the benefits of the unequal social structure. 
The CRT argument is correct: the legal system’s neutrality may repress minority groups in 
the US. We cannot insist that the government retain content neutrality and ignore oppressed 
groups.425 Nevertheless, I argue that excessive limitations on speech will lead to a state losing 
democratic legitimacy and its people their autonomy; thus, only sufficient assurance should be 
provided for oppressed groups. 
On this point, I propose two understandings of the idea to reject “content neutrality.” First, 
rejecting “content neutrality” means that not all kinds of speech are equal. A hate speech law can 
be constitutional because the law does not constitute viewpoint discrimination under the 
perspective of rejecting “content neutrality.” This idea is the same as that advanced by CRT. 
Second, under my proposal, rejecting content neutrality means that a state is not required to 
maintain neutrality with regard to “hate speech.” On the contrary, a government should consider 
the degree of harm caused by different categories of hate speech and the different levels of 
assurance required for distinct oppressed groups. For instance, Matsuda proposes to ban the most 
harmful racist speech, namely, that concerning racial inferiority, directed against a historically 
 
424 Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 383, at 146-147. 
425 Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” supra note 371, at 53-69. 
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oppressed group as prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading.426 Her proposal is aimed to balance the 
harm of hate speech and First Amendment protections. In my sense, she also implies that the 
different forms of hate speech could be separated and could receive various treatments. I agree. 
The issue of regulating hate speech is also not an all-or-nothing matter. Not all hate speech 
should be limited, but the most serious ones should be. No oppressed groups would thus be 
excluded from public discussion, including the most fragile.    
9. Offense, and Human Dignity 
To find the most balanced point between human dignity and freedom of speech, it is also 
necessary to consider the difference between offense and human dignity. CRT emphasizes 
individual harm. I do not agree. I argue Waldron’s view to be correct: dignity is not the same as 
individual harm. Waldron thought that protecting dignity meant supporting vulnerable 
minorities’ social standing, not their feelings or beliefs.427 
Indeed, hate speech regulation does not aim to create an untouchable zone for specific 
groups. It is intended to encourage them to participate in public discourse and to accept criticism 
from others even though the criticism might be strong and sharp. A state should make sure that 
everyone can debate and discuss in a reasonable manner, without anyone being untouchable. 
Therefore, hate speech law should only outlaw speech that denies a group’s social standing.428   
A similar point comes from Robert Post’s theory. Post argues that dignity is not merely 
subjective but based on the claims of a community’s members. Hate speech regulations are 
community norms for Post. The norms are also objective, to some extent, because they belong to 
people who share the same characteristics.429 Therefore, individual harm may happen without 
 
426 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2357. 
427 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 105-143. 
428 Id. at 105-111. 
429 Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 129. 
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directly injuring human dignity. That said, individual injury is still essential to the issue of hate 
speech. Sometimes harm to individuals can be evidence proving the violation of human dignity. 
That is, hate speech can offend a group’s community norms and sometimes can also cause harm 
to individuals.    
The advantage of separating individual harm and harm to human dignity is that it creates a 
more objective standard for hate speech regulation. The assurance it provides gives protection 
that could apply to all members in a community and is based on not only an individual’s feelings, 
but shared norms. The distinction makes both the offense and human dignity easier to identify 
and more foreseeable. 
IV. HUMAN DIGNITY VS FREEDOM OF SPEECH  
1. Overview 
While the United States has freedom of speech supremacy compared to the hate speech 
strategies across the world, the other democratic countries have two leading theories for hate 
speech restrictions. The first is human dignity. Human dignity constitutes an important right for 
supporting hate speech regulation. The second one is militant democracy. Some of the countries 
are using both theories, such as Germany. I will introduce human dignity in the following 
section. 
2. Human Dignity in Different Countries 
One significant distinction between the US approach and the other approaches, including the 
German method, the South African strategy, and the European Court of Human Rights’ plan, is 
the importance of human dignity and freedom of speech. Freedom of speech supremacy is 
unique to the US approach and an example of American exceptionalism. In contrast, other 
methods emphasize human dignity. 
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The United States Constitution does not include text regarding human dignity. Although both 
Justices Brennan430 and Justice Kennedy431 discussed the value of human dignity in a Supreme 
Court decision, the value of human dignity has not been upheld as a constitutional right.432 
Aharon Barak claims that human dignity in the US was an underlying constitutional value and a 
tool to explain the rights in the Constitution. The underlying value is growing in importance but 
not in across-the-board recognition.433  
In contrast, the German Constitution holds that human dignity shall be inviolable.434 Human 
dignity is an absolute right in Germany. No other rights are higher than dignity rights. An eternal 
right, human dignity exists even after people die. Further, it constitutes the supreme value in the 
entire Constitution and is used to explain all constitutional rights.435 Dignity-based jurisprudence 
is also the core of the South Africa Constitution.436 
3. Robert Post’s Argument 
Why is human dignity superior to freedom of speech in the German approach? Robert Post’s 
theory provides the first path to reaching an explanation. Post recognizes human dignity as a 
communal norm.437 Dignity is not merely subjective but based on the claims of members in a 
community. Post points out that cultures would establish institutions such as schools and laws to 
offer authoritative interpretations of norms. Thus, the hate speech regulation is a kind of 
 
430 “I have always thought that one of this court’s most important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark against 
governmental violation of the constitutional safeguards securing in our free society the legitimate expectations 
of every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth.” Paul v. Davis, 424 US 693, 734 (1978). Cited from 
BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 164, at 200. 
431 “Adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and 
still retain their dignity as free persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 567 (2003). Cite from id. 202 (2015). 
432 Id. at 186-187. 
433 Id. at 205-206. 
434 See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art. 1 (Ger.). 
435 BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 164, at 226-232. 
436 See Chapter Three. 
437 Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 129. 
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authoritative interpretation of a norm. Human dignity, under Post’s definition, is based on a 
cultural or group-based communal norm.  
Post compares the US approach to those of the European countries. He claims that European 
countries’ attitudes tend toward banning hate speech because their legal systems are very 
comfortable using the law to enforce “hegemonic community norms” in their societies.438 In 
contrast, the US prefers protecting democratic legitimacy and the public discourse. The 
guarantee of freedom of speech in the US created a “marketplace of communities,” or a so-called 
“marketplace of ideas.”439 The main reason is concern about the government abusing its power to 
oppress speech. Post argues that the other countries’ approaches, based on human dignity, suffer 
from enormous democratic deficits, with concern from their civilians due to the culture of 
trusting the political elite.440 The US has chosen another way due to the preference for populism. 
4. Guy E. Carmi’s Argument 
Guy E. Carmi criticizes Post’s theory, arguing that Post’s view was based on US 
constitutional theory but was not applicable to other countries. People in Germany, France, and 
Canada would not recognize their systems as illegitimate or nondemocratic due to hate speech 
bans.441 Carmi provides his comparative approach as follows. 
Carmi first compares the different historic developments of freedom of speech approaches 
between the US and the other democratic countries. He claims that the First Amendment theory 
was developed from libertarianism and the Enlightenment. The founding fathers’ perceptions of 
 
438 Id. at 132. 
439 Id. at 133. 
440 Id. at 137. 
441 Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty, supra note 166, at 320-321. 
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liberty affected the freedom of speech doctrines in the US. Classical libertarian understandings 
give rise to the main guarantee of negative rights442 in American jurisprudence. 
In contrast, the other democratic countries developed their freedom of speech doctrines in the 
past decade. Those countries abandoned pure and classical libertarianism and added the idea of 
socialism. They recognize positive rights and became welfare states. They emphasize human 
dignity, the concept of which was based on Hegelian, Kantian, and even on theological Judeo-
Christian perceptions of rights.443 Kant’s view of human dignity was based on 
communitarianism. Kant denies the violation of human dignity and asked the government to 
intervene in rights conflicts and to protect dignity. Dignity becomes a duty for all members in 
society under Kant’s theory.444 
The diverse perspectives on freedom of speech are the outcome of the above differences. US 
freedom of speech scholars focus on autonomy. They insist that a state cannot paternalistically 
teach its citizens which point of view is correct or incorrect.445 Also, the idea of dignity in the 
First Amendment would relate to the autonomy justification. For example, Ronald Dworkin 
emphasizes that a state could not have a viewpoint of discrimination toward individuals, or it 
might undermine those speakers’ human dignity.446 
In the United States, the discussion of autonomy mainly focuses on the individual speaker, 
not the audience.447 Further, autonomy is also recognized as “dignity” in US freedom of speech 
theory. In contrast, the other democratic countries’ idea of dignity would be significant different 
 
442 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s proposed Second Bill of Rights as a basis of Positive rights, but the Bill is not in the 
US Constitution. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees? in 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 90, 93-95 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
443 Guy E. Carmi, Dignity the Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of Human Dignity as A 
Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 965-966 (2007). 
444 Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty, supra note 166, at 285. 
445 Carmi, Dignity the Enemy from Within, supra note 443, at 972-975. 
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from that of the US. Consequently, Carmi said: “for an American, human dignity may seem like 
a justification for protecting speech whereas for a European, human dignity may seem like a 
justification for limiting it.”448 
In the United States, human dignity is a value but not a right that is enforceable.449 The US 
academics have conflated human dignity and autonomy, but the other democratic countries 
separate them.450 Therefore, a human-dignity-based democracy might limit freedom of speech to 
protect and promote the value of communities.451 
Carmi provides three variables to analyze the human dignity and freedom of speech model: 
individualism versus communitarianism and paternalism; the speaker versus audience focus; and 
negative rights versus positive rights. 
The first variable, as mentioned above, is individualism versus communitarianism and 
paternalism. In his theory, the First Amendment jurisprudence presents a substantial commitment 
to individualism. The government must maintain neutrality toward free expression and avoid 
viewpoint preference. However, other countries, especially the European countries, designed 
freedom of speech rights with the idea of communitarianism and paternalism. The government 
would not maintain content neutrality toward statement rights but would impose some specific 
value on speech regulation. Carmi explains that European countries might have more 
homogeneous societies than the US, so that these countries built unified communities more 
easily than in the US. Also, the historical experience with autocracy caused the European 
countries to be more willing to use communitarianism against group defamation.452 
 
448 For example, Germany uses human dignity as a justification for limiting freedom of speech. Id. at 986-989. 
449 Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty, supra note 166, at 288. 
450 Id. at 289-290. 
451 Id. at 292. 
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The other variable is the speaker versus audience focus. Based on Dworkin’s perspective, the 
US approach to human dignity focuses on the speaker’s autonomy. The benefit of the rights 
guarantee belongs to the speaker, not to the audience. Carmi uses “a vertical balancing” to 
explain this methodology: “only substantial harm to interest may trump a certain right, such as 
the Clear and Present Danger Test.”453 In contrast, the other democratic countries’ methodology 
is “a horizontal balancing.” That is, “if the harm infringes upon a right, then two rights are 
conflicting: [the] speaker’s freedom of speech undermines the audiences’ human dignity.”454 
Therefore, excepting the US approach, the other democratic countries’ plans focus on both the 
speaker’s and the audience’s rights. 
Thirdly, negative rights versus positive rights are important variables in Carmi’s theory. The 
First Amendment is a typical negative right, which only goes against an invasion of government 
power. Contrastingly, the other democratic countries developed their jurisprudence to create 
positive rights and to require that a government further intervenes in rights conflicts.455 For 
instance, German hate speech regulation represents a balance between human dignity and 
freedom of speech. Freedom of speech in Germany is a positive right to allow the government to 
apply the hate speech regulation and exclude the invasion from private actors. 
Beyond Post’s theory of human dignity, Carmi tried to explain human dignity in the US and 
in the other democratic countries. Carmi claims that the difference is an example of American 
exceptionalism.456 Carmi follows Frederick Schauer’s approach regarding American 
exceptionalism.457 
 
453 Id. at 992-995. 
454 Id. 
455 Id. at 995-996. 
456 Carmi, Dignity the Enemy from Within, supra note 443, at 960-961. 
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5. Balancing the Conflict of Rights 
Were I to propose treating various oppressed groups differently, I would be inclined to accept 
the non-US methodology in the conflict of rights: the balancing approach. I argue that a system 
design for hate speech regulation should balance human dignity and freedom of speech. 
However, how do we deal with this dilemma between human dignity and freedom of speech? 
Steven J. Heyman’s and Waldron’s arguments may offer a hint.  
Heyman’s theory is based on a balancing approach, which is the same as the German 
approach. In his view, freedom of expression is an external right in contrast to the freedom of 
conscience. When speech becomes an attack, it might violate others’ rights, such as human 
dignity and equality. His theory is built on the rights conflict, which includes personal security, 
rights of personality, and the right to recognition.458  
Heyman uses the case of Collin v. Smith as an example to explain his argument. In the 
incident, the targeted group’s personality rights were injured by the parade, which brought up 
painful memories of historical oppression.459 Here, the right to recognition depended on 
everyone respecting one another, but hate speech undermined this will.460 Post recognizes that 
for a community to impose a limitation on public discourse meant undermining its members’ 
autonomy. By contrast, Heyman argues that the imposition was an inherent duty for public 
discourse,461 as does Waldron’s theory.462 
The government should provide assurances to minorities that they will be protected. Waldron 
says that if the only problem of hate speech is the mode and manner of the expression, norms of 
 
458 Heyman, Hate Speech, supra note 350, at 161-162. 
459 The historical oppression was the Holocaust. See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 
U.S. 43, 43 (1977). 
460 Heyman, Hate Speech, supra note 350, at 165-167. 
461 Id. at 175. 
462 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12 at 197-201. 
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civility could be used to regulate the debate over norms of civility. However, norms of civility 
are important in assuring vulnerable minorities.463 
Nevertheless, is hate speech regulation only assurance or is it necessary to introduce the idea 
of hate crimes to provide enough assurance? Post said that hate speech regulations are not the 
right way to end symbolic cultural oppression. He prefers to use several alternatives, such as 
anti-discrimination laws and education, to achieve the same goal.464 
Does this mean that it is important to identify “the Minimization Requirement”?465 I think the 
answer is yes. The guaranteeing of rights, if it means the people in a state have autonomy, should 
not have too many limitations that would reduce the functioning of those rights. However, where 
there is a conflict between rights, as in the case of freedom of speech and human dignity, the 
state’s mission is to balance those rights in such a way as to maximize both sides’ rights. If 
limiting one side’s rights is unavoidable in order to protect the other side’s rights, the state 
should choose the option that minimizes the restrictions on those rights. 
Therefore, I recognize that the government should provide assurances to vulnerable 
minorities, but the strategy may not have to be a speech ban. The approach taken should 
minimize the limitations on freedom of speech and balance the conflicting rights. 
V. MILITANT DEMOCRACY VS FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
1. Overview 
As the above introduction in the last chapter stated, typical examples of militant democracy 
are Article 18 and Article 21 of the German Basic Law, which are designed due to the 
 
463 Id. 
464 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 336, at 312-318. 
465 About the Minimization Requirement, see Clifford S. Fishman, The Minimization Requirement in Electronic 
Surveillance: Title III, the Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 315 (1979). 
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breakdown of the Weimar Republic in Germany.466 Today, many European countries have 
adopted antiterrorist legislation and the theory of militant democracy, against both extreme right-
wing and left-wing politics. This jurisprudence was also imported to international treaties 
protecting human rights, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination of 1969.467 Robert A. Kahn recognizes that the most European countries 
apply militant democracy theory to limit hate speech.468 
The most important example to freedom of speech with militant democracy is the Federal 
Criminal Code of Germany, sections 130(3)&(4), which outlaw National Socialism as an action 
of inciting hatred and disturbing the public peace, which is (in turn) the crime of Holocaust 
Denying. The clause is a mechanism to prevent National Socialism from arising and destroying 
German democracy again.469 
2. The Origin of Militant Democracy 
Other than human dignity, Militant Democracy is another underling theory to explain hate 
speech regulation in Europe. In 1937, Karl Loewenstein, a German political scientist and 
philosopher, emigrated from Germany to the US because the Nazis came into power. 
Loewenstein was anxious about the wave of Fascism in Europe. He considered a new political 
approach to counter Fascism and wrote two articles, “Militant Democracy” and “Fundamental 
Rights One and Two,” to propose his theory: militant democracy.470 
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Loewenstein advocates that democracy should not destroy itself. Hence, “democracy must 
become militant.”471 He argues that Fascism was not a political ideology with any content, but a 
technique. In Loewenstein’s description, Fascism is a parasite attached to the institution of 
democracy.472 He also insists that a democracy should not tolerate intolerance. In the transitional 
stage, disciplined authority should be applied to realize human dignity and freedom.473 
Loewenstein is the father of militant democracy. After him, some scholars have further 
developed his theory. Aharon Barak points out that modern democracy should protect both the 
constitution and human rights. Hence, a compromise between a state and its citizens constitutes a 
restriction of human rights. In other words, human rights should not become tools to destroy 
democracy.474  
Two justifications support militant democracy. The first of these is the idea of “principled 
democracy,” which allows the democracy to abandon neutrality and incorporates some specific 
values into the institution of democracy.475 For example, a democracy should guarantee freedom 
of conscience and equality, and if a political party denies those values, it should be banned.476 
The second justification is “democracy as self-correction,”477 an idea similar to the concept of 
procedural democracy. The institution of democracy must maintain its framework to ensure that 
people can revoke their decisions. That is, “there will always be the next elections, always a next 
moment at which the people can express their views.”478 
 
471 Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I, supra note 235, at 423. 
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Some analyses challenge militant democracy. First, militant democracy goes against an 
internal enemy that threatens the institution of democracy from the interior. However, that means 
a state might deprive some citizens’ fundamental rights. The deprivation of rights needs strong 
justification.479 Second, Loewenstein’s theory presents his unconditional trust in political elites. 
The strong tendency toward elitism contradicts civilians’ autonomy and raises the possibility of 
triggering a government to abuse its power,480 such as in a speech limitation or a party ban.481 
3. The Role of Militant Democracy in Hate Speech Issue  
I accept the European approach to balancing the conflict of rights, which was described in the 
discussion above, as part of my modeling for Taiwan. I also agree with the idea of militant 
democracy. However, in my view, militant democracy is not just a justification for hate speech 
laws; it is also a system of self-correction. From this perspective, a hate speech law has another 
function: a guarantee of permanent assurance. It is a norm of civility to continue using norms of 
civility to regulate the debate over norms of civility. 
So, what is the assurance that provides the basis for the theory of militant democracy? The 
assurance is that it is a free and democratic order. A free and democratic order is the core value 
of militant democracy. This means that some values cannot be changed in a democracy, and 
democracy must have a self-correcting system: democracy always survives. 
The free and democratic order has rarely been discussed in debates over hate speech in the 
United States. However, I have still gained some inspiration from scholarship discussing the 
United States. For instance, Matsuda rejects racial hate speech by referring to history. Slavery, 
the Holocaust, and apartheid are all seriously wrong. Matsuda argues that such a belief is now a 
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general rule and a sign of progress among human beings.482 Like a free and democratic order of 
militant democracy, if a constitution483 rejects racial hate speech, the limitation will constitute a 
non-content-neutral value in a constitution. However, while a view, like a free and democratic 
order, may be regarded as correct today, does it mean we can use this value to define other 
periods in human history, including the future? The answer may be yes if a country’s system can 
be described as “universal acceptance of the wrongness;”484 the state should at least know what 
is right and what is wrong. 
However, the drawback of militant democracy is exactly that: what is right and what is 
wrong. David Richards points out the difference between American and German Constitutional 
Law regarding hate speech in the context of their governmental orders. He said the duty 
Germany imposes for human rights protection by including limitations to offensive discussions is 
a misunderstanding of freedom of speech. Richards insists that “the central concern of free 
speech is not protected by the state but from the state.”485 Furthermore, he argues that the 
meaning of protecting human rights is not only for people supporting constitutional order 
government. He concludes the German theory would facilitate “the return of the repressed.”486 
The counterargument from David Richards connects to the above discussion about hate 
speech and dissent. If a government could decide what is absolutely wrong, the government 
rejects the dissent to its decision at the same time. The decision is dangerous because today’s 
 
482 Matsuda said: “This knowledge is reflected in the universal acceptance of the wrongness of the doctrine of racial 
supremacy.” Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, supra note 39, at 2359. 
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S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 16(2). 
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485 David A. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, The Principle of Free Speech, And the Politics of Identity, 74 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 779, 808 (1999).  
486 Id. at 808-809. 
112 
 
political correctness might have been absolutely wrong in the past. New oppression would arise 
when an ideology is set into an unchangeable value in a constitution. 
Another risk happens when a government could decide what is absolutely wrong; that is, 
what content should be included in the political correctness. A dissent might not challenge what 
is wrong but might reject the content included in this wrong. Matsuda rejects racial hate speech 
because racism is seriously wrong. I agree with her claim. However, who can decide which 
content constitutes racism? If a government, a powerful side, a majority, or an authorized unit 
could determine what kind of expression is racism, the authority in power may recognize any 
dissent against it as racism. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party accuses its opponent 
using a racism claim to stifle the discussion of its political actions and criticism. The comments 
are usually not characterized by racism.487 Moreover, following a government’s, a powerful 
side’s or a majority’s racism claim may encourage new oppression against real victims of 
racism.488 
Indeed, Ruti Teitel emphasizes that the struggle of militant democracy is in using the name of 
democracy to protect it. Defining a threat to a free and democratic order using a legal 
interpretation will be difficult.489 Also, Teitel mentions that while freedom of speech rights fall 
under militant democracy, this freedom would tend to balance the other rights and present a 
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preference toward communitarianism.490 She recognizes that militant democracy should be a part 
of transitional constitutionalism, which means that constitutional developments would happen in 
specific periods immediately after periods of substantial political change.491 
Therefore, while democracy has to become militant at a particular time, it does not need to be 
militant in a well-ordered democracy. This connects with Peter R. Teachout’s convergence 
analysis: the Holocaust Denial clause should be abolished after several decades.492 Thus, militant 
democracy should be designed as a solution of last resort: it only applies if no other remedy is 
available.  
VI. THE THEORY OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
1. Overview 
While the other democratic countries have above two leading theories, human dignity and 
militant democracy, for the restriction of hate speech, why does the United States have an 
incredibly distinct approach based on its First Amendment jurisprudence? Frederick Schauer 
uses American exceptionalism to explain the difference between the United States and the other 
countries.493 
2. What is American Exceptionalism? 
American exceptionalism is a theory that describes the massive differences in history, 
culture, and politics between the United States and other democratic countries.494 The US is 
unique, and its national ideology includes liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and 
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the laissez-faire philosophy,495 compared to socialism, authoritarianism, communism, or 
monarchy in other countries.  
In the field of international human rights law, Harold Hongju Koh emphasis that the US is 
the only superpower country with the ability and willingness to promote democracy and human 
rights based on its outstanding global leadership and activism.496 On the other hand, Michael 
Ignatieff points out that American exceptionalism displays at least three elements, as follows: 
first, the United States does not want to obey all the duties on the international human rights and 
humanitarian law conventions and treaties. The US sometimes signs them but has had many 
reservations at the same time. For example, the US ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1991 but reserved the power of the death penalty on juveniles at 
the same time. Secondly, the US applies double standards on human rights to itself, its allies, and 
its enemies. For instance, the US condemned the fact that Iran and North Korea abused their 
people but ignored the same situation when it happened in Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and 
Uzbekistan. Thirdly, the US works on its own human rights theory by denying the application to 
international law, as it believes its domestic law is better than the international standard.497 This 
third element is also called “legal isolationism.”498 The US justices and judges are not willing to 
apply international law or foreign jurisprudence while they make judgments. In contrast, other 
democratic countries have done so. By way of illustration, judges in Israel applied Canadian 
precedents on minority rights cases, and the South African Constitutional Court interpreted 
social and economic rights by using German cases.499  
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3. Substantive Exceptionalism 
Hate speech is allowed in the United States. Frederick Schauer claims that this approach is 
part of American exceptionalism.500 The First Amendment is a significant part of American 
exceptionalism. According to Schauer’s claim, more than any other country, the US protects the 
speaker under the First Amendment theory. Schauer further distinguishes American 
exceptionalism in freedom of speech using two different subtypes: substantive and 
methodological exceptionalism. The former is “actual outcomes and actual doctrines,” and the 
latter is the “methods and approaches to create the former.”501 A hate speech approach is an 
example of substantive exceptionalism. Although many democratic countries in the world have 
come to a basic consensus to limit hate speech, the US still intentionally chooses a different path. 
The US has refused to execute Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination by insisting on its First Amendment theory. It extended the discrimination 
viewpoint to protect racial hate speech in the R.A.V. case as well.502  
A variety of reasons could explain substantive exceptionalism in hate speech doctrines. The 
first reason for a considerable distinction between the US and other countries might be history. 
Nazi history caused the European countries to strongly restrict hate speech. The US, however, 
emphasizes the freedom of speech due to the Red Scare of the 1910s and the McCarthy era from 
the 1940s to the 1950s. Because of the American exceptionalism view, the US has not made any 
changes to follow other countries’ experiences.503 
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The second reason is the text in the Constitution.504 The protection of rights in the United 
States mainly regards negative rights, based on the following statement in the US Constitution: 
“Congress shall make no law.” No positive rights, such as socioeconomic and welfare rights, 
exist in the US Constitution.505 
The third possible explanation is the cultural factors: first, the culture of liberty—the US 
emphasis on individualism rather than collectivism. The lack of socialist or social-democratic 
traditions in the US political culture have also contributed to this outcome.506 Also, the people in 
the US do not trust political elites compared to the civilians in the European countries.507 The 
culture of distrust presents in the issue of whether to abolish the death penalty.508 Michael 
Ignatieff argues that the reason most European countries abolished capital punishment was not 
because of a majority decision, but due to the political elites’ moral concern.509  
Further, the body politic in the US is usually connected with freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press, for example, in campaign finance and commercial advertising, to reinforce its 
importance.510 Another point is legal isolationism. The US justices, judges, and lawyers refuse to 
apply international law or foreign jurisprudence.511 The US legal profession prefers to export its 
legal theory but rarely imports international law or foreign law. 
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4. Methodological Exceptionalism 
Methodological exceptionalism displays a difference in legal methodology and constitutional 
theories. The American approach could be categorized as rule-based rather than as a balancing 
approach but, in other countries, the balancing approach of the proportionality principle is 
mainstream.512 The human dignity model in other democratic countries, such as Germany or 
South Africa, is combined with a balancing approach, and the US does not do this.513 A 
balancing approach include some features, as follows: 
First, state action is not required under balancing formulas. As a state action, the court could 
intervene in private individuals’ rights conflicts, based on external rights and values, without 
recognizing one side.514 While the court applies the constitutional rights or value between two 
private parties, the German legal system provides a doctrine of secondary effects, which means 
“the Basic Law not only works to disallow civil law provisions that transgress its guarantees, but 
it also informs the substantive meaning of the civil code itself.”515 The civil law is supposed to 
promote public policies. One the contrary, the state action doctrine is the principle of the US 
Constitution, which means that the rights guarantee and equal protection apply only to the state, 
not private sectors.516 
A typical example is the Lüth decision in Germany in 1958. The court balanced the two 
parties’ constitutional rights using an objective ordering of values.517 Therefore, German theory 
argues that “the real threats to expression in German society come from private actors and social 
forces, and not from the state.”518 
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Besides, a balancing approach allows rights and values to extend into the freedom of speech 
area and reject the content neutrality in the First Amendment theory. German Basic Law is not 
neutral at all but is aimed to protect “an objective value system in its section on fundamental 
rights.”519 Further, the German system built a militant democracy system as an objective value 
system, a so-called “free democratic order,” to protect itself by limiting some individuals’ 
rights.520 Balancing formulas also combine the principle of proportionality.521 These 
constitutional techniques cause human dignity to unavoidably restrict freedom of speech in 
particular situations.  
5. Criticism to American Exceptionalism as an Explanation 
Robert A. Khan argues that American exceptionalism could explain the cultural and legal 
institutions of freedom of speech in different countries. However, he claims that the theory has 
its limitations. While states in the world are now connected to one another via the internet or 
other technology, there are speech rules across the national boundaries. For instance, the 
Community Standards of Google or Facebook apply to all nations that use those services. The 
theory of American exceptionalism cannot explain this pragmatic limitation: do American rules 
only apply in the territory of the United States? In contrast, the Community Standards are usually 
stricter than the freedom of speech approach in the US. Why is this not American 
exceptionalism? 522 
Diverse systems might interact with and influence one another. Convergence analysts 
recognize that those systems would be more similar to one another regarding constitutions and 
broad protection in the future, and they might consequently move to more unified rules. For 
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example, American exceptionalism might be changed to a general principle, and German 
Holocaust denial was proposed to end in a few decades.523 However, Khan disagrees with this 
point as a way to explain the coming compromise. He says that different views might conflict 
with each other and it is not yet known which is correct. 
Therefore, Khan rejects both exceptionalism and convergence models and has turned to the 
underlying debate itself.524 He uses militant democracy theory to explain the differences between 
the approach in the US and that in other countries. However, he rejects American exceptionalism 
as a reason why European countries employ militant democracy.  
6. Why Does Taiwan Need to Consider American Exceptionalism? 
According to the theory of American exceptionalism, the United States is an exception to 
freedom of speech rights in democratic countries. However, as an emerging democracy, Taiwan 
has received substantial influence from the United States. Although Taiwan also imports its legal 
theories from some European countries, it prefers to use the doctrines of the American First 
Amendment theory as its leading legal resource to deal with freedom of speech issues. Hence, if 
freedom of speech in the United States is an example of an exception under American 
exceptionalism, Taiwan should be included in the exception. American exceptionalism provides 
me with a method to compare Taiwan and the other democratic countries before designing a hate 
speech law for hate speech issues in Taiwan. 
X. CONCLUSION 
All the approaches to hate speech described in this paper are the specific outcomes of 
different countries based on their unique politics, history, and culture. Considering these factors 
in evaluating and choosing a hate speech approach is valuable. First, the history of conflict 
 
523 See Teachout, Making “Holocaust Denial” a Crime, supra note 492, at 655. 
524 Kahn, Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech? supra note 468, at 549-552. 
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between social, political, or ethnic groups may trigger different methods in diverse countries. 
The second is the cultural factor, which includes the individualistic or group focus on rights. 
Third, different democratic patterns may lead to different hate speech approaches, such as the 
vision of democracy as militant or liberal. However, the questions that remain are: which 
approach is more appropriate for Taiwan? I will address these topics in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DESIGNING AN ARGUMENT FOR HATE SPEECH 
REGULATION IN TAIWAN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Five will focus on three main themes: first, current hate speech problems in Taiwan; 
second, the cultural historical background in Taiwan; and third, the current structures in place 
that fail to address hate speech. The first section will present the problem list to classify some 
patterns of hate speech issues in Taiwan by citing actual instances. The second section will focus 
on Taiwan’s historical background to analyze the historical factors leading to these instances of 
hate speech. This section will discuss significant events from throughout Taiwan’s history, 
especially the historical oppression after World War II. The background discussion offers 
information needed to understand the following points in Taiwan: past persecutions of 
authoritarianism, ethnic tensions and conflicts, and the oppressive history of freedom of speech 
limits in Taiwan. Finally, the third section will outline the development of the Taiwanese legal 
system and will point out how the current system could not resolve hate speech problems in 
Taiwan. 
II. CURRENT HATE SPEECH PROBLEMS IN TAIWAN 
1. Overview 
The common patterns of offensive speech in Taiwan are as follows: first, speech directed 
toward ethnic groups; secondly, speech denying, downplaying, or justifying historical 
oppression; thirdly, speech promoting a war or speech threatening freedom and democratic 
order; and fourthly, speech discriminating against sexual orientation minority groups. Identifying 
likely and frequent patterns of hate speech in Taiwan can help determine the best model for 
regulation. The United States values freedom of speech more strongly, as laid out in the First 
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Amendment of the Constitution. Germany’s method of regulation is influenced greatly by the 
Holocaust and South Africa’s by apartheid. As Taiwan develops its own regulation, cultural 
considerations should be taken into account. Though these countries may have different 
historical backgrounds and present manifestations, they can be referenced to create a cohesive 
model to, in turn, address and regulate these frequent instances. 
2. Offensive Speech Directed toward Ethnic Groups 
The first problem is the tension and conflict among the different ethnic groups in Taiwan 
that trigger the offensive speech: for example, the ethnic conflict between the Hoklo 
Taiwanese525 and mainlanders. The ethnic conflict turned into the national identity conflict after 
Taiwan became a democracy. This example is one of many cases in which ethnic and identity 
conflicts cause hatred. The hate speech spreads among these different groups through either an 
ethnicity-based or identity-based method.  
One example of the inter-ethnic group conflict is the case of Kuo Kuan-Ying. On July 25, 
2006, a Taiwanese government officer, Kuo Kuan-Ying, posted an online article discussing 
Taipei’s Jiancheng Circle market. He used some offensive terms in his commentary to criticize 
 
525 One thing is necessary to point out: the term “Taiwanese” could be diverse meaning, depending on specific 
circumstances. On nationality-based, Taiwanese usually means Taiwanese citizen. Taiwanese are the citizens of 
Taiwan, or citizens of the Republic of China, comparing to a Chinese citizen, which means citizens of the People's 
Republic of China. However, on ethnic-based, Taiwanese are two meanings. First, it means both Hoklo Taiwanese 
and Hakka Taiwanese, comparing to Mainlanders. The classification is based on the end of World War Two. The 
Han people who lived in the Japanese Period were Taiwanese, or “Islanders,” “Benshengren.” But Mainlanders were 
not. The Article will use “Ethnic Taiwanese” to describe both Hoklo Taiwanese and Hakka Taiwanese. And second, 
the narrowest meaning “Taiwanese” are specific as “Hoklo Taiwanese,” except Hakka Taiwanese. The article will 
use “Hoklo Taiwanese.” Further, on Language-based, “Taiwanese” means the “Taiwanese language,” or “Hoklo 
language,” compared to the Modern Standard Mandarin. The article will use “Taiwanese language.” Also, the term 
“Mainlanders,” or “Chinese Mainlanders” need to be clarified. This Article uses “Mainlanders,” not “Mainland 
Chinese” because the “Mainland Chinese” is sometimes a specific term for people living in Hong Kong or Macau to 
describe the people come from their “Mainland China.” See Chang-Cheng Yang, Ethnic Conflict Since 228, in 
WORKSHOP IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 228 INCIDENT, ASIA RESEARCH CENTRE, LSE 





Taiwanese people in his writing.526 For instance, he described the Taiwanese as taibazi (台巴子, 
“Taiwanese rednecks”) and wokou (倭寇, “Japanese pirates”). He called Taiwan a “ghost 
island” (鬼島) as well. Kuo further mentioned in his article: “the imposition of martial law had 
been a benevolent act of the then government,” and “the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
should spend many years suppressing people in Taiwan instead of granting any political freedom 
to them once it has taken Taiwan by military force.” From his perspective, he and his ethnic 
group are “high-class Mainlanders.”527 This article was also posted in the China Times, a leading 
Taiwanese newspaper, on August 2, 2006.528 The report triggered strong disagreements and 
critiques from the Taiwanese public.529 Society recognizes his language as an expression of 
extreme hatred from mainlanders sometimes exhibited toward ethnically Taiwanese people. 
Another example of hateful speech toward ethnic minorities happened on June 9, 2016. A 
self-styled citizen journalist, Hung Su-Chu, posted an interview on YouTube and talked to a 
mainlander, also a retired soldier. Hung Su-Chu asked him, “why don't you go back?” then 
stated, “Taiwanese people cannot afford to support Chinese refugees like you,” and finally 
yelled, “Go back! Go back to your own country.”530 The video also triggered controversy in 
Taiwanese society. Notably, the mainlanders’ community sharply critiqued Hung’s speech. The 
video constituted offensive speech aimed at mainlanders from the Hoklo Taiwanese.531 
 
526 In his writing, “Taiwanese” looks like both an ethnicity-based and identity-based label because he is a mainlander 
and has strong Chinese identity. 
527 Hsiu-Chuan Shih, Kuo Returning from Toronto to Explain Offending Articles, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 15, 2009), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/03/15/2003438537. Also, Yang Kuo-Wen, Chen Feng-Li & 
Jake Chung, Court Rules That Kuo Kuan-ying Can Retire, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/01/19/2003663371. 
528 Id. 
529 Here, the “Taiwanese public opinion” was the national meaning. All of Taiwanese society paid attention to his 
offensive speech.  
530 Che-Fon Chang, Hsin-Hui Lu & Kay Liu, Video of Woman Insulting Mainlander Sparks Criticisms, FOCUS 
TAIWAN CNA ENGLISH NEWS (Jun. 10, 2016). https://focustaiwan.tw/society/201606100011.  
531 Although Hung Su-Chu actually is mixed Taiwanese and mainlander, the mainlander community recognized her 
speech as typical hatred from the ethnic Taiwanese toward them.  
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Regardless, the two biggest political parties in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT), known in 
English as the Chinese National Party, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),532 
condemned Hung’s extreme speech publicly.533  
Additionally, offensive speech that targets the Taiwanese Aboriginal people is still a 
problem. For example, some Hoklo Taiwanese may use “hoana,” which is similar to “nigger” in 
the Taiwanese language, to refer to the indigenous Taiwanese.534 The term shows discrimination 
aimed at Taiwanese Aboriginal people from the other ethnic groups in Taiwan.535 Unfriendly 
expressions to “new immigrants,” including immigrants and migrant workers, is also a problem. 
Therefore, offensive speech that targets ethnic groups and creates ethnic tension and conflict 
constitutes a problem in Taiwan.  
3. Speech Discriminating against Sexual Minority or Sexual Orientation Minority 
Groups 
The LGBTQ population is small in Taiwan, and members of this group usually find it hard to 
have enough representational power to affect politics. They sometimes face offensive speech. 
Taiwan’s Constitutional Court held that the right to same-sex marriage should be guaranteed in 
 
532 The KMT is a mid-right, conservative, and Chinese identity-embracing party. In contrast, the DPP is mid-left, 
progressive, and embracing of Taiwanese identity. 
533 Loa Iok-Sin, Tsai and Hung Share 'waishengren’ Posts, TAIPEI TIMES (Jun. 12, 2016), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/06/12/2003648437. Also, Abraham Gerber, Parties Pan 
Insulting of “waishengren,” TAIPEI TIMES (Jun. 11, 2016). 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/06/11/2003648341. Further, Brian Hioe, The Debate 
Provoked by Hung Su-Chu’s Online Videos and Questions of Identity in Taiwan, NEW BLOOM MAGAZINE (Jun. 12, 
2016), https://newbloommag.net/2016/06/12/hung-su-Chu-videos/. 
534 The report said: “Aboriginal legislators charge that some DPP legislators have referred to them as hoan-a, which 
translates roughly as “nigger” in the Minnan Chinese dialect.” See Mark Munsterhjelm, The First Nations of 
Taiwan: A Special Report on Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (Jun. 2002), 
https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/first-nations-taiwan-special-report-taiwans-
indigenous.  
535 On Aug. 1, 2016, the Taiwanese president, Tsai Ing-wen, formally apologized to the Indigenous people for the 
100 years of “national discrimination” and “injustice.” Austin Ramzy, Taiwan’s President Apologizes to Aborigines 




2017.536 Two years later, the Congress in Taiwan made a law to legalize same-sex marriage, and 
this took effect on May 24, 2019. However, hate speech and hate communication against 
LGBTQ people and same-sex marriage still exists.537 Some hate communications spread online. 
For example, some disinformation from social media platforms has claimed that legalizing same-
sex marriage is connected with HIV. It stated that Taiwanese healthcare would experience larger 
burdens because the HIV-positive homosexual men were going to “flock to the country” and 
“marry a Taiwanese man to use the health-care system.”538  
4. Speech Denying, Downplaying or Justifying the Historical Oppression  
Speech denying the historical oppression is an issue of hate in Taiwan. This pattern of 
speech might be closer to the German model and Holocaust denying. Under the Martial law in 
Taiwan, every incident with serious human rights violations has triggered the hatred between 
groups with different historical memories, such as the February 28 incident and the White Terror 
period from 1949 to 1987. The February 28 incident involved an uprising in Taiwan in 1947. The 
Kuomintang’s government suppressed the rebellion by military force. An estimated 28,000 
civilians died in March 1947, connected to the uprising stemming from the February incident. 
Social division in Taiwan has since deepened, and unity has deteriorated. The people who 
support the former dictator, Chiang Kai-Shek, would try to approve, deny, or to downplay the 
human rights violations before the democratization and further glorify or justify the dictatorship. 
Such speech may trigger hatred and harm toward the victims and their families.  
 
536 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 748 (司法院大法官第 748 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 748] (May 
24, 2017) (Taiwan). 
537 Isabella Steger, Taiwan’s LGBT Groups Fought Fake News before Marriage Vote, QUARTZ (Nov. 24, 2018), 
https://qz.com/1471411/chat-apps-like-line-spread-anti-lgbt-fake-news-before-taiwan-same-sex-marriage-vote/. 
538 Id.  
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On February 21, 2012, a retired politician, Hau Pei-Tsun, who was the Premier of Taiwan in 
the 1990s and the Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces in the 1980s, mentioned the 
February 28 incident having been included in a Taiwanese high school history textbook. He 
stated that “the Kuomintang government killed only a little more than 500 people in that 
incident,” which was far lower than the number given in Taiwanese history textbooks, which 
recognizes that more than 10,000 people died during the incident because of the Chinese military 
force.539 His reason was that just a few hundred people claimed the damages for state 
compensation. His claim was inaccurate, according to most academic research in Taiwan by 
Taiwanese historical scholars.540 Hau also said, “Taiwan’s fate has never been, and will never be, 
determined by the Taiwanese.”541 The speech shows his strong Chinese nationalism and bias 
toward the Taiwan independence movement.  
Another case happened on February 21, 2013. A businessman, John Peng, who is the 
Chinese Maritime Transport Ltd. chairman, wrote an open letter to President Ying-Jeou Ma to 
request cleaning the name of his father, Meng-Chi Peng. Meng-Chi Peng was the former 
commander at the Kaohsiung Fortress, and he was accused of killing a lot of Taiwanese people 
during the February 28 incident, and was called the “Kaohsiung Butcher.” John Peng claimed 
that the people killed by his father were “thugs” so that his father “did not do anything wrong.” 
Prompted by the letter, President Ma started to relaunch the research into the February 28 
incident. However, the DPP legislators recognized that Ma’s actions aimed to justify 
Kuomintang’s massacre and rewrite the history, and they proposed to instead integrate the 
 
539 Yan-Chih Mo, Ma Dismisses Hau Pei-Tsun’s 228 Comments, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/02/25/2003526314.  
540 Michael Forsythe, Taiwan Turns Light on 1947 Slaughter by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Troops,  




German Criminal Code 130, the Holocaust Denying Law,542 into Taiwanese law, to deal with 
denials of the February 28 incident.  
Taiwan experienced more than 30 years of dictatorship, and the pressure under the 
dictatorship also fueled the hate between the oppressing and oppressed groups. How to face the 
historical tragedy and deal with the historical oppression and human rights violations in the past 
has become an argument and point of conflict inside Taiwanese society. Because the transition to 
a democracy for Taiwan was peaceful but compromising, the society has not experienced 
historical justice, or so-called “transitional justice.” The former oppressing group joined the 
democratic system and constitutes a political power in Taiwan. The authentic experiences of 
each group trigger a deeply held hatred between them, and these create an enormous conflict in 
Taiwanese society.  
5. Speech Promoting a War or Speech Threatening Freedom and Democratic Order 
Because of the national identity division, some people in Taiwan with strong Chinese 
Nationalism even supported the PRC’s military invasion to unify Taiwan. Therefore, some 
speech is not just denying the past human rights violations but also promoting the attack from an 
enemy, thereby challenging Taiwanese democracy and promoting a dictatorship to threaten the 
“free democratic order.”543 This kind of speech becomes the other specific issue in Taiwan, 
because the statement is based on the hatred of Taiwanese people. Similarly, encouraging 
invasion by an enemy would be hate speech under South Africa’s model. But Taiwan does not 
have a solution in the legal system for this yet.  
 
542 DPP Legislator Bi-khim Hsiao stated: “Ma’s attempt to rewrite history would be unacceptable in any other 
democracy, especially when many victims’ families who witnessed the massacre are still alive.” See Chris Wang, 
DPP Pans Ma over 228 Massacre, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/02/28/2003555886.  
543 Lee, Taiwan: Spies, supra note 11. 
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On April 12, 2019, a visiting academic from the PRC, Yi Li, who was also famous in 
promoting the PRC’s use of military force to unify Taiwan, was expelled from Taiwan by the 
Taiwanese government. The reason that the Taiwanese government forced him to leave was “his 
intention to conduct political activities on travel permits,” and that his speech may threaten 
national security because of “promoting a war:” achieving the same effect as “a terrorist.”544 The 
issue also raised questions about whether the communicated expression spread hatred between 
Taiwan and China, and whether promoting the war and threatening freedom and democratic 
order in Taiwan should be allowed.  
In this case, the Taiwanese government had a smart way of dealing with the issue: Yi Li is 
not a citizen of Taiwan, and so the Taiwanese government did not allow him to enter. However, 
if Taiwanese citizens urge war to threaten the free and democratic order, especially in relation to 
the issue of China and Taiwan, should promoting Chinese militant invasion be a crime in 
Taiwan? Taiwan does not have a way to deal with this speech if it were to come from its 
citizens.545 
6. Conclusion 
Classifying the patterns of hate speech would be useful for system design, especially as 
Taiwan chooses between different countries’ approaches to create its own. The United States’ 
scholars define hate speech as speech targeting “minority groups.” However, some methods, 
such as those used in Germany and South Africa, are not limited to minority groups. The German 
approach restricts the speech denying the historical oppression—the Holocaust denying and the 
 
544 Taiwanese Premier Tseng-Chang Su pointed out: “Taiwan is a free, democratic, and open country. We welcome 
all to visit Taiwan... However, if you come here to advocate unification through armed invasion under the pretext of 
sightseeing, you are no different from a terrorist,” Staff writer, with CNA, Unificationist Li Yi Put on Plane after 
Deportation, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/04/13/2003713329.  
545 For example, China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP), who invited Yi Li to Taiwan to promotes PRC unifying 
Taiwan. Some members of the party are Taiwanese citizens. See id. Also, Lee, Taiwan: Spies, supra note 11. 
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decisions of European human rights courts—as well. The United States legal system does not 
have corresponding regulations on speech denying historical oppressions. Similarly, the German 
approach also does not allow speech that threatens freedom and democratic order, but the United 
States does. Speech promoting war is protected in the United States unless it exceeds a clear and 
present dangerous standard; however, South Africa and the European human rights courts have a 
more aggressive approach toward this type of speech. Speech promoting war is a kind of hate 
speech in both South Africa and the European human rights courts. In order to design a new 
model of hate speech regulation, the current legal system in Taiwan and how it regulates and 
fails to resolve hate speech must be examined.  
III. TAIWANESE HISTORY AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
1. Introduction 
Like how Germany and South Africa have codified the value of human dignity into their 
motivations of their hate speech regulations, Taiwan has a history that indicates that this value is 
held strongly in their present culture. Taiwan is an island located at a conflict point among 
several countries and it is also a former colony of multiple countries.546 These conflicts have led 
to incidents of violence and oppression, including the February 28 incident and the period of 
martial law following World War II. Additionally, Taiwan’s colonial past has led to ethnic 
conflict that must be resolved by protecting the dignity of oppressed groups, even after Taiwan’s 
democratization and independence were established. The importance of human dignity extends 
to considerations about other minorities, like the LGBTQ community. All of these factors in 
 
546 The shadow of colonialism has never left Taiwan. Spain, the Netherlands, Japan, and China all colonized Taiwan 
during different periods. The United States also plays an essential role in Taiwanese history, culture, and politics. Wu 
Rwei-Ren believes that “the Modem Taiwanese nationalism” is the outcome from the influence of the following 
historical empires: the Qing Empire, Japanese Empire, United States, and the raising modern China. Rwei-Ren Wu, 
Fragment of Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism, in TAIWANS STRUGGLE: VOICES OF THE 
TAIWANESE 27 (Shyu-tu Lee & Jack Francis Williams eds. 2016). 
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Taiwan’s history and culture indicate how human dignity must be considered as a value when 
developing a hate speech regulation. 
In Alexander Tsesis’ argument, systematic persecution, which undermines human dignity, 
includes genocide, unfair and inequitable subordination, and separation. Tsesis mentioned that 
Germany used all three methods and US used subordination, and separation.547 I will address 
systematic persecution in Taiwanese history to show the historical oppression to human dignity. 
2. February 28 Incident and its Influence 
The Taiwanese society is an immigrant society. Diverse ethnicities include Taiwanese 
Indigenous people,548 the Hoklo Taiwanese, the Hakka Taiwanese,549 mainlanders,550 and New 
Immigrants. The above groups, except New Immigrants, are identified as the “Four Main 
Ethnicities.” After World War II, the Chinese government occupied the island and led the new 
immigrants, so-called mainlanders, to move to Taiwan. Compared to mainlanders, people whose 
ancestors migrated from southeastern China to Taiwan around the end of the 16th century or 
lived under the Japanese colonial period before World War II were the so-called “Taiwanese,”551 
including the Hoklo Taiwanese and the Hakka Taiwanese. In 2018, the population of ethnic 
groups of Taiwan was 70% Hoklo Taiwanese, 14% Hakka Taiwanese, 14% mainlander, and 2% 
Taiwanese Indigenous and New Immigrants.552  
 
547 TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES, supra note 33, at 117. 
548 Taiwanese aboriginal people are Austronesian peoples. The others are mainly from the Han group. Before the 
17th century, the Taiwanese indigenous people had already lived on the island. They were the earliest residence in 
Taiwan’s island thousands of years ago. Jim Lin, One Island, Twenty Tongues, KETAGALAN MEDIA (May 03, 2017). 
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2017/05/03/one-island-twenty-tongues/.  
549 In the 17th century, Han immigrants from southeastern China moved to Taiwan to seek a better chance to survive 
from their life in China. They were Hoklo Taiwanese and Hakka Taiwanese. 
550“Mainlanders” are not all Han Chinese, because “mainlanders” specifically means the Chinese immigrants who 
followed KMT in moving to Taiwan after World War II. They are mainly Han, but also include the other ethnicities 
in China, such as the Manchu people and Mongols. 
551 Yang, Ethnic Conflict Since 228, supra note 525. 
552 However, the boundary between these different ethnic groups is vague. They may marry with the other ethnic 
groups and individuals may have multiethnic identities. Joyce Chepkemoi, Ethnic Groups of Taiwan, WORLD ATLAS 
(last updated on Jun. 7, 2018). https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-taiwan.html. Also see Cheng-
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As World War II ended, Japan surrendered on October 25, 1945. At this time, the Republic 
of China began a military occupation of Taiwan.553 Japan abandoned any claims to sovereignty 
over Taiwan by signing the Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951.554 The ROC 
government, which was led by the Kuomintang distrusted the people who lived in Taiwan under 
the Japanese period, as such most officers of the Taiwan Provincial Government were from 
China.555 Also, the second phase of the Chinese Civil War, between the Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party of China, started in August of 1945. The Kuomintang government used 
Taiwanese natural resources and food supplies to support its military force against the 
Communist Party’s troops.556 Furthermore, unemployment, inflation, and corruption problems 
made people suffer. People in Taiwan fell under the economic crisis and experienced poor public 
security.557 The tension between the mainlanders and Taiwanese was rising.558  
The February 28 incident, or so-call February 28 Massacre, occurred in 1947. In the 
beginning, the agents of the Monopoly Bureau559 targeted a vendor that sold private cigarettes.560 
 
Feng Shih, Language and Ethnic Politics in Taiwan, VOL. 8, NO. 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PEACE STUDIES 89 
(Autumn/Winter 2003). 
553 The Republic of China (ROC) began its military occupation in Taiwan in 1945. The occupation was the same as 
the Ryukyu Islands under United States administration from 1945 to 1972. Under the period of the military 
occupation, Japan still had Taiwanese sovereignty until 1951. Japan officially abandoned its sovereignty of Taiwan 
in the Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951. 
554 One significant point is that “the military occupation” means the Republic of China had not had “the returning of 
Taiwanese sovereignty” yet. In fact, in the Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, neither the ROC nor PRC 
was benefited the Taiwanese sovereignty from Japan. Thus, Taiwanese sovereignty is a significant dispute in 
international law. See Bonnie S. Glaser & Michael J. Green, What Is the U.S. “One China” Policy, and Why Does It 
Matter? CSIS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-China-policy-and-why-does-it-matter.  
555 SHELLEY RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN: VOTING FOR DEMOCRACY 56-57 (1999). 
556 Id. 
557 Id. 
558 In the beginning of Chinese occupation, people in Taiwan welcomed the “mother country,” but they suddenly 
found that the new government was not better than the Japanese. A scholar, Shelley Rigger, points out: “The 
Taiwanese, accustomed to a government that was strict but honest, were especially outraged by corruption and 
abuses of power.” Id. at 55-59. 
559 Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau was a governmental agency for monopoly business. The 
monopolized items included tobacco, liquor, and camphor in 1947. See TAIWAN TOBACCO & LIQUOR CORP, History, 
https://www.ttl.com.tw/en/about/about_06.aspx (last visited July 3, 2020). 




The law enforcement officers beat the vendor and shot an innocent bystander. The shooting 
triggered huge protests throughout the entire island going against the Chinese government, which 
rejected handing over the officers.561 The Kuomintang leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, recognized that 
there was an uprising and sent his troops to Taiwan from China. On March 8, 1947, Chinese 
soldiers landed in the northern and southern parts of Taiwan; then they started the killing. After 
one month of killing across all of Taiwan, more than 20,000 Taiwanese civilians died, and an 
even greater number of people were imprisoned or missing without any due process or fair 
judgment.562 
The February 28 incident was not just a tragedy, but also a strong violation of its victims’ 
human dignity. The scholar Stefan Fleischauer points out that the February 28 incident enhanced 
the animosity between both Taiwanese people and mainlanders.563 The military killed numerous 
highly educated Taiwanese people in this incident. It was a systematic massacre. A generation of 
Taiwanese elites died, were imprisoned, or were exiled. It forced ethnic Taiwanese people “into 
submission.” The surviving groups were scared “away from politics.”564 Ethnic Taiwanese 
people recognize that they were oppressed and massacred by a powerful minority group, the 
mainlanders,565 and compare the incident with the Holocaust in Germany.566 In contrast, for 
 
561 RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 58. 
562 Id. at 57-58. 
563 Stefan Fleischauer, The 228 Incident and the Taiwan Independence Movement’s Construction of a Taiwanese 
Identity, 21, No. 3 CHINA INFORMATION 373, 382 (2007). 
564 Id.  
565 Stefan Fleischauer mentioned: “In its struggle for democratization and liberalization, the dangwai movement 
rested heavily on the dichotomy and inequality between native Taiwanese and Mainlanders. This claim of ethnicity-
based bias corresponded to the political realities of that time. The Mainlanders were in fact a powerful minority 
group, since they controlled not only the key coercive state apparatus and the military, but also a substantial portion 
of the ideological machinery and civilian media. Taiwanese identity was consequently expressed as a feeling of 
being victimized by a mainlander minority.” Id. 
566 Lung-Chih Chang, A Tragic Beginning Remembered: Reflections on the Dual History of the February 28 Incident 
in Post-Martial Law Taiwan, NO. 5 TAIWAN LECTURE SERIES WORKING PAPERS ONLINE, INSTITUTE OF CHINESE 
STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 1, 9 (2010), available at https://www.zo.uni-
heidelberg.de/md/zo/sino/research/taiwan_lecture_series_workingpaper_no5.pdf. Also, see Amy B. Wang, For 
decades, no one spoke of Taiwan’s hidden massacre. A new generation is breaking the silence, The Washington Post 
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mainlanders, especially conservatives in Kuomintang, insist on claiming that they were the actual 
victims because of the Taiwanese people’s random ethnicity-related assaults on mainlanders in 
the protest.567 The different understanding of the incident triggered bias and hatred between the 
Taiwanese and the mainlanders. 
3. Inequitable Subordination: Taiwanese Ethnic Tension and Conflicts 
Mainlanders controlled the political power and financial resources in the martial law period. 
A minority in a population could not reflect the real political and economic power in a 
Taiwanese society. Most of the mainlanders568 could speak Mandarin, but the Taiwanese did not. 
In contrast, most mainlanders could not understand the Japanese and Taiwanese languages. The 
different language skills of the two ethnicities gave an advantage to the mainlanders in their 
education because schools focused on Mandarin education. Moreover, the Taiwanese did not 
have equal opportunities for political participation under the martial law period. mainlanders had 
more of an opportunity to obtain jobs in the government.569  
The education and culture under the martial law period focused on Chinese nationalism and 
justification for the Kuomintang’s ruling. The Taiwanese people experienced strong 
“Sinicization.”570 The teaching of geography and history defined Taiwan as being part of China, 
and the ROC is the only legal China. The other apparent phenomenon was that the military 
department was set inside the school to supervise the faculty, staff, and students.571 Just like 
 
(Feb. 28, 2017, 3:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/28/for-decades-no-one-
spoke-of-taiwans-hidden-massacre-a-new-generation-is-breaking-the-silence/.  
567 Fleischauer, The 228 Incident and the Taiwan Independence Movement’s Construction of a Taiwanese Identity, 
supra note 563, at 385-386. 
568 In Taiwan, mainlanders specifically mean people who followed the KMT from China to Taiwan after World War 
II. Their nationality is Taiwanese, not Chinese. People who immigrated from China to Taiwan after democratization 
are recognized as New Immigrants. 
569 RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 59. 
570 A-CHIN HSIAU, CONTEMPORARY TAIWANESE CULTURAL NATIONALISM 128-129 (2005). 
571 RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 72. 
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scholar Shelley Rigger said, “schools were the number one tool of political socialization.”572 
Mandarin is still the only official language in Taiwan. Speaking Taiwanese or the other local 
languages was not allowed in government facilities and schools. Students were given punishment 
by “fining” or “wearing humiliating placards” when they did so.573 As Shelley Rigger pointed 
out: “The regime promoted the view that Taiwanese (Taiwanese language) was a second-rate 
dialect: primitive, ugly, and low class.”574 The above unequal treatment caused harm to the 
Taiwanese people’s human dignity and triggered ethnic hatred in Taiwan.  
Besides, the Indigenous people lack political power and economic benefits in the Taiwanese 
society. They have been a discrete and insular minority under ethnic and economic bases, 
regardless if they were in the Japanese period, Kuomintang’s martial law period, or after 
democratization. The Qings’ territory did not include Taiwanese Indigenous people’s’ lands. 
Japan conquered the Indigenous with their military, and the Japanese forced them to adopt the 
Japanese, then the Kuomintang forced them to adopt the Han culture.575 After democratization, 
the Taiwanese have begun to give the Indigenous people’s rights and culture a new importance. 
Additionally, after democratization, “new residents” and “new immigrants” became the other 
minority groups in Taiwanese society. They are mainly from China,576 Vietnam, Indonesia, 
 
572 Id. 
573 Id.  
574 Id.  
575 MELISSA J. BROWN, IS TAIWAN CHINESE? THE IMPACT OF CULTURE, POWER, AND MIGRATION ON CHANGING 
IDENTITIES 8 (2004). During the Martial Law Period, the Indigenous movement was based on the opposition group, 
the “out of the party” as a tool against “Chinese nationalism,” to show a different origin of Taiwanese people from a 
Chinese background. However, the view of “out of the party” was close to Hoklo Taiwanese perspective. HSIAU, 
CONTEMPORARY TAIWANESE CULTURAL NATIONALISM, supra note 575, at 166-167. 
576 Therefore, mainlanders only mean the people who followed KMT from China to Taiwan in the period between 
the end of World War II and Taiwanese democratization. After democratization, Chinese immigrants were not 
referred to as mainlanders. They are included in “new immigrants”. 
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Thailand, or the Philippines through either marriage with Taiwanese citizens or employment in 
Taiwan.577  
The ethnic tensions and conflicts between the mainlanders and Taiwanese were one of the 
original social conditions under the martial law period, because of the Kuomintang’s unequal 
policies. The whole history of Taiwan’s ethnic politics presents a systemic injustice under the 
martial law period, although there was no concrete slavery and racial segregation. Still, cultural 
bias and unequal opportunities for different ethnicities have existed. Those problems constitute 
violations of human dignity. In addition, Taiwanese Indigenous people and New Immigrants lack 
social and political power even today. The bias against the vulnerable minorities in Taiwan also 
undermines the guarantee of human dignity.  
4. Inequitable Subordination: Sexual Minority or Sexual Orientation Minority Groups 
in Taiwan 
Before Taiwanese democratization, the oppression originated mainly from the Kuomintang 
government, and the leading human rights issues were political rights and freedom of speech 
rights. After democratization, the Taiwanese people enjoyed a great progression of political 
rights and free expression, then the rights of equality started to attract the attention of the public 
and develop. 
LGBTQ rights have progressed quickly as well. Taiwan has never seen any crimes for 
same-sex relations or same-sex sexual activity, even under the martial law period.578 After 
democratization, the issue of LGBTQ rights has focused on discrimination protections and same-
sex marriage. The Taiwanese Constitutional Court held that same-sex marriage should be 
 
577 Jermyn Chow, New Immigrants Putting down Roots in Taiwan, THE STRAITS TIMES (May 29, 2017), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/new-immigrants-putting-down-roots-in-taiwan.  
578 See HSING FA [Criminal Code] (Taiwan). 
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allowed in March 2017, and the Congress in Taiwan made the law to legalize it two years after 
that. The Act of Gender Equality in Employment was applied in 2002 and the Gender Equity 
Education Act was applied in June 2004 to make sure the Taiwanese LGBTQ group would not 
face discrimination in workplaces and schools.579 
However, there is some dissent behind Taiwan’s progressive LGBTQ rights. Conservative 
voters and the anti-LGBTQ group proposed a referendum to oppose same-sex marriage and saw 
a tremendous victory in 2018.580 Therefore, the dissenting opinion still has enormous political 
power and potential to cause setbacks in the future. Moreover, concerning hate speech or hate 
crimes in Taiwan, they still exist but do not have specific data or research tracking them because 
the Taiwanese government agencies do not make a sufficiently accurate distinction to address 
crimes based on race, ethnicity, or gender.581 Those offensive speeches and actions undermine 
the assurance of human dignity. 
5. Conclusion 
Historical factors are significant for understanding the reasons for the current state of hatred 
and hate speech in Taiwan. The historical oppression provides the context for hate speech in 
Taiwanese culture. The historical oppression undermines oppressed groups’ human dignity, and 
oppressed groups have become the victims of hate speech. This influence still exists today. On 
the other side, I will address freedom of speech in Taiwanese history to explain why freedom of 
speech has become a superior right in Taiwan. 
 
579 English versions of both acts are available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/Index.aspx.  
580 Agencies, Taiwan Votes down Same-sex Marriage as China Welcomes Midterm Results, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/24/anti-gay-marriage-groups-win-taiwan-referendum-
battle.  
581 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor United States Department of State, 2016 Human Rights Report 
(Taiwan Part), AIT (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.ait.org.tw/2016-human-rights-report-taiwan-part-2/.  
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IV. TAIWANESE HISTORY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
1. Introduction 
After the February 28 incident, the Kuomintang used highly political oppression to control 
Taiwan, including enacting the “political arrests” and “detentions” of dissenting people.582 The 
government announced the martial law period in Taiwan on May 19, 1949. It started the one-
party-led dictatorship in Taiwan. Kuomintang used “Temporary Provisions against the 
Communist Rebellion” to replace the Constitution of the ROC.583 The martial law period in 
Taiwan continued on for 38 years.  
The Kuomintang brought highly “centralized and authoritarian” political institutions from 
China to Taiwan.584 The Constitution was frozen during the martial law period. The “Temporary 
Provisions” excluded the limitations in the Constitution regarding the President. That meant that 
the presidential power was unlimited. Without checks and balances, the president was essentially 
a dictator.585 Under the “Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion,” the ROC 
Constitution’s bill of rights was frozen. That means some fundamental rights, such as habeas 
 
582 While the KMT government lost the Chinese Civil War and its officials escaped from China to Taiwan in 1949, 
many more Chinese immigrants followed the KMT government from China. The People's Republic of China (PRC) 
was founded in Beijing at that time. For countering PRC, KMT claimed its ROC government was the only legal 
China in the world rather than the PRC in Beijing. RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 58. 
583 About “Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion,” See TAIWAN DOCUMENTS PROJECT, History of 
Constitutional Revisions in the Republic of China, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/constitution07.htm (last visited 
May 28, 2019). 
584 KMT directly brought the institutions from its “mainland,” and the government structure was suitable for all of 
China. The Constitution in Taiwan, which is titled the “Constitution of the Republic of China,” was brought from 
pre-PRC China by the National Government of the ROC, dominated by KMT, while losing the Chinese Civil War 
around 1949. Id. at 8. 
585 Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a Liberal and Democratic 
Country, VOL. 11 NO. 3 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 531, 540-545 (2017). Also, RIGGER, POLITICS IN 
TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 7. One instance demonstrating this was when KMT’s leader, President Chiang Kai-shek 
led the Legislators of ROC from China to Taiwan after 1949. However, he did not hold the elections for the 
Legislators because he recognized they represented the “whole China.” He only held the vote for the represents of 
“Taiwan Province.” The 43-years-long legislature made sure they could always elect Chiang and his son, due to the 
fact that the presidential election was not directly elected by all citizens. Moreover, the Taiwanese government kept 
the two levels of government in the same area, which were the government of ROC and the government of the 
Taiwan Province. RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 6. 
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corpus, freedom of speech, and procedures for due process of the law did not apply to Taiwanese 
people.586 The Kuomintang regime used its influence in the military, education, and media to 
oppress opposition. The right to freedom of speech was greatly repressed. The government 
continued to suppress political dissidents and protesters.587 Taiwan’s history of oppressing its 
citizens’ freedom of speech impacts how the Taiwanese view and react to potential limitations on 
that freedom today, including potential hate speech regulations. 
2. Freedom of Speech under Oppression 
Political activities were highly restricted under the temporary provisions and martial law. 
Speeches, assemblies, and parades to protest the government were considered criminal activities. 
Except for Kuomintang, no political parties were allowed.588 The media, including newspapers, 
magazines, television, and radio, were controlled by the government. The owners of the above 
media had to hold various permits from the regime.589 
The most severe political censorship was the former Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the 
ROC. Article 100 was the act of sedition.590 Even people with only the intent to destroy the 
organization of the State, seize State territory, or using illegal means, change the Constitution or 
 
586 Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century, supra note 585, at 537-538. 
587 RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 70-74. 
588 “Outside the Party,” or so-called “Dangwai (黨外)” in the Chinese Language, refers to the groups of political 
activists that do not support the KMT under Martial Law Period. At that time, “Dangwai” was illegal or in the gray 
zone in politics. The regime prohibited the opinions from dissidents, but it could not stamp them out. The members 
of “Dangwai” suffered political repression. Their collaborative goal was against the KMT’s ruling, but their political 
purposes sometimes were diverse. Some of them proposed a free China by changing the ROC into a liberty state, 
while others demanded an independent Taiwan from ROC, which meant subverting the regime. However, the Feb. 
28 incident and the White Terror period became symbols of killing and enslaving Taiwanese by a dictator in the 
appeal of “Dangwai.” “Taiwanese consciousness” was raised through “out of party movement” under the 
oppression. Fleischauer, The 228 Incident and the Taiwan Independence Movement’s Construction of a Taiwanese 
Identity, supra note 563, at 381-383. 
589 RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 70-74. 
590 The former Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “Any person with the intent to destroy the 
organization of the State, seize State territory, or, using illegal means, change the Constitution or overthrow the 
Government shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than seven years; the ringleader shall be sentenced to 
life imprisonment.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 100 (Taiwan).  
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overthrow the Government could elicit punishment by this code. Article 100, plus Article 2(1) of 
the Act for the Control and Punishment of Rebellion, increased the “life imprisonment” into the 
“sole death penalty.”591 The Kuomintang regime used Article 100 to mainly target two thought 
crimes: the “Taiwan independence” and “PRC support” crimes. The law became an essential root 
of the White Terror period. The real practice of temporary provisions and Criminal Code 100 
were administered by the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC), which was a military organization. 
It supervised civilians and enacted the censorship of the publishing and media platforms. It also 
authorized criminal jurisdictions without any due process. According to research, “An estimated 
ten thousand cases involving civilians were decided in military trials from 1950 to 1986.”592 
Another severe type of self-censorship among people living in Taiwan was caused by “the 
spies,” i.e. those people who were informers and served the Kuomintang. This behavior existed 
in all areas in Taiwanese society, including executive offices, schools, and even private 
companies. Although Taiwanese international students studied abroad, they still needed to worry 
about these punishments because of the government agency’s supervision.593 The “chilling 
effect” of speech was deeply inside the Taiwanese people’s mindset. The pies’ actions also 
resulted in the “Blacklisting.” The dissidents overseas would be prohibited from going into 
Taiwan, or their visas would be dismissed so that they could not go back to their hometowns.594 
 
591 The Act for the Control and Punishment of Rebellion was made on May 24, 1945 and abolished on May 22, 
1991. 
592 RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 70-74. 
593
 Id. 
594 Chris Fuchs, Documenting Taiwan’s Blacklisted Dissidents, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2017/04/03/2003667971. A short Documentary about Blacklisting in 
Taiwan during the Martial Law filmed by Christina Hu could be found on the Youtube website. Christina Hu, 




3. Important Events and Social Movements for Freedom of Speech 
People that lived in Taiwan kept fighting against the authoritarian regime, no matter if they 
were mainlanders, Taiwanese, or other ethnicities. In the 1950s, a mainlander liberalist 
intellectual, Lei Chen, lead the movement to pursue political reform in Taiwan during the martial 
law period. In 1960, he proposed to fund a new opposition party, the China Democratic Party, 
against the Kuomintang and requested that Chiang Kai-Shek should not take the next term of 
office since he had been the President since 1948.595 Lei was put in prison and charged with 
sedition, and he received a 10-year sentence.596 The “Free China Journal” was banned. It was 
banned a symbol of their control over free speech and became a heavy oppression tactic against 
Freedom of Speech at that time.597  
On December 10, 1979, during the Human Rights Day, the Formosa Magazine, which was 
founded by members outside the Kuomintang, held a parade to demand Taiwanese 
democratization in Kaohsiung City. The parade finally became the conflict point between riot-
controlling law enforcement and civilians—hundreds of people were injured in the incident. 
After the event, the military department started to arrest dissidents. Most of the arrested 
protestors were charged with severe crimes.598 The government imprisoned and tortured the 
opposition leaders.599  
 
595 As a former presidential adviser for Chiang Kai-shek, he published the “Free China Journal” against PRC’s 
propaganda in 1949 with the sponsorship by KMT. However, when Chiang began his dictatorship in Taiwan, the 
“Free China Journal” started to critic the Taiwanese politics, especially the KMT government. In 1953, Chiang fired 
Lei’s position in Presidential Hall and dismiss his membership of KMT in 1954. See Taiwan Today, President Ma 
Opens Lei Chen Memorial Museum, Research Center, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(TAIWAN) (Mar. 08, 2012), https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,23,45&post=2255.  
596 In May 2019, the Taiwanese Transitional Justice Commission overturned his conviction. Yu-Fu Chen & Jonathan 
Chin, Justice Commission Plans to Exonerate 1,505 People, Taipei Times (Dec. 2, 2018), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/12/02/2003705352.  
597 Nevertheless, although the “Free China” Journal had healthy “mainlanders’ perspectives,” it certainly inspired 
some opposers, the members outside the party, to publish and spread some prohibiting information through 
disallowed media. 
598 SHELLEY RIGGER, FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER: TAIWANS DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY 20-21 (2001). 
599 One of the opposition leaders, Lin Yi-Hsiung, a human right’s lawyer in Taiwan, was jailed due to the 1979 
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In the 1980s, a democratic activist, Cheng Nan-Jung, founded several magazines.600 He was 
continuing to write articles to criticize the politics in Taiwan, including Chiang’s family, the 
Kuomintang’s ruling, the February 28 incident, and the human rights violations under martial 
law, which were all deemed illegal speech at that time. His main proposal was “Taiwan 
independence” and “100% freedom of speech.” His speech and publications were recognized as 
a threat by the Kuomintang regime. In 1988, Cheng was charged with sedition due to his 
magazine and its articles. He refused to appear before the court, rejected the arrest by the police, 
and stayed in the press building. He said: “The Kuomintang will only take my body; they will 
never take me alive.”601 Finally, he burned himself and committed suicide to protest against the 
Kuomintang’s oppression of freedom of speech.602 Cheng’s death sparked the Taiwanese society 
into discussions against the oppression of freedom of speech. The act of sedition was modified603 
on May 18, 1992.604 
 
Kaohsiung Incident. His 60 years-old mother and two daughters, who were nine and seven-years-old, were 
murdered by an unknown criminal, even though his family was under watch by intelligence agencies. The murder 
happened precisely on Feb. 28, 1980. The government has still been unable to find the murderer. See Iok-sin Loa, 
The 228 Incident: Lin I-hsiung’s Family Tragedy Commemorated, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/01/2003555993; Matthew Strong, Taiwan President 
Attends Mass to Mark Lin Family murder, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3105068. 
600 He registered 18 permits for different names of publications, which was a strategy to go against the publicizing 
censorship by governmental agencies. If one license was invalid, he would just switch to another one. 
601 Hui-lin Hu, Nylon’s Life, NYLON CHENG LIBERTY FOUNDATION, 
http://nylonenglish.blogspot.com/2017/05/nylons-life_18.html#more (last visited Jun. 06, 2019). 
602 Id. Also see: Rich Chang, Twentieth Anniversary of Activist’s Death Is Marked, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 30 2009), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/03/30/2003439755.  
603 The act was modified by adding “by violence or threats committing an overt act.” 
604 On May 9, 1991, the Investigation Bureau, which is one of the intelligence agencies in Taiwan, arrested five 
students at the National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan. The agency claimed those criminals proposed for the 
Taiwan Independence Association. However, the five students only read some prohibiting books. Although the 
democratization started and the Martial Law Period ended, “the conspiracy to act sedition” crime still applied in 
Criminal Code 100 of ROC, which included a death penalty crime. The intellectuals and college students protested 
and demanded to abolish “the code 100.” After the movement, the crime was modified on May 18, 1992. AMNESTY 




4. Conclusion  
After amending Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of China, the act of 
sedition, and abolishing the Act for the Control and Punishment of Rebellion, people in Taiwan 
no longer needed to worry about severe punishment because of their speech. Under the martial 
law period, however, some activists had never stopped confronting the oppressors. The social 
movements for freedom of speech continued to rise. The activist Cheng Nan-Jung became a 
symbol of a freedom fighter.605 His “seeking 100% freedom of speech” was respected by 
Taiwanese society.606 Because of the specific historical oppression in speech, the freedom of 
expression became the most important individual right after democratization. The Freedom of 
Speech supremacy had now found its position in Taiwanese political culture. 
V. DEMOCRATIZATION, NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE, AND MILITANT 
DEMOCRACY 
On Oct 25, 1971, United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which 
recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only “legitimate representative of China 
to the United Nations” and expelled Chiang Kai-Shek’s representatives and the Republic of 
China from the position.607 The Republic of China, based in Taiwan, became isolated from the 
political world. The Republic of China is not “legal China.” People in Taiwan with Chinese 
 
605 Some comments may challenge that Cheng’s death did not directly change politics immediately. However, his act 
is recognized as one of the key reasons to end the Martial Law Period. An argument said: “in 1999 Time magazine 
named Britain’s radical feminist movement leader Emmeline Pankhurst one of 100 major figures of the 20th century. 
Her selection was not so much because she achieved "real" democratic reforms, said editors, but because she took 
extreme measures such as hunger strikes that sparked the feminist community into discussions and public outcries. 
This is precisely what Deng Nan-jung helped bring about in Taiwan’s democracy movement.” Staff Writer of 
Taiwan News, Students See Deng Nan-jung as the Hero He Was, TAIWAN NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014), 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2395406.  
606 April 7, on which Cheng Nan-Jung died, is as a national holiday in Taiwan, the Freedom of Speech Day. See 
Wendy Lee, Taiwan Marks Freedom of Speech Day, TAIWAN NEWS (Apr. 07, 2017), 
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3135498.  
607 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter ended the diplomatic relations between the United States and the Republic of 
China, then started diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1979. Glaser & Green, What Is the 
U.S. “One China” Policy, supra note 554. 
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identity face robust challenges. Under the martial law period, the only legally political identity 
was “the ROC Chinese,” which means that neither “Taiwan independence” nor “PRC Chinese” 
identities were allowed at that time.608 After democratization, the rapid change in national 
identity is the other important character in Taiwanese society. The national identity reflects the 
different outcome of the colonialism at the beginning of the democratization.609 Taiwanese 
national identity is rising, but the Chinese national identity is declining.610  
The conflict of national identity combines, surpasses, and replaces the ethnic conflict after 
democratization. Therefore, Taiwanese identity is not only an introspection of reality from 
people who live in Taiwan, but also an extension of protesting the historical oppression of Feb 
28 incident and the martial law period.611 This triggers hatred between people with different 
national identities. National identities constitute a bias that can cause hateful speech and actions 
in Taiwan, consequently. 
Moreover, the national identities in Taiwan is related to militant democracy. PRC claims its 
sovereignty over Taiwan, and it is not a democratic country. Hence, in Taiwan, militant 
democracy justifies hate speech regulation. The justification is not based on the harm to specific 
 
608 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 644 (司法院大法官第 644 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 644] (Jun. 
20, 2008) (Taiwan). 
609 Nowadays, more than 60% of Taiwanese citizens insist they are Taiwanese, not Chinese. The examples show the 
identity transition as following: According to the researching from National Chengchi University’s Election Study 
Center, the Taiwanese identity is 17.6% in 1992, 43.7% in 2008, and 59.3% in 2016, on the contrary, Chinese 
identity is 25.5% in 1992, 4.1% in 2008, and 3.4% in 2016; “the both,” which means dual-identity, is 46.4% in 1992, 
44.7% in 2008, 33.6% in 2016. See J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwanization” in Taiwan’s Politics, BENTUHUA, CULTURAL, 
ETHNIC, AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY Taiwan 17, 46-47 (2016). 
610 See SHIAU-CHI SHEN, DEMOCRACY AND NATION FORMATION: NATIONAL IDENTITY CHANGE AND DUAL IDENTITY 
IN TAIWAN, 1991-2011 (2013), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/item/ac:161971. 
611 “The turning point occurred when Taiwan Independence went from a revolutionary movement to a position on 
the political spectrum of a democratic society. In the 1990s, Taiwan Independence traded its original strategy of 
violent protests for a strategy of electoral competition. The DPP and the KMT reached a grand compromise over the 
life and death of the ROC: the former could have its democracy and self-rule, while the latter got to keep state 
institutions intact. The battleground moved from the streets to the ballot box. Instead of overthrowing the ROC 
outright, the Taiwan independence movement instead began “Taiwanizing” the ROC.Instead of overthrowing the 
ROC outright, the Taiwan independence movement instead began “Taiwanizing the ROC.” See Chieh-Ting Yeh, 




groups, but to the institution of democracy. That is, the guarantee to protect human dignity also 
needs to defend itself. The basic democratic order is the core of any democratic system and 
cannot be changed. 
This theory makes sense in Europe because of the historical reliance on militant democracy, 
but would it work in Taiwan? The Taiwanese legal system has applied militant democracy in 
banning a political party opposed to a free and democratic order, but the rule has never been used 
in freedom of speech jurisprudence. The Taiwanese Judicial Review has preferred instead the 
Clear and Present Danger Test, found in the United States, in this area.  
VI. WHY DOES THE CURRENT SYSTEM FAIL TO FIX PROBLEMS? 
1. The Current Taiwanese Legal Land Space for Freedom of Speech 
A. Current Legal Structure of Freedom of Speech in Taiwan 
Democratization made the Bill of Rights in the Constitution “revive” and become applicable 
again. Article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of China rules on the guarantee to freedom 
of speech,612 stating that it provides the guarantee for “freedom of speech” in Taiwan. The 
structure of the legal system in Taiwan relies on the idea of “reception,” which means receiving 
and applying Western laws.613 After the democratization in Taiwan, the judiciary interpreted 
freedom of speech rights and adapted American First Amendment theory to the Taiwanese legal 
system.614 Therefore, on the constitutional level, Taiwanese freedom of speech jurisprudence is 
 
612 Article 11 of Constitution of Republic of China rules that: “the people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, 
writing and publication.” Minguo Xianfaart art. 11 (1947) (Taiwan). An English version of the Republic of China 
Constitution is available on Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan), available at 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000001 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).  
613 This phenomenon was not, however, only beginning from Taiwanese democratization, but also happened at the 
Japanese period and KMT’s Authoritarian. For example, Meiji Japan transferred Western law to Japan. However, 
Taiwan did not fully apply the Japanese system, Japanese imported some modern legal terminology for civil law 
matters in Taiwan. Also, the ROC government brought its constitution and legal system to Taiwan, and the system 
was created and based on the German and Japanese systems. Tay-Sheng Wang, Translation, Codification, and 
Transplantation of Foreign Laws in Taiwan, 25 WASH. INT'L L.J. 307, 307-318 (2016). 
614 For examples, Interpretation 407 held that obscenity is unprotected speech. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 
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highly similar to the First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States. Also, Article 7 is the 
“equal protection clause” in the Taiwanese legal system.615 Article 23, however, is the 
“proportionality clause” under Taiwan’s Constitution.616 It provides the same function as the 
“proportionality test” that originated from the balancing approach of Germany. Taiwan has a 
history of borrowing freedom of speech law from Western countries and it follows that Taiwan 
would continue to look to those countries when considering hate speech regulations.  
B. Statues of Regulating Freedom of Speech in Taiwan 
After democratization, the government’s power was required to follow the legal regulations 
with accuracy and foreseeability, which means some laws under the martial law period would 
not apply again, such as “the conspiracy to act sedition” in Criminal Code 100 of the ROC. The 
principle about rights guarantee is “all is freedom unless the specific limitation was met.”  
 
407 (司法院大法官第 407 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 407] (Jul. 5, 1996) (Taiwan); Interpretation 
617 narrowed the crime to only include content such as “violence, sexual abuse or bestiality but is lacking in artistic, 
medical or educational value, or an average person will either find it not publicly presentable or find it so intolerable 
as to be repulsive;” See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 617 (司法院大法官第 617 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 617] (Oct. 26, 2006) (Taiwan); Interpretation 414 imputed the “the two-level theory” from the 
United States to divide high-level speech and low-level speech for different scrutinizes, as similar to Chaplinsky vs. 
New Hampshire case. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 414 (司法院大法官第 414 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 414] (Nov. 18, 1996) (Taiwan); The low-level speech could be naturally limited by the 
government, like unprotected speech in the US. Interpretation 577, which holds that commercial speech is low-level 
speech and could also be banned by the government. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 577 (司法院大法官第 577 
號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 577] (May 7, 2004) (Taiwan); Interpretation 445 held that the government 
has the right to prohibit speech advocating communism or secession as being unconstitutional. Also, it applied the 
“two-track theory” from the US legal system to divide “the restriction to speech” and “the restriction to time, place 
and manner.” Furthermore, it imported “clear and present danger” doctrine speech. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi 
No. 445 (司法院大法官第 445 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 445] (Jan. 23, 1998) (Taiwan); 
Interpretation 509 is vital to explain Criminal Act Article 310—the defamation clause. The court attributed the 
“actual malice clause” in New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan. See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 509 (司法院大法官
第 509 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 509] (Jul. 7, 2000) (Taiwan); Interpretation 656, Justice Tzu-Yi 
Lin’s dissent in part explained that the “public figures” should have a higher burden of proof in their defamation 
complain. The opinion has been broadly used in all levels of courts in Taiwan. See See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi 
No. 656 (司法院大法官第 656 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 656] (Apr. 3, 2009) (Taiwan). 
615 Article 7 of Constitution of Republic of China rules that: “all citizens of the Republic of China, irrespective of 
sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the law” Minguo Xianfaart art. 7 (1947) (Taiwan). 
616 Article 23 of Constitution of Republic of China rules that: “all the freedoms and rights enumerated in the 
preceding Articles shall not be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon 
the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare.” 
Minguo Xianfaart art. 23 (1947) (Taiwan). 
146 
 
Freedom of speech rights only have restrictions under limited regulations, such as the 
following: first, the torts law617 rules on the wrongfully damaged reputation.618 Article 195 is the 
special rule for Article 184 to protect the reputation of other speech. Secondly, criminal 
threatening is not allowed by the Criminal Code. Articles 151619 and 305620 prohibit threatening 
speech or acts to both the public and individuals. Thirdly, Article 234 of the Criminal Code621 
and Article 235622 prohibit the spread of obscene speech and publication, including pornography. 
Interpretation 617 narrowed the crime so it would only include violence, sexual abuse, or 
bestiality that has no artistic, medical, or educational value, or something an average person 
would recognize as being intolerable. Fourthly, Chapter 27 of the Criminal Code is aimed at 
dealing with “offenses against reputation and credit.” Article 309 identifies “insults” as being 
similar to “the fighting words” in the US legal system. 623 The “fighting words” in Taiwan also 
 
617 Article 184 of Civil Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who, intentionally or negligently, has 
wrongfully damaged the rights of another is bound to compensate him for any injury arising therefrom. The same 
rule shall be applied when the injury is done intentionally in a manner against the rules of morals. A person, who 
violates a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others and therefore prejudice to others, is bound to 
compensate for the injury, except no negligence in his act can be proved.” Min Fa [Civil Code] art. 184 (Taiwan). An 
English version of the Republic of China’s Civil Code is available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the 
Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0000001 
(last visited Jun. 06, 2019).  
618 Article 195 of Civil Code of the Republic of China rules that: “If a person has wrongfully damaged to the body, 
health, reputation, liberty, credit, privacy or chastity of another, or to another's personality in a severe way, the 
injured person may claim a reasonable compensation in money even if such injury is not a purely pecuniary loss. If 
it was reputation that has been damaged, the injured person may also claim the taking of proper measures for the 
rehabilitation of his reputation.” Min Fa [Civil Code] art. 184 (Taiwan) 
619 Article 151 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who endangers public safety by 
putting the public in fear of injury to life, body, or property shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 
two years.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 151 (Taiwan). 
620 HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 305 (Taiwan). 
621 Article 234 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who for purpose of exhibition 
publicly commits an obscene act shall be sentenced to imprisonment for less than one year, short-term 
imprisonment; and, in addition thereto, a fine of not more than three thousand yuan may be imposed.” HSING FA 
[Criminal Code] art. 234 (Taiwan). 
622 Article 235 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who distributes, broadcasts, sells, 
publicly displays, or by other means to show an obscene writing, picture, audio record, video record, or any other 
object to another person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years, short-term imprisonment, 
in lieu thereof, or in addition thereto, a fine of thirty thousand yuan may be imposed.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] 
art. 235 (Taiwan). 
623 HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 309 (Taiwan). 
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have unprotected speech. Furthermore, defamation624 is criminally illegal in Taiwan. Unlike in 
US law, defamation in Taiwan is regulated by criminal law rather than civil law. Fifthly, Article 
311625 provides the exceptions clauses for both Article 309 and 310. It includes “the Fair 
Comment doctrine.” The third is the Social Order Maintenance Act,626 which is a specific 
criminal law in Taiwan. The act is applied to actions that spread disinformation to harm society. 
But the above statutes all target the crimes against individuals, not against groups.  
Last but not least, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are treaties 
signed by members of the UN. Although Taiwan is not a member of the UN and did not sign the 
ICESCR and ICCPR, the Taiwanese legislature passed the “Act to Implement the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights” and “Enforcement Act of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women” as a bridge to apply the three Covenants.627 The Act may be a 
 
624 HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 310 (Taiwan). About the defamation, Interpretation 509 requires that the crime 
would affect only the “actual malice clause” found. The courts also apply Justice Tzu-Yi Lin’s dissent in part in 
Interpretation 656, which pointed out the “public figures” should have a higher burden of proof in their defamation 
complain. 
625 Article 311 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China rules that: “A person who makes a statement with bona-
fide intent under one of the following circumstances shall not be punished: 1. Self-defense, self-justification, or the 
protection of legal interest; 2. A report made by a public official in his official capacity; 3. Fair comment on a fact 
subject to public criticism; 4. Fair report on the proceedings of a national or local assembly, court, or a public 
meeting.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 311 (Taiwan). 
626 Article 63 of Social Order Maintenance Act rules that: “People engaged in any of the following behaviors shall be 
punishable by detention of not more than three days or a fine of not more than of NTD 30,000: 5. Spreading rumors 
in a way that is sufficient to undermine public order and peace.” SHE HUI CHIH HSÜ WEI HU FA [Social Order 
Maintenance Act] art. 63. An English version of the Social Order Maintenance Act is available on the Laws & 
Regulations Database of the Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0080067 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).  
627 See “the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” as a bridge to apply the two Covenants” and “Enforcement Act 
of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” English versions of both acts are 





tool to meet the speech regulation in the three Covenants. However, not all courts followed the 
act because it lacked provisions for substantial punishment. 
C. The Judgments from District Courts, Appeals Courts and the Supreme Court in Taiwan 
The Constitution of the ROC remains the basic structure of the legal system in the ROC 
before World War II. Judicial Yuan is the highest judiciary in the Republic of China. It includes 
the Constitutional Court and “the Supreme Court.” The Judicial Review is the exclusive power 
for the Constitutional Court.628 The Supreme Courts were designed to serve each province in 
China as the appeals courts629, not like the US Supreme Court. Therefore, the court’s system in 
Taiwan has Four-level courts: District Courts, Appeals Courts, the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitutional Court.630 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Taiwan has the power to unify the 
interpretation of laws and orders. It has created some precedents and cases for applying the 
above regulations of limitation for freedom of speech. The precedent has a substantial binding 
effect on the low-level courts. 
After amending Criminal Code 100, “the conspiracy to act sedition” crime on May 18, 1992, 
the sedition has been very rarely applied in court. The general court saw cases about speech 
limitations that invoked Article 309, “the insults,” and Article 310, “the defamation.” The insult 
 
628 Same as in the German legal system, the judicial review is an “abstract review,” and only carried out by Justices 
of the Constitutional Court in the Judicial Yuan. The “abstract review” means the Court would only focus on 
whether the regulation violated the Constitution, but not the facts in the case. In contrast, the judicial review in US is 
a “concrete review” and authorized to all level courts to apply the Constitution. The judicial review in the US 
reviewed the whole case appealing from the appeals court. To use “interpretation” is appropriate because the judicial 
review of the Republic of China’s Constitution was not originally designed as “judgement form” but as “legal 
consult” to the president. After democratization, Taiwanese Justices have tried to make it a judgement. 
629 The Supreme Court in Taiwan is an appeal court for trial of Law (not Trial of Facts), and the highest appeal court 
for a specific case. The Supreme Court has the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders. An appellant 
only can appeal an issue of the regulation violated the Constitution, from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional 
Court, not his or her case because of the “abstract review.” (an issue of law appeals, but the case, that bring the issue, 
does not). Relative information can be found in the Judicial Yuan and Supreme Court websites, available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/en/, and http://tps.judicial.gov.tw/english/.  
630 An appellant only can appeal an issue of the regulation violated the Constitution, from the Supreme Court to the 
Constitutional Court, not his or her case, because of the “abstract review.” 
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means offensive words or fighting words. However, the language must precisely aim at an 
individual in a public place.631 It is not a group of libel crimes. The “defamation” means a 
misleading statement intended to cause substantial injury to an individual. The individual also 
cannot aim this statement at a group. The courts in Taiwan have limited the application area for 
the insult crime and the defamation crime. For example: if the offensive words came with 
another factual comment and were not pure offense, after considering the whole sentence, the 
insult might not apply.632 Also, the victims’ reputation must have been injured.633  
Moreover, the court also gives enormous space for “the Fair Comment doctrine” in Article 
311 of the Criminal Code. If the defendants could prove that their insult or defamation speech 
was based on a comment for public events, the statement is still a fair comment, although the 
language can still be considered harsh, ironic, or extremely offensive.634 
D. Conclusion 
That Taiwan still does not have strong speech regulation may be due to the freedom of 
speech supremacy because the historical oppression under the martial law period was too intense, 
so freedom of speech became a superior right in Taiwan, held more highly than all other rights in 
the Constitution. After democratization, the guarantee in the bill of rights in the ROC 
Constitution has been revived for the Taiwanese people. The rights protection shows that the 
main principle is that all is freedom until the specific restriction is met. The Judicial Review, or 
 
631 T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen Kao Hsiung Fên Yüen 103 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 612 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh 
(臺灣高等法院高雄分院 103年度上易字第 612號刑事判決) [Taiwan High Court Kaohsiung Branch Court 2014 
Appeal-I No. 612 Decision] (Jan. 15, 2015) (Taiwan). 
632 T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen 103 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 2447 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh(臺灣高等法院 103
年度上易字第 2447號刑事判決) [Taiwan High Court 2014 Appeal-I No. 2447 Decision] (Jan. 13, 2015) (Taiwan). 
633 T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen 103 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 1795 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh(臺灣高等法院 103
年度上易字第 1795號刑事判決) (Taiwan High Court 2014 Appeal-I No. 1795 Decision) (Dec. 4, 2014) (Taiwan). 
634 T'ai Wan Kao Têng Fa Yüen 105 Nien Tu Shang I Tzu Ti 1533 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh (最高法院 105年度
上易字第 1533號刑事判決) [ Taiwan High Court 2016 Appeal-I No. 1533 Decision] (Oct. 5, 2016) (Taiwan). 
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all courts in Taiwan, usually provide ample space for people to comment on public affairs or 
issues. Moreover, many constitutional law theories were also imported from the United States by 
Taiwanese scholars.635 After the Justices of the Constitutional Court issued its interpretations and 
the Taiwanese Supreme Court provided its judgments, the right to Freedom of Speech has been 
applied in a way very similar to the US legal system.  
2. Regulating Hate Speech is an Unfinished Work 
A. Legal Regulation of Hate Speech 
In Taiwan, the limitation on freedom of speech mainly applies to protect an individual’s 
rights, not the groups’ dignity. There is no law or court case about limiting hate speech. Some 
specific acts may relate to the hate speech issue as follows: first, the Sexual Harassment 
Prevention Act,636 the Gender Equity Education Act,637 and the Act of Gender Equality in 
Employment638 rule that “sexual harassment” may relate to gender-based hate speech. However, 
the expression may constitute “sexual harassment” but not become “hate speech.” 
 
635 The majority of the first generation of legal scholars were Mainlanders. Their scholarships were mainly from 
Chinese Law, and also had profound influence from Japan. After 1960, the majority of the second generation 
became ethnic Taiwanese. Most of them studied in Western Germany. Furthermore, the US law imputed to Taiwan 
after 1945 was not because of scholars, but the relationship between the ROC government and the US. For example, 
the mortgage on moveable property and securities exchange system translate to Taiwan in the 1960s. After 
democratization, the second and the following third and fourth generations of legal scholars strongly imputed the 
foreign law as the modern legislation model, mainly from Japan, Germany, and the US. The foreign laws from 
democratic countries became a tool for scholars to criticize KMT's Authoritarianism. They argue imputing those 
foreign laws could better than KMT's legislation. The right of Freedom of Speech as part of the imputing foreign 
law. See Wang, Translation, supra note 613, at 318-323. 
636 The Article 2(2) of Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, “sexual harassment,” includes “languages of 
discrimination.” HSING SAO JAO FANG CHIH FA [Sexual Harassment Prevention Act] art. 2(2) (Taiwan). An 
English version of the Sexual Harassment Prevention Act is available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the 
Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0050074 
(last visited Jun. 06, 2019).  
637 The Article 2(4) of Gender Equity Education Act includes: “Unwelcome remarks that carry explicitly or 
implicitly a sexual or gender discriminating connotation.” HSING PIEH P'ING TENG CHIAO YÜ FA [Gender 
Equity Education Act] art. 2(4) (Taiwan). An English version of the Gender Equity Education Act is available on the 
Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=H0080067 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).  
638 The Article 12(1) of Act of Gender Equality in Employment defined the “Sexual harassment” includes “verbal 
with an intent of gender discrimination.” HSING PIEH KUNG ZUÒ P'ING TENG FA [Act of Gender Equality in 
Employment] art. 12(1) (Taiwan), An English version of the Act of Gender Equality in Employment is available on 
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Secondly, the draft of the Ethnic Equality Act was proposed mainly by Kuomintang 
legislatures. The purpose of the act is to promote the equality of different races and ethnicities. 
The draft was discussed by the Internal Administration Committee of the Legislative Yuan on 
June 24, 2016, but it had not yet become law. The draft uses the precise term to describe 
“discrimination,”639 including the “speech with bad intention.” It includes “discrimination speech 
by media”640 and “discrimination by advertisement,”641 and it prohibits public figures and 
government employees spreading “hate speech.”642 Furthermore, the “hate speech” to incite 
ethnic conflict or tension is not allowed.643 Covering the hate speech is restricted as well.644 
The Ethnic Equality Act incited arguments in Taiwan. Scholar Bruce Y.H. Liao strongly 
supports the Act. He mentions that the purpose of the act should be specific for protecting 
minority groups, such as indigenous people, new immigrants, or LGBTQ members because of 
other ethnic groups in Taiwan, such as the Hoklo Taiwanese, the Hakka people, and mainlanders, 
have abilities to rule against the hate speech from each other.645 However, those with counter-
opinions recognize that the act aims not only to stop the extreme hate speech but also to promote 
the ideas and discussion about ethnic history and national identity. DPP politician Wen-Chieh 
Liang mentions that the act was an approach intended to silence the criticism aimed at the 
mainlanders.646 
 
the Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic Of China (Taiwan), available at 
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=N0030014 (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).  
639 Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 2(1), available at 
https://lci.ly.gov.tw/LyLCEW/agenda1/02/pdf/09/01/02/LCEWA01_090102_00013.pdf (last visited Jun. 06, 2019).  
640 Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 17. 
641 Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 18. 
642 Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 19. 
643 Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 20. 
644 Draft of the Ethnic Equality Act, art. 21. 
645 Bruce Y.H. Liao, Hate Speech, Ethnic Equality, and Anti-discrimination, No. 127 TAIWAN L. J. 1, 1-11 (May 1, 
2009). 




B. Courts’ Decisions about Hate Speech  
The Taiwanese legal system has not addressed either hate speech or hate crime yet. Thus, the 
courts could not punish the hate speech until the hate speech breached Article 309, which 
criminalizes insulting individuals. By reviewing the Judicial Yuan Law and Regulations 
Retrieving System, the term hate speech in Chinese (仇恨言論) could only rarely appear in 
judgments. However, in those cases, the court used hate speech as a tool to narrow the concept of 
insulting an individual. The Taiwan Changhua District Court held that the defendants were not 
guilty because only the hate speech may cause a painful feeling in the victims.647 The hate 
speech, however, became the defense in those cases. The other case was the criminal threatening 
case. The defendant was accused of making a threat to the public and violating Article 151 of the 
Criminal Code. He threw eggs at the Taipei Japanese School and used red spray paint to write 
“Japanese are devils” and “kill Japanese.” The court used hate speech, but connected with Article 
19 of the ICCPR and the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as reasoning to 
hold the defendant guilty of a criminal threatening crime. Nevertheless, the defendant’s speech 
had already reached the criminal threatening threshold. Thus, the main reason for the guilty 
verdict was still his misconduct that constituted the threat, not hate speech.648  
 
647 T'ai Wan Chang Hua Ti Fang Fa Yüen 101 Nien I Tzu Ti 560 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh (臺灣彰化地方法院
101 年易字第 560 號刑事判決)[Taiwan Changhua District Court 2012 I No. 560 Decision] (Feb. 17, 2014) 
(Taiwan); T'ai Wan Chang Hua Ti Fang Fa Yüen 101 Nien I Tzu Ti 901 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh(臺灣彰化地方
法院 101 年易字第 901 號刑事判決) [Taiwan Changhua District Court 2012 I No. 901 Decision] (Feb. 17, 2014) 
(Taiwan); T'ai Wan Chang Hua Ti Fang Fa Yüen 101 Nien I Tzu Ti 1164 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh (臺灣彰化地
方法院 101 年易字第 1164 號刑事判決) [Taiwan Changhua District Court 2012 I No. 1164 Decision] (Feb. 17, 
2014) (Taiwan).The three judgements were judged by the same judge in Taiwan Changhua District Court. 
648 T'ai Wan Shi lin Ti Fang Fa Yüen 103 Nien I Tzu Ti 206 Hao Hsing Shih P'an Chüeh (臺灣士林地方法院 103 年




Reviewing the text of the ROC Constitution and the decisions made by the Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court, the Taiwanese legal system does not have any regulations specific for 
regulating hate speech, although some particular rule may relate to hate speech. The draft of the 
Ethnic Equality Act may be close to hate speech regulation if it passes the legislature. However, 
the Act has been highly criticized and politically contested. The implementation of hate speech 
laws in Taiwan is still an argument that needs further discussion. All levels of courts in Taiwan 
usually provide ample space for people to comment on public affairs or issues, including using 
hate speech. Hate speech is allowed in Taiwan.649 The current mechanism in Taiwan fails to 
resolve the problems of hate speech, and victims of hate speech in Taiwan have no recourse. 
Therefore, to consider a new approach to balance speakers’ freedom of expression and victims’ 
human dignity is significant for Taiwan. 
 
649 Some scholars may discuss the hate speech issue in Taiwan and the cases in other countries, such as Charlie 
Hebdo Shooting case. See Ching-Yi Liu, The events could not be limited by states’ law, No. 264 TAIWAN L. J. 29, 
29-31 (Jan. 15, 2015). Hsiu-Yu Fan, Rethinking Constitutional Rights in a Society of Immigration: A Discussion 
inspired by Charlie Hebdo Shooting, No. 28(1) SOOCHOW L. REV. 151, 151-183 (Jul. 2006). But most of them focus 
on introducing the hate speech regulations in other countries. See Liao, What is Hate Speech? supra note 289, at 
455-515 (2015). Vivianne Weng, The freedom and responsibility of speech, No. 363 TAIWAN L. J. 5, 5-11 (Mar. 14, 
2019). Bruce Y.H. Liao, Virginia v. Black and the Regulation of Racist Hate Speech in Light of the Critical Race 
Theory, in ESSAYS ON IMPORTANT DECISIONS OF US SUPREME COURT (Institute of European and American Studies 
(IEAS), Academia Sinica ed. 2007). 
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CHAPTER SIX: HOW TO DESIGN NEW HATE SPEECH SYSTEM  
I. A New System of Hate Speech Regulation in Taiwan 
Before designing a hate speech law for hate speech issues in Taiwan, I would like to propose 
some general rules and principles based on the theories from earlier chapters. In Western 
democratic countries, there are two basic political models of hate speech regulations for Taiwan 
to consider. First, the approach of the United States, which allows hate speech, but limits hate 
crime; and secondly, the approaches to criminalize both hate speech and hate crime, which 
Germany, South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights do.  
My proposal is closer to the approach of the United States. I recognize that a general hate 
crime law is enough to fix or alleviate most hate speech issues in Taiwan. However, I also 
propose hate speech laws for protecting some specific groups. Those groups are discrete, insular, 
under historical oppression, and frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas. This 
particular protection must end, so those groups are no longer to be eliminated from public 
discussion. Moreover, for speech immediately inciting violence, I argue for using the limitation 
of speech. 
II. Reasons to Offer the New System for Taiwan 
1. Taiwanese History and Culture are Closer to the United States 
My new system relates to American exceptionalism. The relative parts are history and 
culture, but not legal methodology. American exceptionalism, as a theory, explains why the 
United States is the exception to freedom of speech rights in democratic countries. However, as 
an emerging democracy, Taiwan has received substantial influence from the United States. 
Although Taiwan frequently imports legal theories from some European countries, Taiwanese 
courts will prefer to look to United States legal precedent and use the doctrines of the US First 
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Amendment theory as their leading legal resource to deal with issues of freedom of speech. 
Hence, in the freedom of speech field, the Taiwanese legal system should be included in the 
American exceptionalism category. 
Under the perspective of Substantive Exceptionalism,650 Taiwan’s approach to freedom of 
speech is already similar to that of the US in some respects, for shared reasons based on 
American and Taiwanese history. First, according to Frederick Schauer’s claim, the experience 
of limits to freedom of expression during the Red Scare in the 1910s and the McCarthy era, from 
the 1940s through the 1950s, affected the United States’ First Amendment theory, which 
emphasizes the supremacy of freedom of speech.651 Scholar Geoffrey R. Stone has reviewed the 
history of the conflict between the First Amendment and national security. The nation always 
regretted its actions after its people realized that those actions were “excessive responses to war 
fever” or “government manipulations.”652 Stone states that it is a great achievement that 
Americans still insist on the value of democracy and First Amendment rights even under 
threats.653  
For the same reason, Taiwanese society respects freedom of speech because of the limits on 
freedom of expression during the martial law period. Taiwanese people cannot accept the return 
of thought crimes, like the former Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the ROC. We remember 
that the White Terror in Taiwan created a “chilling effect” on speech in Taiwanese people’s 
mindset. Besides, Taiwanese people emphasize the sacrifice of pro-democracy activists, like Lei 
 
650 See Chapter Four, Section VI, part 3. 
651 Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 94, at 42-43. 
652 He lists many historic events to provide evidence for his statement, including the Sedition Act of 1798, Lincoln’s 
suspensions of habeas corpus, judgments during the World War I prosecutions of dissenters, the internment of 
Japanese-Americans during World War II, and the US government’s action against antiwar activities during the 
Vietnam War. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 
1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 529 (2004).  
653 He argues, “freedom of speech can endanger security, but it is also the fundamental source of American strength.” 
Id. at 548-549. 
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Chen’s imprisonment and Nan-Jung Cheng’s death. Taiwanese people recognize that the right to 
freedom of speech is not easy to fight for, and we should not abandon it just because we could 
not tolerate other people’s expressions. Taiwanese people might be afraid to limit speech now, 
just like Americans, because of this shared history. 
For sure, the previous dictatorship and authoritarian rule by the Nazi Party and Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany were similar to the period of martial law in Taiwan. Also, Holocaust 
history in Germany is comparable to the February 28 incident in Taiwan. This similarity could be 
helpful in examining whether the Holocaust-denying clause applies to Taiwan. Ruti G. Teitel 
mentions that the hate speech law could link prior persecution, revive contested histories, or the 
operative political abuses.654 Yet, she also points out that legal tradition in the United States is 
heavily speech protective, so the hate-crime legislation could offer another choice to correct a 
history of slavery, segregation, and enduring racism. Considering the culture of respecting 
freedom of speech, Taiwan should learn the approach taken by the United States.  
Another similarity between Taiwan and the United States is the culture of distrusting the 
government. Schauer and Robert Post both observe that people in the United States trust their 
political elites less than people in European countries trust theirs.655 Similarly, Taiwanese people 
prefer to make their own decisions than believe politicians. For instance, as in the United States, 
the majority of people in Taiwan do not accept the political elites’ idea of abolishing the death 
penalty.656 Indeed, the drawback of hate speech law is about trust. The government could decide 
both what hate speech is and who the protected groups are, but the two contents are very vague 
 
654 TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 107-108. 
655 Id. at 46-47; Steiker, Capital Punishment and American exceptionalism, supra note 507, 72-76. 
656 Syrena Lin, Will Taiwan Ever Abolish the Death Penalty? THE NEWS LENS INTERNATIONAL EDITION (Oct. 30, 
2019), https://international.thenewslens.com/article/126766.  
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and unforeseeable.657 If people cannot predict what kind of statement the government may 
punish them for making, they must create self-censorship in their mind. That is precisely a 
chilling effect on freedom of speech, and this is what Taiwanese people try to avoid.  
Moreover, the culture in the United States is highly individualistic, in contrast to the 
collectivism of European countries.658 In Taiwan, individualism is also reflected in the vague 
sense of national and ethnic identities. Although ethnic conflicts may happen in Taiwanese 
society, politics in Taiwan has never fallen purely along ethnic group lines. For instance, some 
mainlanders, whose ancestors followed the Kuomintang from China after World War II, still 
support the DPP and participated in democratic activities during the martial law period, like Nan-
Jung Cheng. Indeed, first and second generations descended from mainlanders may have strong 
Chinese identity, but a lot of young mainlanders do not share their political views with older 
ones.659 Communities may influence people’s identities, but not everyone in Taiwan follows the 
communities’ norms.660 They feel different levels of harm from the same offensive speech. 
Taiwanese national identities are not only based on ethnicity but on individuals’ choice.    
2. Taiwanese Legal Methodology for Constitutional interpretation is Closer to 
Germany’s  
Still, Taiwan does not exclusively follow the mode and precedents provided by the United 
States. One interesting point is that Taiwan does not follow the legal isolationism of the United 
States. One example of American exceptionalism in practice is the United States legal 
 
657 See Chapter Two, Section I. 
658 Carmi, Dignity the Enemy from Within, supra note 443, at 990-992. 
659 Hugo Tierny, Mainlanders and What It Means to Be a Taiwanese, TAIWAN SENTINEL (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://sentinel.tw/Mainlanders-means-taiwanese/. 
660 See Ming-Sho Ho, The Activist Legacy of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 




profession’s rejection of applying international standards or foreign laws.661 By contrast, Taiwan 
imports international standards or foreign laws as models to improve its legal system, including 
laws from the United States. Taiwan imports freedom of speech jurisprudence from the United 
States so that the right to freedom of speech in Taiwan is similar to that of the United States, but 
other laws have been taken from the other countries. For example, Taiwan imported some 
modern legal terminology for civil law matters from Japan. Also, the ROC government brought 
its constitution and legal system to Taiwan, and the system was created and based on the German 
and Japanese systems.662 
Moreover, the Taiwanese legal system does not share the idea of methodological 
exceptionalism with United States theory. Taiwanese constitutional jurisprudence uses a 
balancing approach to balance conflicts of rights. This means that Taiwan exemplifies 
substantive but not methodological exceptionalism.663 While Judicial Review is used in Taiwan 
to deal with human rights issues, the government must balance each side’s rights and follow the 
principle of proportionality, not just to apply doctrine and reject one side’s claim.664 Like Guy E. 
Carmi’s theory, German and South African methodology are horizontally balancing, a a 
methodology that focuses on both the speaker’s and the audience’s rights, not a vertically 
balancing approach, which only focuses on the speaker’s autonomy.665 The Taiwanese legal 
system shares its methodological idea with Germany and South Africa. 
 
661 Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 94, at 51. 
662 Wang, Translation, supra note 613, at 307-318. 
663 See Chapter Four, Section VI, part 3 & 4. 
664 For example: Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 641 (司法院大法官第 641 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No. 641] (Apr. 18, 2008) (Taiwan); Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 670 (司法院大法官第 670 號解釋) [Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No. 670] (Jan. 29, 2010) (Taiwan).  
665 See Chapter Four, Section IV, part 4. 
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The Taiwanese legal system also recognizes positive rights. People in Taiwan can ask the 
government to provide a positive duty to a third party.666 Like Germany, freedom of speech in 
Taiwan could be a positive right to allow the government to apply the speech regulation and 
exclude the invasion from private actors.667 By contrast, the United States legal system requires a 
state action against which people in the US mainly have negative rights.668 Thus, although 
Taiwan applies the United States First Amendment theory, it still can adopt a balancing approach 
to seek harmony between two sides in a conflict of rights dispute.   
3. Democracy Legitimacy, People’s ’s Autonomy, and Public Disclosure are Significant 
in Taiwan 
Other considerable elements of designing hate speech laws for Taiwan are democratic 
legitimacy, people’s autonomy, and open public discourse. Democratic legitimacy and people’s 
autonomy constitute the difference between a democratic country and an authoritarian regime. 
After democratization, the Taiwanese government finally received the democratic legitimacy of 
ruling Taiwan,669 and Taiwanese people enjoy high autonomy to make political decisions. The 
highly open public discourse in modern Taiwan constitutes a tremendous difference between 
modern Taiwan and the martial law period. The Taiwanese political system is open and free 
rather than closed and autocratic. That is also a reason that Taiwan is not the same as its 
neighbor, the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, democratic legitimacy, people’s autonomy, 
and open public discourse are all extraordinary in Taiwan. 
 
666 For example: Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 472 (司法院大法官第 472 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No. 472] (Jan. 29, 1999) (Taiwan); Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 550 (司法院大法官第 550 號解釋) [Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No. 550] (Oct. 4, 2002) (Taiwan). 
667 See Chapter Four, Section IV, part 4. 
668 Carmi, Dignity the Enemy from Within, supra note 443, at 995-996. 
669 Or the government of Republic of China finally received the democratic legitimacy of ruling Taiwan, although 
the Republic of China does not represent “China” anymore. 
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Yet, does this mean that Taiwan should allow all hate speech? Indeed, as Jeremy Waldron 
argues, democratic legitimacy is not “an all-or-nothing matter.” 670 European countries do not 
allow hate speech, but most of them are still democracies. A democratic country would not lose 
any democratic legitimacy purely because of a hate speech law. It is a matter of degree for 
tolerancing democratic deficits. So, the following issue might be how much in the way of 
“democratic deficits”671 do the Taiwanese people prefer to tolerate? 
The answer might not be much. Like the United States, Taiwanese people would not 
welcome too many norms of civility to intervene in the marketplace of ideas or undermine 
individuals’ autonomy. As the discussion in the above chapter stated, all level courts in Taiwan 
keep enhancing the freedom of speech right and reject reducing the space for people’s 
comments. That is to say, freedom of speech is superior to the value of human dignity in Taiwan.  
4. Taiwanese Society Always Has Dissenting Opinions 
Another strong reason for Taiwan to keep protecting freedom of speech is that the society in 
this country had always had strong dissent. Under the martial law period, Taiwanese identity was 
a dissent against suffering historical oppression. After democratization, Chinese identity has 
become an unpopular dissent, while Taiwanese identity is political correctness in Taiwan now.672 
Previous political incorrectness has become political correctness today. The Taiwanese identity’s 
elevation was not based on hate speech law, but the freedom of speech. Like C. Edwin Baker’s 
claim, free speech protections have likely played a significant role in political progress.673 
 
670 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1644. 
671 Post, Hate Speech, supra note 34, at 137. 
672 Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, How People in Taiwan View Mainland China and the U.S., PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Jun 1, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/05/12/in-taiwan-views-of-mainland-china-mostly-
negative/?fbclid=IwAR13p9MpuhpHtLLIY441DPiayA6424ldbgwS_WbcgSlSiSi_muNZ9PAhTGg.  
673 Baker said: “In this regard, I might note that the single most defining element of the American experience, 
continually reflected in countless aspects of American law, especially in our policy failures, is the legacy of African-
American slavery and the American civil war. Europe hardly has a monopoly on hate, on hate speech, or on racism. 
But to the extent that America has made any progress on this front, free speech protections have likely played a large 
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Besides, hate speech law is risky when it oppresses the extreme members of the oppressed 
groups because objection might present as hate speech.674 For example, in Taiwan, some ideas of 
ethnic history might involve criticizing the mainlanders’ roles in the Feb. 28 incident, but this 
might be recognized as inciting hatred between different ethnicities.675  
Also, for Taiwan the questions arise regarding which group is a discrete and insular minority. 
Furthermore, which group has been historically oppressed? These might not be as clear as in the 
United States and European countries. All ethnic groups in Taiwan will claim that they are 
minorities, or that they suffered either historically or are currently oppressed, if Taiwan has a 
hate speech law. For example, mainlanders may insist they are a minority group in the 
population.676 The Hoklo Taiwanese emphasize that they have previously been historically 
oppressed by mainlanders under the martial law period.677 They would like to be the victims and 
enjoy the privilege of untouchability and avoiding criticism if there were to be a hate speech laws 
in Taiwan.  
5. Reject Both Content Neutrality for Freedom of Speech and Content Neutrality for 
Hate Speech 
Besides, the idea of content neutrality should be modified in relation to freedom of speech 
issues. A government with a strong constitutional norm of content neutrality would not fix the 
harm caused by hate speech and would not promote the public good.678 For example, in the case 
R.A.V. vs. St. Paul, the Supreme Court of the United States failed to deal with the cross burning 
problem due to rejecting content-based restrictions on speech. Luckily, although the Taiwanese 
 
role.” Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 156-157. 
674 Id. at 154. 
675 Liang, Kuo Kuan-Ying and of the Ethnic Equality Act, supra note 646, 255-263. 
676 Mainlanders make up only 14% of the population. See Chepkemoi, Ethnic Groups of Taiwan, supra note 552. 
677 See Chapter Five, section III, part 3. 
678 See Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” supra note 371. 
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Constitutional Court has imposed a lot of legal doctrine from First Amendment theory in the 
United States, the Court has not followed the decision of R.A.V. to insist on the idea of content 
neutrality on hate speech issues.679 There, the Taiwanese legal system could choose not to input 
the R.A.V. case. Limiting hate speech is sometimes necessary to balance freedom of expression 
and human dignity, and to provide assurance to people in Taiwan.  
On the other hand, I reject content neutrality in relation to hate speech itself as well. A part of 
hate speech may be allowed because its harm is not serious. Some oppressed groups have 
sufficient capacity to confront oral offenses. The only thing they need is a hate crime law as 
protection to defend them from violence, threats, or other crimes of prejudice. However, some 
oppressed groups may need a stronger assurance, namely, a hate speech law. For example, Bruce 
Y.H. Liao mentions that ethnic Taiwanese and mainlanders could have the ability to rule against 
each other in public discourse. He says that only Taiwanese Indigenous people and New 
Immigrant populations need protection.680 For me, the key point is whether a group is frequently 
excluded from the marketplace of ideas.  
This concept means that the Taiwanese legal system could use its methodology of rights 
balancing and apply the principle of proportionality to deal with the hate speech issue. Like 
Germany, South Africa, and the European Union Court of Human Rights, the Taiwanese legal 
system could balance freedom of speech and human dignity. It should always consider the means 
of least harm to balance the two sides’ rights. It should focus on both speakers’ autonomy681 and 
victims’ stories.682 A hate speech law only applies to those groups who are discrete, insular, 
 
679 The court only held that See Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 445 (司法院大法官第 445 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 445] (Jan. 23, 1998) (Taiwan) 
680 See Liao, Hate Speech, supra note 645, at 9-10. 
681 Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, supra note 323, at 139. 
682 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 323 (2017). 
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under historical oppression, and frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas. Moreover, if 
anti-discrimination laws or hate crime laws could fix problems, hate speech laws would be 
unnecessary. 
6. Protecting Dignity Should Encourages More Speech, Not Avoid Criticism 
Therefore, in my view, like Jeremy Waldron’s claim, hate speech laws should protect the 
dignity and reputation of a group, but not to impose an aura of untouchability around their 
convictions.683 Dignity is not the same as individual harm. Waldron thought that protecting 
dignity meant supporting vulnerable minorities’ social standing, not their feelings or beliefs.684 
Hate speech law shall not aim to create a criticism-free zone for anyone.685 Everyone, even a 
discrete and insular minority, or a group that has been historically oppressed, needs to face other 
people’s dissent and criticism, although the criticism might be unpopular, strong, and sharp.  
Hate speech law should ensure that everyone in a society can communicate with the other 
groups. No one should be excluded from the marketplace of ideas. No one should be free from 
the criticism either. Only if a speech aims to exclude the other from the marketplace of ideas 
should the hate speech law intervene in public disclosure to limit one side’s freedom of 
expression, in turn, to avoid forcing the other side into silence. The Taiwanese legal system 
should not ban speech or debate only because someone feels offended, but it should avoid the 
harm of hate speech to exclude or silence an individual in order to reject their equal social 
position.686 
 
683 Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 31, at 1613. 
684 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12 at 105-143. 
685 For a criticism please see Arthur Milikh, Hate Speech and the New Tyranny over the Mind, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION 11-15(May 19, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/FP-77.pdf.  
686 WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH, supra note 12, at 105-143. 
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To alleviate hate speech problems in Taiwan, I propose the idea of providing assurance to 
protect oppressed groups. Under the assurance, vulnerable minorities would not be excluded 
from public discussion. The assurance could be either a hate speech law or hate crime law, 
depending on the groups’ needs. A general hate crime law to enhance sentences for prejudice-
motivated crimes could be sufficient assurance for most communities in Taiwan. However, some 
groups may be too weak to use hate crime laws as protection. Therefore, in specific situations 
where an oppressed group is very vulnerable, hate speech laws should be used to prevent the 
group from being excluded from public discourse.687 A government should provide primary 
evidence in order to write the legislation, to show why the group lacks sufficient social power to 
protect itself against others.  
7. The Role of Militant Democracy in Taiwan  
Moreover, should hate speech law in Taiwan protect the institution of democracy? The 
Taiwanese Constitutional Court held that a free and democratic order exists in the Taiwanese 
Constitution and constitutes the boundary of constitutional modification.688 The finding follows 
the same concept as the German militant democracy system. However, Justice Tzong-Li Hsu 
insists that militant democracy only applies in party bans, but not in the freedom of speech.689  
In my view, Taiwan should consider extending militant democracy jurisprudence in relation 
to the right to freedom of speech as a form of self-correction, or at least as a value to justify some 
speech regulation. The theory would follow the European Union Court of Human Rights’ 
 
687 My final proposal may be similar to an opinion from a Taiwanese scholar, Bruce Y.H. Liao. He said that the hate 
speech should only be defined as protecting minority groups as well. However, my reasons are very different from 
his point of view. My theory is based on a necessary assurance. Also, a minority in population is not included in my 
hate speech definition. See Liao, Hate Speech, supra note 645, at 1-11. 
688 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 499 (司法院大法官第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (Mar. 
24, 2000) (Taiwan) 
689 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 644 (司法院大法官第 644 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 644] (Jun. 
20, 2008) (Taiwan). 
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decision that speech inciting violence or triggering warfare is not allowed.690 The reason is that 
Taiwanese democracy faces a threat and a possible military invasion from China, which is not a 
democratic country.691 If China destroys Taiwanese democracy, democratic legitimacy, people’s 
autonomy, public discourse, and the assurance of protection for any vulnerable minority will not 
exist. From this perspective, a hate speech law to protect the institution of democracy is a 
guarantee of permanent assurance as well.  
Another possible reason to apply militant democracy to the hate speech approach in Taiwan 
is the country’s process of transitional justice, which is a state’s approach to correct systematic 
human rights violations in the past.692 Teitel recognizes that transitional justice, which is based 
on militant democracy, should be a justification for hate speech laws.693 The Taiwanese 
government is currently performing and executing transitional justice work in order to deal with 
illegal acts and the resulting harm that occurred during the period of authoritarian rule in 
violation of the liberal democratic constitutional order.694 Nevertheless, the work of transitional 
justice in Taiwan mainly focuses on “uncovering political archival records, removing 
authoritarian symbols,695 redressing judicial wrongs, restoring historical truth, promoting social 
 
690 Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999-IV. Cited from EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRESS RESOURCES, a factsheet on hate speech, supra note 290, at 5; Otegi Mondragon v Spain, App No 2034/07 
(ECtHR, 15 Mar. 2011). Cited from id. at 12-13. 
691 Taiwan faces both a military invasion and a political one. Here, I mean the possible military invasion. Lee, 
Taiwan: Spies, supra note 11. 
692 TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 177-179. 
693 Id. at 107-108. 
694 Article 1 of the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice: “This Act is enacted to promote transitional justice and 
implement a liberal democratic constitutional order. The handling of transitional justice matters, where they pertain 
to illegal acts and the resulting harm that occurred during the period of authoritarian rule in violation of the liberal 
democratic constitutional order, shall be planned and implemented in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 
TS'U CHIN CHUAN HSING CHENG I T'IAO LI [Act on Promoting Transitional Justice] art. 1 (Taiwan). An 
English version of Act on Promoting Transitional Justice is available on the Laws & Regulations Database of the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030296.  
695 See James X. Morris, The Great Debate: Chiang Kai-shek’s Role in 21st Century Taiwan, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct 
29, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/the-great-debate-chiang-kai-sheks-role-in-21st-century-taiwan/. 
166 
 
reconciliation, settling and utilizing ill-gotten party assets.”696 The act does not directly limit the 
freedom of speech. 
I agreed with Teitel’s view, in which transitional justice could be a justification for hate 
speech laws. However, to use hate speech laws to correct the wrongful value in a country means 
imposing current political correctness to restrict some groups’ autonomy and rejects the 
possibility of counterargument at the same time. Indeed, when the injustice has been corrected, 
the limitation should not continue existing. That is why Teitel recognizes that militant democracy 
should be a part of transitional constitutionalism,697 and Peter R. Teachout recognizes that the 
Holocaust denial clause should be not permanent.698 
The drawback of the militant democracy approach to hate speech is also considerable. David 
Richards has said that militant democracy is the return of the repressed.”699 In Taiwan, this 
concern is reasonable. Under the martial law period, the Taiwanese government banned 
advocating communism700 and used the act of sedition to make thought crime illegal.701 The goal 
of militant democracy is to protect the institution of democracy, not execute political correctness 
or change democracy into authoritarianism. Hence, the speech ban based on militant democracy 
should be considered as a last resort thatonly applies when there is no other remedy. The 
Taiwanese government should choose other laws as primary methods to protect the institution of 
democracy, rather than hate speech laws. 
 
696 TS'U CHIN CHUAN HSING CHENG I T'IAO LI [Act on Promoting Transitional Justice] art. 2. 
697 Teitel, Post-Communist Constitutionalism, supra note 491, at 168. 
698 See Teachout, Making “Holocaust Denial” a Crime, supra note 492, at 655. 
699 Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 485, at 808-809. The same opinion, see Milikh, Hate Speech and 
the New Tyranny over the Mind, supra note 685, at 29-31. 
700 Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Jieshi No. 445 (司法院大法官第 445 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 445] (Jan. 
23, 1998) (Taiwan). 
701 RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN, supra note 555, at 70-74. 
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Certainly, I still prefer to use hate crime laws to solve the threat to the institution of 
democracy and leave the space for freedom of expression. Nevertheless, if the speech incites 
immediate violence, I agree to use hate speech laws to avoid the harm from the violence, like the 
German criminal code that punishes calling for violence,702 since violence is a more immediate 
way to silence people than pure offensive speech. The victims would usually be excluded from 
the marketplace of ideas. For me, hate speech inciting immediate violence is more severe than 
other hate speech. The speech is closer to true threats or hate crimes. In Taiwan, using violence 
to silence people’s expressions is a severe problem, especially considering the political risk from 
the Chinese Communist Party.703 For instance, Chinese supporters in Taiwan suppress the 
opinions supporting Hong Kong protests with violence.704 Militant democracy could justify the 
hate crime law and the restriction on speech inciting violence.      
Comparing the two models of hate speech regulation, the new hate speech law in Taiwan 
would embody an eclectic approach. The new system is closer to the approach of the United 
States, which allows hate speech and limits hate crime, but also has the characteristics of the 
approach taken by the other democratic countries.  
III. How to Deal with Current Hate Speech Problems in Taiwan 
1. Hate Speech between the Different Ethnic Groups 
In Taiwan, ethnic conflicts are a legacy of political oppression and colonial history. I propose 
that Taiwan should have a hate crime law to avoid crime with an ethnic bias, but a hate speech 
law only for very vulnerable oppressed groups, who are frequently excluded from the 
marketplace of ideas.  
 
702 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] § 130, para. 2. 
703 Lee, Taiwan: Spies, supra note 11. 
704 Chih-Chung Chen & Jo-yao Chi, Taiwan Will Not Tolerate Violence against Freedom of Speech: Tsai, FOCUS 
TAIWAN - CNA ENGLISH NEWS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201909260014. 
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In Kuo Kuan-Ying’s case, some opinions said that Kuo’s statement was not hate speech 
because ethnic Taiwanese do not constitute a minority of the population in Taiwan.705 The case 
triggered the argument about hate speech in Taiwan. Scholar Bruce Y.H. Liao supports Kuo’s 
position and recognized that Kuo should not be punished because he stated that the hate speech 
should only be defined as protecting minority groups. So, in this view, since Kuo attacked the 
Taiwanese, who are not a minority, his words should not constitute hate speech, but rather 
political speech. Liao also mentioned how Taiwan should not consider the Holocaust denial 
model for criminalized denial of the historical oppression in Taiwan because it is too strict.706 
Another scholar, Ser-Min Shei, stated that Kuo’s statement is hate speech, but the government 
only punished him and has ignored other hate speech in Taiwanese society. In Shei’s opinion, 
this constituted another type of viewpoint discrimination.707 However, the different opinions 
pointed out that Kuo’s case embodies typical hate speech issues and reflects a lack of transitional 
justice in Taiwan.708 
However, if my definition of hate speech covers any group that has experienced historical 
oppression, ethnic Taiwanese people are included because they were oppressed during the 
martial law period. Their language was discriminated against, and they found it harder to reach 
high positions in the government. No matter what “Taiwanese rednecks,” “Japanese pirates,” or 
“ghost island” mean in Kuo’s mind, he has never treated the Taiwanese as equal members in his 
country. He has claimed that he is a high-class mainlander in order to demonstrate that he is 
superior to those belonging to other groups. His most offensive statement has been, “China 
 
705 Liao, Hate Speech, supra note 645, at 1-11. 
706 But what is too strict? He had no further elaboration. See id, at 11. 
707 Ser-Min Shei, Is it freedom to discriminate hate speech? No. 12 REFLEXION J. 247, 247-253 (Jun. 2009). 
708 Hao Yeh, Kuo Kuan-Ying’s incident and the meaning of transitional justice, No. 12 REFLEXION J. 233, 233-241 




should spend many years suppressing people in Taiwan instead of granting any political freedom 
to them once it has taken Taiwan by military force.”709 This statement is one of pure hatred, 
expressing the hope that China could use political oppression to suppress Taiwan and deprive the 
Taiwanese people of their political freedom. In my view, his speech was definitionally hate 
speech. 
Hung Su-Chu’s case is another example of hateful ethnic expression in Taiwan. Her speech 
offended the mainlander community. She said that the mainlanders were refugees from China. 
Her meaning, along with the words “Go back to your own country,” was an expression of hatred. 
However, are mainlanders a historically oppressed group in Taiwan? From one point of view, 
mainlanders comprise 14% of Taiwanese society, and they are a minority of the population. As 
to whether they have suffered historical oppression in Taiwan? however, the research shows that 
the policy of the period may have been in their interests. 
Nevertheless, under the Kuomintang’s authoritarian rule, many mainlanders participated in 
democratic activities and were oppressed by the government. Some of them may have thus been 
oppressed.710 For example, Lei Chen and Cheng Nan-Jung were mainlanders.711 This situation 
relates to the concept of intersectionality as developed in critical race theory. Intersectionality 
means that different oppressions and subordinations may overlap and combine in various 
settings.712 Thus, a mainlander could also have been in an oppressed group while they were 
under political oppression during the martial law period.  
 
709 Shih, Kuo Returning from Toronto to Explain Offending Articles, supra note 527. 
710 Maybe they could be defined as a specific oppressed group, mainlanders under KMT’s oppression in the martial 
law period.  
711 See both Lei Chen’s and Nan-Jung Cheng’s cases. 
712 Intersectionality means that different oppressions and subordinations may overlap and combine in various 
settings. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 51-52. 
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However, there may be no need, in either Kuo’s or Hung’s case, to apply hate speech laws. 
Both of their speeches received extensive criticism in the Taiwanese public opinion. Their free 
expression did not exclude vulnerable groups; on the contrary, the speakers themselves were 
almost rejected from Taiwanese society. The two biggest political parties, the Kuomintang and 
DPP, all recognized that such speech was troublesome and would have a negative influence on 
their political interests. Kuo and Hung were troublemakers, and few people wanted to support 
them. Kuo and Hung cannot enact serious harm on their victims. They cannot exclude vulnerable 
groups. 
Thus, in my view, expressions of hatred between ethnic Taiwanese people and mainlanders 
would not need the protection of hate speech regulations. Such groups may need the assurance of 
a hate crime law to avoid insults against individuals or violence against them, but both 
Taiwanese people and mainlanders have enough of an ability to fight back against hate speech 
purveyors. By contrast, speech offending Taiwanese Indigenous people should be considered as 
hate speech, and protection by hate speech law should be considered. For example, the term 
“hoana” means that the user does not recognize Taiwanese Indigenous peoples’ social standing, 
and since they only comprise 2% of the population, they lack sufficient social and economic 
power to act against the offense. They are frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas. 
2. Speech Discriminating Against Sexual Minority or Sexual Orientation Minority 
Groups 
In addition, hate speech that attacks LGBTQ groups could be criminalized by hate speech 
legislation in order to prevent increased prejudice against them. However, a question arises: does 
hate speech include communications that provide untrue research or information? The issue may 
be answered by the above discussion defining hate speech. Dissenting arguments relating to a 
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group that are made in good faith should be allowed. However, if the communication is aimed at 
excluding a group or reducing its social standing, it is hate speech, no matter its forms of 
expression. Here, a hateful statement such as “Legalization of same-sex marriage is connected 
with HIV”713 should be regarded as group defamation. Governmental assurance is required to 
outlaw such speech by establishing rules of group defamation against LGBTQ minorities.   
3. Speech Approving, Denying, Downplaying, Glorifying, or Justifying the Historical 
Oppression 
Speech approving, denying, downplaying, glorifying, or justifying historical oppression 
injures the wounded in Taiwanese society. Take, for example, a statement denying or justifying 
the massacre in the February 28 incident. Such a statement undermines the victims and their 
families’ human dignity and may also exacerbate conflict in Taiwan. Under the martial law 
period, the February 28 incident was considered taboo in public discussion. Not only were the 
victims and their families’ voices silenced, but all of Taiwanese society was forced to remain 
silent.714 If the historical injustice has not been corrected, the victims and their families may be 
excluded from the marketplace of ideas again in the future. As a part of Transitional Justice in 
Taiwan, I propose that there should be stronger assurances to protect the victims of these kinds 
of expression. A hate speech law could apply in such a situation. 
However, a problem comes into question: can a description of a historical event be 
challenged by any evidence or research without the speaker being prosecuted for hate speech?715 
The answer should be yes. For instance, the February 28 incident is not the same as the 
Holocaust, for which clearly established historical events were identified by the Nuremberg 
 
713 See Chapter Five, Section II, part 5. 
714 Wang, For Decades, No One Spoke of Taiwan’s Hidden Massacre, supra note 566. 
715 See the issue, “Clearly Established Historical Events,” in Chapter Three, Section V, Part 2. 
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Trials’ investigations. Although many Taiwanese scholars have conducted thorough research on 
the February 28 incident, there are still many unclear details.716 Therefore, it is necessary to 
permit contradictory views to be expressed about the incident in order to establish the historical 
facts. Here, Taiwanese society should allow different arguments about the incident to be 
expressed. 
Even the rule concerning the existence of clearly established historical events such as the 
Holocaust is debatable. The law excludes all counterarguments about the history of the 
Holocaust. It means that the courts must adjudicate on the works of historians, despite the fact 
that even Holocaust deniers like David Irving might still provide useful material for research on 
the Holocaust. For example, Irving’s value for historians is that he has been able to unearth 
documents that had been lost, or at least he has offered different perspectives for socially 
responding to it.717 This is why Teachout argued that Germany should consider abolishing the 
Holocaust denial law.718 
What, then, should Taiwan’s line be for discussing the February 28 incident? In Hau Pei-
Tsun’s case, he is a politician and a public figure. His speech undermined the victims of 
February 28 and the victims’ families’ human dignity because he downplayed the victims’ 
 
716 For example, how many people died in the incident, including the shooting on February 28, 1947, and the 
massacre in the following months. See Chapter Five, Section II, Part 3. 
717 See C. Edwin Baker’s argument in Chapter Four, Section II, Part 3. 
718 Teachout claims: “That most of the assertions listed above are at odds with known historical fact would meet 
little disagreement among respected historians. Nor does one have to be an expert in the field to appreciate that most 
of these claims, except perhaps for the last, lack credibility. That does not necessarily mean, however, that such 
claims or assertions should be censored by the state or subject to criminal punishment. If one important role of 
historical criticism is to challenge conventional views of the past--to “stir up” acquiescent understandings--then why 
should the generally accepted account of the Holocaust not also be subject to provocative question and challenge? 
Why, in other words, should Holocaust-denial historiography not be treated as a legitimate form of historical 
revisionism?... This very last charge, it could be argued, might also be made against not a few mainstream historians 
and legal scholars about whom it might be said with some validity that “[t]heir commitment is to an ideology and 
their ‘findings' are shaped to support it.” But should that be grounds for state censorship? It may be true that the 
history generated when a historian allows his ideology to “shape” his argument is often not very good history, but 
that fact alone should not be enough to warrant throwing the historian in jail.” Teachout, Making “Holocaust 
Denial” a Crime, supra note 492, at 663- 665. 
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deaths. His speech is the same as a part of Holocaust denial: downplaying damages and death.719 
He offered his evidence, which was the number of those claiming damages and cases requesting 
state compensation. I agree that there should be some space for discussion of the damages and 
deaths arising from the February 28 incident. Therefore, I propose applying Richard J. Evans’s 
theory to judge his statement. 
On the debate of justifying Holocaust denial law, Evans focuses on the method of scientific 
investigation. He claims that Holocaust deniers are punishable because their methods are 
inherently invalid and unreliable.720 Those deniers ignore the basic precepts of scientific 
historical investigation.721 In my view, February 28 incident deniers’ speech may be punishable 
if their methods of scientific investigation are inherently invalid and unreliable. 
Another case was that of the Kaohsiung Butcher, Meng-Chi Peng, who was accused of being 
responsible for many deaths in the February 28 incident. His son tried to justify his father’s 
actions and claimed that the victims were thugs. The son might provide evidence to show that 
some of the victims were possibly violent protestors, but many of the victims were not thugs, 
according to the other research.722 The statement might nonetheless be recognized as group 
defamation because its methods of scientific investigation are inherently invalid and unreliable. 
The statement was thus hate speech and should receive punishment under the hate speech law.   
 
719 HOLOCAUST DENIAL ON TRIAL, Kristallnacht: Damages and Death (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.hdot.org/debunking-denial/kn6-damages-death/. 
720
 RICHARD J. EVANS, TELLING LIES ABOUT HITLER: THE HOLOCAUST, HISTORY AND THE DAVID IRVING TRIAL 
18-19 (2002). Cited from Teachout, Making “Holocaust Denial” a Crime, supra note 492, at 664. 
721 Evans mentions: “Those deniers’ massage and mangle the evidence to suit their ideological agenda, disregard 
conflicting evidence, and in some instances rely on fabricated or deliberately falsified evidence.” Id. 
722 A news mentioned: “The murder of unarmed civilians, including children”. See TAIPEI TIMES, Editorial: Meet the 
David Irvings of Taiwan (Mar. 3, 2007), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/03/03/2003350823. Pen’s mass killing was also 
described in a lot of Taiwanese historic documents.   
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4. Speech Promoting a War or Speech Threatening Freedom and Democratic Order 
I agree that it is the correct approach to use the Clear and Present Danger Test in freedom of 
speech in Taiwan because of its culture of freedom of speech supremacy. However, in some 
extreme periods, militant democracy could still have a place in supporting possible speech 
regulations. In this particular situation, the government would still need to provide evidence of 
compelling government interests to limit speech. 
Moreover, I argue that strong limitations on speech may not pass the principle of 
proportionality test. The Taiwanese government should always seek an alternative approach in 
order to avoid restrictions on freedom of speech. For example, the Taiwanese legislature 
imported the Foreign Agents Registration Act from the US to counter the information war waged 
by China. This approach is one way to avoid directly limiting speech.723  
In Yi Li’s case, his statement promoting war involved invading Taiwan. His comment shows 
a strongly negative attitude toward Taiwan’s free and democratic order, considering that China 
has minimal political freedom. Militant democracy could find a place to deal with this issue. 
However, the approach still needs to consider balancing such hatred with the right to free speech.  
In this case, the Taiwanese government had a clever way of dealing with the issue: Yi Li is 
not a citizen of Taiwan, and so the Taiwanese government did not allow him to enter. However, 
how does one draw the line for Taiwanese citizens who urge war to threaten the free and 
democratic order, especially in relation to the issue of China and Taiwan? In other words, should 
promoting unification with China be a crime in Taiwan? The experience of the European Court 
of Human Rights could offer Taiwan some assistance on the basis of militant democracy 
 




jurisprudence. The European Court of Human Rights recognized that the key to tolerating speech 
depends on whether the speech incites violence and breaks the public peace. 
Therefore, a speech promoting peaceful unification would be and should be protected speech, 
Therefore, I propose leaving some space for such speech. At least, limiting such speech should 
be a last resort. However, speech to promote war or violence may present a hard case. The 
statement shows intolerance toward Taiwanese democracy.724 The speech may silence its victims 
and exclude the victims from the marketplace of ideas. Following the approaches of both South 
Africa and the European Court of Human Rights, the speech to promote war or violence could be 
recognized as hate speech and punishable. For me, I agree that the Taiwanese legislature should 
enact a law to punish speech for inciting immediate violence.  
IV. Conclusion  
Based on the above discussion, Taiwanese society highly respects freedom of speech for 
specific cultural and historical reasons. Under these circumstances, a strict speech ban is not 
suitable for Taiwan. The legal reform to impose the approach of mainly punishing hate crime is 
actually more possible to do in Taiwan under its current governmental system. This is why I 
argue that a general Ethnic Equality Act to deal with ethnic hate speech is a bad idea.725 
However, a hate speech law to protect a discrete, insular, or historically oppressed group could 
be incremental if necessary.  
Therefore, I would like to provide a suggestion as follows: first, the Legislative Yuan, which 
is the Taiwanese Parliament, should add an amendment to Article 57 of the Criminal Code726 to 
 
724 Nevertheless, the important thing is that Taiwan still has a military force to fight against China. To promote a war 
may not be immediately dangerous to Taiwan. 
725 See Chapter 5, Section V, Part 2 (B). 
726 Article 59 of Criminal Code of the Republic of China: “Sentencing shall base on the liability of the offender and 
take into account all the circumstances, and special attention shall be given to the following items: (1) The motive 
and purpose of the offense.” HSING FA [Criminal Code] art. 59 (Taiwan). 
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rule as to what Bias-Motivated Crime is, including “a criminal offense committed against a 
person or property which is motivated by the offender’s bias against a race, religion 
ethnic/national origin, sexual orientation, or disability.”727 Second, in some specific laws for 
vulnerable, discrete and insular minorities, such as the Indigenous Peoples’ Basic Law, the 
Taiwanese legislature should design hate speech regulation to protect the group’s social standing. 
Third, for the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, the Taiwanese legislature should design 
hate speech regulation to avoid approving, denying, downplaying, glorifying, or justifying 
historical oppression. Fourth, the Taiwanese legislature should consider limiting speech to 
promote war or violence. 
 
727 FBI, Hate Crimes, supra note 117.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
Taiwan is considered one of the world’s free countries. However, the current Taiwanese legal 
system has no law specifically for hate speech. The motivation of this dissertation is to consider 
how the new approach could resolve or alleviate the hate speech problems in Taiwan.728 The 
main goal of this dissertation is to design a new hate speech system for Taiwan, based on 
reviewing and discussing the historical debate about the levels of limitation in hate speech. 
Therefore, I did not address the interaction among the internet, social media and the hate speech 
regulation. In the future, I will extend this research to the issues triggered by the said interaction, 
such as: “troll armies,” which silence speakers by using hate speech, and “the cancel culture 
movement,” which has been applied as an informal corrective of hate speech.729   
In my view, hate speech targets a discrete and insular group, or the group has been 
historically oppressed. The speech could be diverse but must be persecutorial, hateful, and 
degrading to the protected groups, including hateful communication, misleading research, or any 
other forms of expression that are persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. The speech should harm 
the objective social standing of a community, not only be considered a subjective offense.730 
The US Supreme Court has designed an essential structure for hate speech regulation since 
hate speech was allowed in the R.A.V. case. Even though hate speech might be harmful, the 
Court deems that it could not regulate it without prohibiting all negative speech. In contrast, 
Germany prioritizes human dignity, leading to more restrictions on hate speech. German Basic 
Law is designed as a human dignity-based legal system with the jurisprudence of a militant 
democracy. Criminal law, administrative law and civil law in Germany have regulations to limit 
 
728 See Chapter One.  
729 Thanks for Professor Jeannine Bell’s and Professor Anthony Fargo’s comments in my final defense.  
730 See Chapter Two. 
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hate speech. Also, the Constitution of South Africa is created to correct the wrongful 
discrimination based on race and the apartheid system of the past. Its jurisprudence places an 
emphasis on the guarantee of human rights, equality, and dignity. Freedom of speech is not the 
superior right in the Constitution. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has collected 
hate speech incidents from different European countries and developed unification rules and 
basic standards for hate speech regulation.731  
Some influential scholars in the United States have provided very significant theories to 
support freedom of speech supremacy to justify the United States’ methods, including 
democratic legitimacy, citizens’ autonomy and to protect the integrity of public discourse. On the 
contrary, Scholars of Critical Race Theory (CRT) argue that American society is still rife with 
racism and white supremacy. They recognize that hate speech is part of the oppression of 
minorities. Further, Jeremy Waldron proposes that a state ban on hate speech is an assurance to 
protect vulnerable minorities’ dignity. In Germany and South Africa, human dignity constitutes 
an important right for supporting hate speech regulation. In addition, the most European 
countries apply militant democracy theory to limit hate speech.732 
Frederick Schauer uses American exceptionalism to explain the difference between the 
United States and the other countries. A variety of reasons could explain substantive 
exceptionalism in hate speech doctrines, such as history, the text in the Constitution, culture, and 
legal isolationism. Also, about methodological exceptionalism, the American approach could be 
categorized as rule-based rather than as a balancing approach but, in other countries, the 
balancing approach of the proportionality principle is mainstream.733 
 
731 See Chapter Three. 




The Taiwanese legal system does not have any regulations specific for regulating hate 
speech. All levels of courts in Taiwan usually provide ample space for people to comment on 
public affairs or issues, including using hate speech. Some problems with hate speech still exist 
in Taiwan: speech that demonstrates the tension and conflict between ethnic groups or national 
identities, speech that spread hatred toward discrete and insular minorities, speech that denies or 
downplays the past human rights violation, speech that challenges Taiwanese democracy, 
promotes dictatorship to threat the free democratic order. The current mechanism in Taiwan fails 
to resolve the problems of hate speech, and victims of hate speech in Taiwan have no recourse.734  
Under the perspective of Substantive Exceptionalism, Taiwan’s approach to freedom of 
speech is already similar to that of the US in some respects, for shared reasons based on 
American and Taiwanese history. Also, another similarity between Taiwan and the United States 
is the culture of distrusting the government. Moreover, the cultures in both the United States and 
Taiwan are highly individualistic, in contrast to the collectivism of European countries. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan exemplifies substantive but not methodological exceptionalism, and it still 
can adopt a balancing approach to seek harmony between two sides in a conflict of rights 
dispute.735 
Democratic legitimacy, people’s autonomy, and open public discourse are all extraordinary 
in Taiwan. Taiwanese people do not prefer to tolerate too much in the way of democratic 
deficits. Also, the society in Taiwan had always had strong dissent. Therefore, I recognize that if 
some oppressed groups have sufficient capacity to confront oral offenses, the only thing they 
need is a hate crime law as protection to defend them from violence, threats, or other crimes of 
prejudice. However, some oppressed groups may need a stronger assurance, namely, a hate 
 
734 See Chapter Five. 
735 See Chapter Six. 
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speech law, depending on whether a group is frequently excluded from the marketplace of ideas. 
Besides, I still prefer to use hate crime laws to solve the threat to the institution of democracy 
and leave the space for freedom of expression. Nevertheless, if the speech incites immediate 
violence, I agree to use hate speech laws to avoid the harm from the violence.736 
In sum, my proposal includes a general hate crime law to fix or alleviate most hate speech 
issues in Taiwan. I also propose hate speech laws for protecting some specific groups, which are 
discrete, insular, under historical oppression, and frequently excluded from the marketplace of 
ideas. This particular protection must end, so those groups are no longer to be eliminated from 
public discussion. Moreover, I argue for using the limitation of speech for speech immediately 
inciting violence.737 
Therefore, I would like to provide a suggestion to the Taiwanese Parliament. First, to add an 
amendment to the Criminal Code to rule as to what Bias-Motivated Crime is. For example, a 
criminal offense committed against a person or property which is motivated by the offender’s 
bias against a race, religion ethnic/national origin, sexual orientation, or disability. Second, in 
some specific laws for discrete and insular minorities, which is usually excluded from the 
marketplace of ideas, the Taiwanese legislature should design hate speech regulation to protect 
the group’s social standing. For instance, the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law should protect the 
indigenous people’s social standing. Third, for the Act on Promoting Transitional Justice, the 
Taiwanese legislature should design hate speech regulation to avoid approving, denying, 
downplaying, glorifying, or justifying historical oppression, Fourth, the Taiwanese legislature 
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